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Abstract 
 This dissertation examines the history of Canada’s early bilateral foreign assistance 
program to India between 1950 and 1960.  With Canada’s decision to join the Colombo Plan for 
Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia in 1950, India became the 
largest beneficiary of Canadian aid for the next decade.  This dissertation argues that the 
ideology of high modernism permeated conventional thinking among elites in the Canadian and 
Indian governments, convincing officials in both countries of the rightness of modernization and 
industrialization.  Canada’s support for the Commonwealth and particularly the United 
Kingdom, and the context of a new Cold War, provided its initial motivations to join the Plan.  
Although the first year of the program challenged officials, Canada settled into an aid 
relationship with India that tried to find, in the words of Colombo Plan administrator R.G. Nik 
Cavell, a “distinctively Canadian” approach that matched Canadian goods and expertise with the 
developmental needs of India.  This approach contrasted with that of Escott Reid, high 
commissioner in India between 1952 and 1957, who advocated a developmental framework 
which focused on India’s economic needs over Canadian domestic priorities.  Although Reid 
never made the impact on the aid program that he desired during his time in the country, he 
succeeded in emphasizing its importance to officials in Ottawa.  Significant changes followed the 
election of the Progressive Conservative government in 1957, including a greater commitment to 
multilateralism as exemplified by the decision to join the World Bank’s Aid-India Consortium, 
and the reorganization of various disparate aid programs into the External Aid Office under the 
direct control of the Department of External Affairs.  Diefenbaker did not succeed in his larger 
attempt to make the Colombo Plan a wheat surplus disposal program, and Cavell’s vision for the 
“distinctively Canadian” program began to fade by the end of the decade.  
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Introduction: Yaks, Modernity, and Development 
In 1954, Louis St-Laurent, the prime minister of Canada, travelled to India.  Prior to his 
departure, Jean Lesage, minister for the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 
asked St-Laurent whether or not he might raise a rather novel idea with the Indian prime 
minister, suggesting that a group of yaks be brought from India to Canada under the Colombo 
Plan.  The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, 
a Commonwealth economic assistance program, had been operating for three years by 1954, and 
it was still in its formative and experimental years.
1
  Perhaps this is why no one immediately 
dismissed the proposal to bring yaks to northern Quebec.  This had been the case with a similarly 
strange suggestion by the Indian acting high commissioner to send monkeys to Canada for 
research purposes in 1951.
2
  For a few months, officials seriously discussed the suggestion, made 
“with a view to improving and diversifying the economy of Canadian Eskimos.”  The Hindustan 
Times even picked up the story.
3
   
Nobody explicitly defined what help yaks could bring to the Inuit of northern Quebec, 
although there was a vague idea that they could be used for food, clothing, and transportation as 
                                                          
1
 The author will use the terms “aid” or “foreign aid,” “economic assistance,” and “foreign assistance,” or “official 
development assistance “ODA” interchangeably. ODA has been defined by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in this way: “those flows to countries on 
Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipient (developing countries) and to multilateral institutions for flows to Part I aid 
recipients which are (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executing 
agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant 
element of at least 25% (calculated at a discount rate of 10%).” OECD, “Official development assistance – 
definition and coverage,” http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm, 
accessed 15 April 2014.  This term did not come into official use until 1969, which postdates the era of this 
dissertation.  Nonetheless, it is a useful definition which does accurately describes Canadian Colombo Plan aid 
throughout the 1950s.  
2
 LAC, RG 25, Volume 6618, File 11038-B-40, pt. 1.1, A.J. Pick, “Memorandum for Mr. Plumptre – Wheat for 
India,” 25 January 1951, 1-2. 
3
 LAC, RG 25, Volume 8407, File 11038-4-2-40, pt. 1, Clipping - “Tibetan Yaks for Canada,” The Hindustan 
Times, 27 July 1954, 1. 
2 
 
in Tibet.
4
  The main appeal of the idea in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and in 
Indian ministry of finance was that it would be, as the Hindustan Times article framed it, “a 
pleasant reversal of the Colombo Plan.”5  The Colombo Plan had been envisioned as a 
partnership between nations of the Commonwealth, but in the case of Canada and India, it was 
primarily a one-way relationship: Canada gave, and India accepted. What benefits accrued to 
which country is a considerably more complex story.  While the yaks would be only a token gift, 
they would also be symbol of reciprocity and partnership.  However, despite initial optimism 
about the idea, the DEA questioned its suitability as a Colombo Plan project, as it did not aid the 
South and Southeast Asian region.
6
  The deputy minister of Northern Affairs and Resources 
admitted that there were “a number of technical problems in connection with the establishment 
of yak herds,” and promised to bring the matter back to the DEA when further talks had been 
conducted with the Animal Husbandry Commissioner of India and the Canadian Department of 
Agriculture.
7
  Had the Himalayan yaks been aware of the scheme, they would have been quite 
relieved to know that they had avoided a long voyage to Canada, as the idea did not again 
reappear in the Colombo Plan files. 
In an odd way, the yak plan is a good snapshot of the Canadian aid relationship with 
India during the 1950s, although the short-lived idea came from outside of the three relevant 
Colombo Plan departments, the DEA, the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC) and the 
Department of Finance (DF).
8
  Officials had no clear idea about what the yaks could contribute, 
how their presence could impact the targeted population – in this case, the Inuit of Northern 
                                                          
4
 LAC, RG 25, Volume 8407, File 11038-4-2-40, pt. 1, Keith Goldschlag to Prem Narain, 23 April 1954, 1. 
5
 LAC, RG 25, Office of the High Commissioner to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 April 
1954, Volume 8407,  File 11038-4-2-40, 1-2; Ibid, Clipping - “Tibetan Yaks for Canada,” The Hindustan Times, 27 
July 1954, 1. 
6
 Ibid, 14-15. 
7
 Ibid, 12. 
8
 Any reference to the “interested” or “relevant” departments should be understood as referring to the DEA, the 
DTC, and the DF. 
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Quebec – or what constituted beneficial economic development for those peoples.  The officials 
focused on diplomatic concerns, and questions of the technical suitability of the Colombo Plan as 
a vehicle for the yak gift.  More basic questions such as “why?” received a cursory examination.  
Those involved made widely-shared assumptions about the benefits of the scheme, bizarre as it 
may seem to a modern reader, and these assumptions appeared obvious in this particular 
historical context.  If this strange idea did not provoke a deeper inquiry into the purposes of aid 
for economic development, then it may come as no surprise to learn that officials thought very 
little about the objectives of more ordinary schemes, such as aid to improve transportation, food 
supplies, or the provision of equipment for power generation.   
This dissertation will examine the history of Canadian bilateral aid to India between 1950 
and 1960.  It will look at what development projects and types of aid Canada gave to India in 
those years.  While it is far beyond the scope of this project to analyze every project in detail, it 
will give the reader insight into how Canadian and Indian officials devised and agreed upon aid 
projects, what problems they encountered, and each party’s definition of success and failure.   
It will also be a history of their developing relationship and how the two countries 
worked together to achieve broadly shared goals, although at times disagreements did arise when 
donor and recipient objectives did not match.  While the aid relationship did not necessarily 
reflect exactly what was happening in the overall Canada-India diplomatic relationship, it did 
represent the largest continuous point of contact between those two countries; it was a tangible 
effect of their foreign relations.  There were other important opportunities to build the Canadian-
Indian diplomatic relationship in this decade, including, for example, their shared work at the 
UN in bringing an end to conflict in Korea.  They also participated in a much more fractious 
interaction at the International Control Commission, established as a result of the tenuous peace 
4 
 
in Indochina following the end of the First Indochina War in 1954.  Through all of this, the 
Colombo Plan was a constant.
9
  Despite the continuous nature of this contact, the Colombo Plan 
received little thoughtful attention. Indeed, Escott Reid, the Canadian high commissioner in India 
between 1952 and 1957, was practically alone in considering the overall international 
implications of the aid relationship between the two countries during his time as high 
commissioner.  While India was not diplomatically unimportant to Canada, it ranked far below 
the major preoccupations of the United States, the United Kingdom, or occasionally other states 
in Western Europe. 
Although Ottawa, through the Colombo Plan, gave aid to a number of Commonwealth 
and later non-Commonwealth countries, India has been chosen as the subject of study for this 
dissertation because of its key importance to the development of the Canadian aid program in the 
1950s.  In many ways, the story of the Canada-India aid relationship is the story of the early 
Canadian aid program.  Between 1950 and 1960, India received about one-half of the entire 
Colombo Plan budget.
10
 India also presented Canada with diplomatic challenges given its 
adherence to the non-aligned movement in the Cold War; it “belonged” to neither West nor East.   
Further, India’s immediate post-independence history under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is a fascinating one for historians of development.  Nehru’s self-
conscious attitude toward development, and his ambitious plans to rapidly modernize his country 
through state-controlled industrialization, represents the proto-typical example of the vision of 
                                                          
9
 For a full account of the Canada-India diplomatic relationship throughout these years, see Ryan Touhey, “Dealing 
with the Peacock: India in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1941-1976,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of 
Waterloo, 2006, 93-297. The ICC was comprised of one communist member, Poland, one from the so-called free 
world, Canada, and one neutral country, India. It was to oversee the implementation of the Geneva Accords that had 
ended the Franco-Indochinese war in 1954. Often, India and Canada did not see eye to eye. For an account of this, 
see Douglas Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973, (Toronto: UTP, 1984). 
10
 Department of External Affairs, Government of Canada, Canada and the Colombo Plan, (1962), 31. 
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development held by elites in what was then styled the “Third World.”11  All of these factors 
make it an important object of study for anyone interested in the early history of the Canadian 
aid program.  It must be noted that while India is important to Canada’s aid program, the reverse 
is not true.  Canada and India had a positive, if somewhat superficial, diplomatic relationship 
during the 1950s, of which aid was one important factor, but the amount of aid that Canada gave 
to India was too small to be very relevant to India’s development plans.12 
This dissertation is also a Cold War history, although a paradoxical one.
13
  Much was 
made of the supposed impact of the Colombo Plan in stemming the rising tide of communism in 
South and Southeast Asia, and there can be little doubt that this was an important motivating 
factor behind Canada’s decision to join the Plan and its very existence. Yet it is a mistake to see 
the Colombo Plan only in these terms.  A few in Canada did fervently believe that Canadian aid 
in India was, or had the potential to be, an important factor in leading the government and 
population of that country away from communism.  However, the Government of India (GOI), 
                                                          
11
 The term “Third World” came into usage in the early 1950s, first in French and then in English, but gained 
traction after the Bandung conference in 1955.  Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions 
and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2. 
12
 Ryan Touhey argues that although Canada and India had a “cooperative” relationship during the 1950s, it did not 
have a “special” relationship, as Escott Reid later claimed.  Touhey, Dealing with the Peacock, iii; 199-296. 
13
 For an overview on the growth of the Cold War as a historical sub-field, see Odd Arne Westad, “The Cold War 
and the International History of the Twentieth Century,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-19.  Naturally, 
the field grew extensively following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent availability of archival 
documents in former Soviet republics, and the increasing availability of formerly classified documents in the United 
States.  The growth of university programs such as the Centre for Cold War Studies and International History at UC 
Santa Barbara and the publication Journal of Cold War Studies, first published in 1999, reflect this growing field.  
The publication of the three-volume Cambridge History of the Cold War shows the extensive interest in the history 
of the Cold War, as well as the “international and multidisciplinary approach” that post-1991 historiography has 
taken, which has focused as much on “the role of ideas, ideologies, and culture” as on standard political and 
diplomatic approaches.  Odd Arne Westad, “The Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1, 
6.  The role of the “Third World” as a proxy-site of conflict in the Cold War has been a topic of increasing interest in 
Cold War studies.  See, for example, Michael E. Latham, The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the 
Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham: Rowman and Littlfield, 2006);  Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War; 
Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, eds., The End of the Cold War and the Third World: New Perspectives 
on Regional Conflict, (New York: Routledge, 2011); Ragna Boden, “Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to 
Indonesia,” Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 110-128; as well as a number of the chapters in 
the Cambridge History of the Cold War, including Mark Philip Bradley, “Decolonization, the Global South, and the 
Cold War, 1919-1962,” in Leffler and Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1, 464-485. 
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under Nehru’s leadership, heartily disliked any indication that aid was given for political 
purposes, and Canada carefully avoided giving any appearance that political reasons motivated 
its aid.  Although both knew that this was a diplomatic pleasantry, it had real impact.  The GOI 
did prefer accepting aid from Canada than from more overtly political sources, as in the case of 
the United States, because of this crafted appearance.  However, necessity generally 
overwhelmed preference, and the GOI accepted large amounts of US aid during this time as well, 
either directly through bilateral means or indirectly through multilateral institutions like the 
World Bank.
14
 
Another important factor to consider is the hard numbers.  In 1950, the Colombo Plan 
covered an area which included approximately 531 million people.
15
 Of this, India had a 
population of 350 million.
16
  To this entire area Canada contributed only C$25 million that 
year.
17
  While this figure doubled to C$50 million annually by the end of the decade, the 
                                                          
14
 American bilateral aid to India began with a US$4.5 million sum for the Indo-American Technical Agreement 
signed in December 1950.  Beginning in 1952, the US began to give annual aid allotments to India of approximately 
US$65.5 million per year until 1957.  By 1960, that figure had grown to US$194.6 million annually as a result of the 
Indian financial crisis which will be covered in chapter 7.  Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United States 
and India’s Economic Development, 1947-1963 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 3.  In 
comparison, Canada had allocated C$223.4 million during the decade of the 1950s.   For a summary of the Canadian 
program, see Appendix A in this document, “Projects and Programs of Canadian Bilateral Assistance to India 1950-
1960.” 
15
 This figure is not completely accurate, as it includes the entire population of Indonesia in 1950.  However, in 
1951, only North Borneo was a part of the Plan as an associate member with the United Kingdom.  As a result, this 
figure is too high.  Also, this includes the entire population of Malaysia in 1950, while in the Colombo Plan Sarawak 
and the Federation of Malaya were counted as separate entities.  However, in order to make the comparison between 
1950 and 1960, this discrepancy is unavoidable because the UN data does not disaggregate the various incarnations 
of colonial rule.  This figure does not include the populations of the dominant donor countries as they were not the 
major recipients of aid, as the figure quoted in the original Colombo Plan document (570 million) seems to do 
(although if one were to include the donor countries into this total it would be 607 million – the discrepancy between 
the Colombo Plan document’s figure and this figure is likely due to the inclusion of the entire Indonesian 
population.) United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Volume 1: Comprehensive Tables, 
(2012), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/theme/trends/index.shtml (accessed 2 April 2014), 109-
116. National Archives of India [hereafter NAI], Western India States Agency, D. Files, Progs. Nos. 19-42, 1950, 
Text of the Statement by the Hon’ble Finance Minister on the Colombo Plan Presented to Parliament on 28th 
November, 1950 at 4.00 P.M. and attachment, “The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in 
South and Southeast Asia,” 2.  
16
 Ibid, 14. 
17
 All figures in Canadian dollars unless otherwise indicated.  All figures will be provided in the nominal values. 
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population of the Colombo Plan area also rose to 728.3 million.
18
  India received between 45 and 
60 percent of the annual Colombo Plan aid allotment in the 1950s.  As this dissertation will 
show, the GOI did value this aid for various reasons, one of the most important being the 
country’s ongoing difficulty in matching its heavy industrialization program with its limited 
foreign exchange holdings.  It appreciated any relief that an external source could provide, 
especially when given in a manner perceived to be politically neutral.  It is difficult to believe 
that any well-informed Canadian official who thought seriously upon the issue truly believed that 
this dramatically mismatched ODA could in any significant way address the problems that 
tended to be the subject of domestic speeches about the Plan.  These usually focused on the 
masses of impoverished peoples in Asia and their vulnerability to communism.  Certainly, the 
Colombo Plan made great speech material for Canadian politicians.  However, officials within 
the Canadian and Indian governments had no illusions about what aid could achieve.  That is 
why considerations of communism, usually thought about in terms of comparisons between 
Canadian and Soviet aid, rarely appeared in administrative-level discourse.  The Cold War was at 
once both extremely important and almost irrelevant to the Canada-India aid relationship. 
The Cold War had a paradoxical effect on the nature of the Canadian ODA program.  The 
post-war context, on the other hand, had a much more straightforward impact.  As chapter 1 will 
show, Canada’s previous experience with aid had been tied to war and post-war aid and 
reconstruction, especially through the vehicle of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration.  Canada first gave food aid to the Government of India during the Second World 
War as part of the war effort.  When Canada decided to join the Colombo Plan, this prior 
                                                          
18
 The GNP of Canada in 1951, the first year that Canada contributed the C$25 million figure, was C$21.6 billion at 
market prices.  This puts the C$25 million figure at 0.12 percent of GNP.  By 1960, the GNP had risen to C$38.3 
billion, which edged the Colombo Plan to GNP ratio up to 0.13 percent.  Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics of 
Canada, Section F: Gross national product, the capital stock, and productivity, 29 July 1999, Statistics Canada, 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/pdf/5500096-eng.pdf (accessed April 4, 2014). 
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experience with aid determined how officials at the time thought about the nature of the program.  
The rhetoric may have been grandly political, but at the administrative level it was viewed as a 
temporary and technical initiative geared toward export promotion, and therefore housed within 
the Department of Trade and Commerce.  As chapter 2 will demonstrate, the post-war context 
also influenced Canada’s decision to join the program, since the pressure from the United 
Kingdom, based on their own financial hangovers from the war and India’s unique place within 
these problems, swayed Canadian opinion.  As a result, the program spent nearly ten years using 
outdated and inappropriate machinery.  By the time the External Aid Office took over the aid 
administration and brought it into the Department of External Affairs in 1960, the Colombo Plan 
administration was thought to be a backwater for federal employees, known for incompetence 
and financial mismanagement.  As a result, aid was not fully integrated into Canadian foreign 
policy during the early years of the program.  When political scientist Keith Spicer wrote in his 
seminal book on Canadian aid, which included significant analysis of the Colombo Plan, that the 
“central and decisive fault of Canada’s early programme” was the “refusal of Canadian 
governments until 1960 to adopt an explicit long-term view of aid and its administration,” he 
failed to take this post-war context into consideration.
19
  Initially, since the Plan was on a six-
year timeline, there was no incentive to think long-term.  Soon after the program began, officials 
started to recognize that the Colombo Plan represented something quite different from the aid 
programs of the past.  However, given that aid was not a policy priority for the governments of 
the 1950s, there was not much pressure placed on the program to resolve the administrative 
inconsistencies that held it back. 
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These topics – foreign aid, foreign relations, the Cold War, the administration of the 
program – are all important subjects which will be discussed below.  However, at its heart, this is 
a study not just of what happened externally, but of what was also happening internally.  It will 
interrogate the intellectual context in which aid officials in both Canada and India worked, that 
is, in the context of high modernism.   
High Modernism 
What is high modernism?  Political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott writes that 
it is an ideology.  According to Scott, modernism was the general belief in scientific and 
technical progress that accompanied industrialization in Western Europe and North America 
from 1830 until World War I.  High modernism is an “amped-up” version of that faith that took 
over throughout the middle of the twentieth century:  
It is best conceived as a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-
confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the 
growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), 
and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific 
understanding of natural laws.  It originated, of course, in the West, as a by-product of 
unprecedented progress in science and industry.
20
 
 
Scott emphasizes that high modernism was not a scientific practice, but “as the term 
‘ideology’ implies, a faith,” that borrowed from the legitimacy earned by science and technology 
during that period.
21
  Scott uses the term to understand some of the great failures of 
developmental projects in the twentieth century, including the disastrous villagization movement 
in Tanzania, urban planning projects gone awry as in the case of Brasília, and the obvious 
catastrophes associated with Soviet collectivization.  His major critique of high modernism is of 
its imperialistic or hegemonic nature, and its tendency to devalue and dismiss local knowledge.  
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This imperialism is also, according Scott, high modernism’s fatal flaw, as without a necessary 
local knowledge base, what he terms mētis, major projects failed to achieve their goals, 
oftentimes with tragic results. 
It is the hegemonic, or pervasive, nature of the ideology that Scott identifies which is 
useful for this study, rather than the dramatic consequences on which he tends to focus his work.  
It is also his identification of high modernism as a “faith” that makes it a helpful definition.  
Medieval European philosophers and naturalists could not postulate theories about humans and 
nature outside of a Christian worldview.  Similarly, government officials working in Ottawa and 
New Delhi in the 1950s had been steeped in a high modernist worldview to such an extent that 
alternative concepts of the desired futures of their economies and societies did not, for them, 
exist.  India’s adherence to what is now commonly viewed as an unrealistic strategy for rapid 
mass industrialization through state planning, and Canada’s support of those plans through its 
aid, was an expression of this worldview.  Canadian officials may have questioned how 
effectively the GOI used the aid for this purpose, but the purpose itself, and the belief that aid if 
properly used could help achieve that purpose, was never questioned.   
Thirty years ago, Marxist philosopher Marshall Berman also highlighted this 
pervasiveness as a hallmark of the experience of living in modernity: “[t]o be modern is to be 
part of a universe in which, as Marx said, ‘all that is solid melts into air.’”22  Berman uses Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust as a tool with which to explore not only the modern experience 
but also as an early expression of the relationship between the desire for development and 
modernity itself.  According to Berman, in Goethe’s imagining of the classic tale, the bargain 
Faust strikes with Mephistopheles is not just for the physical trappings of power, but for a radical 
                                                          
22
 Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: Viking Penguin, 
1988), 15. 
11 
 
transformation of “the whole physical and social and moral world he lives in,” a radical 
transformation that is necessary for the modern experience.
23
  In Berman’s assessment, for 
Goethe, self-development and economic development must come together as one “before either 
of these archetypally modern promises can be fulfilled.”24  In following the Faustian tradition, 
the radical transformation that Faust desires comes with a great cost, constructive and destructive 
at the same time.  In applying this model to what he terms the “Third World,” Berman argues 
that the “Faustian split” takes the form of large, modern development projects, which both create 
the potential for new economic growth, but inevitably destroys what was there before.
25
   
Whether or not one finds Berman’s Marxist analysis of Goethe’s work valid, his 
assertions about the “air” of modernity that spread in the twentieth century, and the creative and 
destructive potential of development and modernism, are applicable in the light of the experience 
of post-war international development and aid. An Indian analogy can be found in the Hindu 
conception of the trimūrti located in the scriptural texts of the Purāṇas, where a constant tension 
exists between Brahmā, the creator, and Śiva, the destroyer.26  Policy-makers and administrators, 
working on behalf of economic development in the 1950s did seek a radical transformation in 
India, but their appreciation and pursuit of the creative promise of industrialization led them to 
neglect and ignore its equally destructive potential.  There is no more revealing an example than 
Canada’s participation in funding the Mayurakshi dam project, which displaced thousands of 
indigenous Santhal peoples to make way for a dam to control flooding, create irrigation for 
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modern agriculture, and generate electricity.  The project generated no comment in Ottawa 
regarding this displacement.  Perhaps the ideology of high modernism was not so much an air as 
it was a fog, obscuring the impact of development projects on the lives of those affected, and 
reducing the concept of impact into the plain figures of how much money, how many 
commodities, and how many skills Canada shipped overseas. 
Economist Michael Cowen and historian Robert Shenton’s impressive volume Doctrines 
of Development is a rigorous and wide-ranging interrogation of the intellectual background of the 
idea of development.  They trace back the growth of these doctrines to the formation of the idea 
of trusteeship in nineteenth-century Europe, which they argue formed as reaction to the 
dissatisfaction with the social disorder caused by capitalist industrialization. Cowen and Shenton 
point to important nineteenth-century philosophical influences, such as the Saint-Simonians, 
John Stuart Mill, and John Henry Newman as crucial in forming the intellectual basis for the 
doctrines of development.  In their view, the spread of the trusteeship, primarily through the 
colonial development enterprise, is still an active part of development today, even by those who 
consider to be practicing “alternative” modes of development.27  Post-development theorist 
Gilbert Rist also describes development as a “part of our modern religion,” emphasizing its 
metamorphoses from a western “myth” to a “global faith.”28  Rist traces the origins of the myth 
back ever further to Aristotle and Augustine.
29
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It is all too easy to allow hindsight to guide one’s perception of the past.  Contemporary 
researchers justly focus on two main streams of research in surveys of modern development 
practice: “development economics and socio-political development theories.”30  They point to 
development economists of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s – figures such as Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan, W.W. Rostow and Gunnar Myrdal – who remain important figures in the history of 
modern development practice.
31
 Sociologist Daniel Lerner’s 1958 The Passing of Traditional 
Society: Modernizing the Middle East is sometimes referred to as the “Bible of modernization 
theory” and was highly influential in American development policy-making.32  However, as 
political scientist John Martinussen points out, the connection between growth and development 
“was not generally accepted within mainstream development economics in the 1950s .... They 
rather conceived of economic growth as the supreme goal in itself; it was economic growth that 
the poor countries needed."
33
  Thinking about “development” itself in terms of its human impact, 
much less the sociological implications of modernization as defined by Lerner or Myrdal, was 
years away in 1950 when the Colombo Plan began.
34
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For this dissertation, then, it is important to make the distinction between modernization 
theory, as represented by figures such as Rostow or Lerner, and high modernism as an ideology 
or faith as defined by Scott, Berman, Cowen and Shenton, and Rist.  While modernization, 
usually expressed as industrialization, was an implicit and expressed part of the modernism that 
underlay the practice of aid-giving and receiving in the 1950s, its origins can only partially be 
found in the contemporary development theorists of the day.  Taking the time to carefully 
examine the beginning of the modern practice of development forces one not to move too briskly 
between the realm of ideas and the practice of development and aid as it was.  The years between 
1950 and 1960 were very fertile for the newly emerging field of development theory.  However, 
these ideas took time to permeate into policy-making.  As a result, this dissertation will spend 
some time discussing what aid and development meant in both countries prior to 1950, as well as 
how modernization theory grew up alongside the practice of development.   
However, it is important to note that while this can be read as an exploration of high 
modernism it is in no way a criticism of the historical actors themselves, the officials and 
bureaucrats who set about working on the task of administering aid and creating development 
both in Canada and India.  The very point is that the air of modernity had so permeated the 
accepted norms of social and economic life that the officials acted in predictable accordance with 
the positive values of their time.  Canadian historians have noted the extent to which the culture 
of the Cold War, and its notorious inhospitality toward radical or counter-cultural thinking, 
penetrated the Canadian government during the 1950s.
35
  However, to have thought outside of 
the constructs defined by developmental thinking in 1950s Ottawa would have gone beyond 
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radicalism as it was even perceived in this era, since Marxists and socialists too, thought about 
“development” and “underdevelopment” in the same way that mainstream economists of their 
era did.
36
 
  During the 1950s and 1960s, aid had an air of motherhood around it, and the only 
opponents it tended to find were those that felt the money should be spent domestically rather 
than internationally.  However, in the 1970s, that changed.  Beginning with the publication of 
Teresa Hayter’s 1971 book, Aid as Imperialism, leftist critics argued that aid, through the 
perpetuation of the capitalist system, enacted a new form of neo-colonialism used to control the 
countries of the developing world.
37
  This critique grew alongside a critique of development 
more generally, usually informed by radical, Marxist perspectives.
38
  Focusing on US aid, critics 
exposed what they deemed the cynical uses of aid: to fulfill national security goals; to open 
markets to exports; and, to partake in the extravagant lifestyle that prestigious positions in 
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multilateral agencies sometimes provided.
39
  It can be safely asserted that no Canadian aid 
official led an extravagant lifestyle as a result of their work for the Colombo Plan. That said, 
Canadian policy with respect to ODA was often “cynical”, although it was not thought to be so at 
the time. Ottawa officials had no hesitation in using aid as a tool to promote Canadian exports, to 
realize larger geo-political and diplomatic goals, or to relieve wheat surpluses in Canada, among 
other policy initiatives. These were all considered absolutely legitimate and positive outcomes of 
aid.  Politicians tended to emphasize the suffering masses in their speeches, but they also 
emphasized the large amount of money spent within Canada on the aid program.  They 
considered this to be politically necessary in order to “sell” development to their citizens as well 
as to their opponents who believed that “charity” began at home.   
However, neither Canadian nor Indian officials thought of aid as charity.  This honesty 
about the self-serving goals of the Colombo Plan leads to another theme which will be developed 
in this dissertation.  In the 1950s, the Canada-India aid relationship was much more reciprocal 
and negotiated than the “aid as imperialism” critique allows.  Indian officials had no illusions 
about the purposes of Canadian aid.  Naturally, Canada could never have had the kind of geo-
political influence that made India so skeptical of American, and, to a lesser degree, Soviet aid.  
The GOI did appreciate the politeness with which Canada hid what minor geo-political 
ambitions the aid program intended.  However, Canadian officials wore their economic 
ambitions on their sleeve.  As a result, Indian officials felt their job was to extract what benefit 
they could out of the Canadian program.  They did not unthinkingly accept what was offered by 
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their supposed benefactors.  The GOI negotiated and lobbied for what it needed, understanding 
that Canada benefitted from the program as much, if not more, than India did.  While this tended 
to irritate some Canadians, over the years important officials within the DEA and the DF 
developed a respect for the Indian approach, and advocated for India when they felt that 
Canadian politics negatively affected the aid program, particularly during the Diefenbaker 
administration. 
The influence of western culture was at work in the aid relationship, but it was not as 
simple as those who argue that aid is a form of neo-colonialism have traditionally emphasized.  
This impact was reflected in the acceptance within the Nehru government in India of a 
widespread industrial modernization project.
40
  The independence movement, and Nehru 
himself, had been deeply influenced by reactionary Gandhian approaches that advocated a return 
to traditional, self-sufficient economies.  Nehru turned away from those approaches, and 
although he adopted Gandhi’s concept of self-sufficiency, he thought of it on a national scale 
rather than at the village level.  Influenced by the planning movement in Great Britain in the 
1920s and 1930s, as well as the success of Soviet models due to the rapid industrialization of that 
region, if not by its authoritarian approaches, Nehru and like-minded colleagues within Congress 
advocated a socialist-style economy within a democratic context that prioritized industrial 
growth.  For international economists beginning to work in the burgeoning field of development 
economics, India represented a kind of experimental terrain where ideas and theories could be 
tested.  Nehru gave P.C. Mahalanobis, an Indian statistician, the freedom to develop the core of 
the Second Five Year Plan, an ambitious but problematic program of rapid industrialization to 
span the years between 1956 and 1960.   
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However, to criticize Nehru and the Indian National Congress (INC) for accepting these 
approaches so enthusiastically is once again wrong-headed.  They, too, operated within the “air” 
of high modernism, and while Gandhi’s spiritual entreaties appealed to many, for Nehru and the 
bulk of Indian politicians and businesspeople, this was not a realistic path.  Their reality focused, 
understandably, on who was poor, who was not poor, and how economic growth had been 
achieved in Europe, North America, and in other richer countries.
41
  They chose the obvious, and 
perhaps only, path that seemed to be available to them.  To see them as collaborationists in a 
neo-imperialist scheme is to disregard the historical context in which they lived.   
Not only did Nehru carefully cultivate his vision of a non-aligned state, but to assume 
that the adoption of western models of economic growth is necessarily co-option is misguided.  
As will be explored in chapter one, India’s colonial history played a crucial role in creating what 
“development” meant to Indian elites at independence in 1947.  It was a collaborative process, 
emerging out of the interplay between Indian elites, such as political activists in Congress and 
industrialists, the colonial government, and ideas about the role of the state in government that 
had become popular in Great Britain.  Despite the importance of British imperialism to this 
history, to attempt to separate out what is authentically “Indian” from the colonial is 
counterproductive.  Indian industrialists and Indian political elites took from imperial models of 
government and economics what appealed to their intellects, and what helped them gain wealth, 
power, and status, either personally or for the country at large. 
Within this framework of analysis, it is more accurate to see Nehru’s ambitions as an 
attempt to appropriate Western models for the Indian context in order to achieve absolute 
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political independence.  That Nehru was forced into accepting large amounts of U.S. aid as a 
result of the failure of the Second Five-Year Plan to achieve its goals could be read as an 
expression of neo-colonialism.  Nehru did feel defeated as a result of this capitulation.  However, 
the driving force in all of this was not imperial ambition; it was a faith, driven by the historical 
context of the ascension of high modernist values, that industrialization could achieve a certain 
version of success shared by elites worldwide, India included.  
The Assumptions of Modernity 
How did the assumptions of modernity play out in the aid relationship?  The first, and 
most significant way was in the type of project chosen for funding.  Food aid in the form of 
shipments of Canadian wheat to India comprised the largest single real grant of aid from Canada 
to India.  However, food aid did not qualify as “economic development” as officials understood 
it in the early 1950s, and the legislation that brought the Colombo Plan into being in Canada 
specifically required that moneys voted for the Colombo Plan be for “economic development” 
purposes. Canadian and Indian officials working in the 1950s only considered funding for 
technical and capital assistance, defined rather narrowly, to be true economic development aid.  
Technical assistance had multiple meanings; it could include the transfer of skills through 
training by Canadian “experts,” the employment of Canadian professionals on projects in India, 
or educational training of Indians in Canada.  Capital assistance projects primarily took the form 
of the shipment of Canadian equipment to India, such as trucks or locomotive boilers.  
Sometimes, Canadian aid combined the two, especially during the atomic reactor project and the 
hydro-electric dam projects, which used Canadian professionals and Canadian equipment in the 
construction process.  In order to “turn” Canadian wheat into economic development, they used 
the concept of counterpart funds in which the rupee sales collected by the Indian government 
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would be used for technical or capital assistance projects within India.  This was a highly 
problematic technical exercise, as will be discussed below. Non-food commodities, or the 
provision of industrial metals like aluminum and copper occupied a bit of a grey area, and 
officials justified this non-project aid because it contributed to the smoother functioning of 
industrial factories in India. 
 The vast majority of Canadian-funded technical or capital assistance, either funded 
directly or through counterpart funds, went toward projects that had been defined, initiated, and 
administered by the Indian government.  Indian and Canadian officials looked for a “magic 
formula” which matched Canadian goods and skills to Indian development projects.  Canada 
rarely initiated a project in India, with the one significant exception being the Canada-India 
reactor project which Canada proposed to India in 1955.  As a result, most projects funded by the 
Canadian government in some way contributed toward India’s own concept of development 
through industrialization, a concept shared by those working in the Canadian government.  
Therefore, the vast majority of Canadian aid went toward the building of transportation 
networks, the provision of electricity to non-electrified areas, the modernization of agriculture 
through irrigation and the provision of fertilizers, and the advancement of nuclear science 
through the atomic reactor project.  What this reflected was a shared belief that modernization, 
industrialization, and the advancement of science were the only methods through which the GOI 
could address its poverty. 
Canadian officials also paid little attention to the mechanics through which aid translated 
into poverty reduction, partly because the projects that the Canadian government funded were 
Indian projects. Ottawa did not have a role in the planning and preparation of the projects, and so 
did not feel responsible for the operation of those programs.  While officials did commission 
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Canadian experts to tell them about the technical feasibility and “soundness” of, for example, 
hydro-electric dams, and sometimes made quite subjective judgements about what types of 
projects they felt to be “appropriate,” they gave little consideration to exactly how Canadian aid 
dollars made people less poor.  This is because the relationship between modernization and 
wealth was so self-evident to officials of the time that they did not feel it merited discussion.  In 
North America, for example, irrigation, mechanization, and fertilizers had revolutionized 
farming productivity, and so it was obvious that it would also do so in India, which would 
inevitably lead to better fed, wealthier, and healthier people.  The technical feasibility of a hydro-
electric dam, then, was the only barrier to a whole series of positive changes, making this 
obvious point, (at least to 1950s officials and politicians), the only worthwhile focus of 
examination.  Occasionally Canadian officials also worried about the competence of Indian 
management and skills; however, if a given project led to a successful technical execution of that 
project, they considered it a success.   
As a result, officials did not collect data about the outcomes of their aid-funded projects.  
Once the dam had been built, or the locomotives delivered, they gave no thought to whether or 
not the assumed impacts had been achieved.  Of course, this would have been difficult, since 
they never articulated the assumed impacts in the first place.  While some projects, such as the 
provision of locomotives, did require ongoing communication with the GOI since they 
occasionally needed spare parts, Canadian and Indian officials deemed it to be the GOI’s 
responsibility to monitor whether or not an aid-funded project had achieved its purpose.  Usually 
after the money had been spent, Canadian involvement ended. 
As well, Canadian officials did not consider the make-up of targeted populations.  As a 
result, they did not differentiate between men and women, or mainstream and minority 
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populations.  Officials gave virtually no thought to those who might be affected by aid-funded 
projects.  Once again, this was deemed to be a responsibility of the GOI.  That the impacts might 
be felt disproportionately, or benefits might accrue unequally depending on whom it reached, did 
not occur to Canadian officials.  The thinking of the time viewed all modernization and 
industrialization as progress.  The populations most at risk for communism were those not 
affected by the reach of modernization and therefore poor by the definition imposed by high 
modernist ideology.  If a project did not achieve its goals, or even if that project inflicted harm 
on an impacted population, this did not necessarily mean it was a failure.  For the GOI, “failure” 
was the continuation of the status quo, with large segments of their population living in 
“backward” societies and conditions.  For Canada, “failure” was the loss of India to communism 
given Ottawa’s belief that “backward” and impoverished people were easy prey for communist 
influence.   
This failure to “see” those whom aid was supposed to help supports critiques made in the 
past few decades about the inherently gendered, classist and racialized nature of the ideology of 
modernism and its expression in development.  As feminist philosopher Sandra Harding has 
observed, “institutions of Western modernity and their scientific and political philosophies, 
designed by and for men in elite classes, persistently create meanings and practices of modernity 
which create fearful specters of ‘the feminine’ and the ‘primitive.’”42  The active retreat from 
these “specters” has, in Harding’s view, fed the impulse to spread western forms of 
modernization through development.
43
  Feminist post-colonial scholars have found parallels 
between the theoretical framework first popularized by Edward Said in his discussion of imperial 
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constructions of “the other” as foundational to the western imagination in his famous book 
Orientalism, and the modern practice of development.
44
 As Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues, 
“only from the vantage point of the west is it possible to define the Third World as 
underdeveloped and economically dependent.  Without the over-determined discourse that 
creates the Third World there would be no (singular and privileged) First World.”45  While 
Mohanty chastises western feminists in the 1970s and 1980s for writing about “Third World 
women” as a singular, undifferentiated unit, in the period described in this dissertation high 
modernism so shaped the dominant worldview that women are simply absent in the discourse 
and power structures involved in the Canada-India aid relationship.
46
 
The Literature  
Canadian aid has not received much attention from historians, partly because it is a 
relatively new phenomenon, and partly because it has represented only a small part of the larger 
post-war Canadian foreign policy story.  The latter has been very well documented by many 
outstanding historians, but rarely has the subject of aid provoked much interest among these 
authors.  Where Canadian aid has received attention in the historical literature, it is usually 
mentioned in passing, cited as just one example among many of the outward turn of Canadian 
foreign policy in the post-war years.
47
  This paper will not disrupt this assessment of the 
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importance of Canadian aid to overall foreign policy objectives. Aid simply did not have the 
same pressing importance attached to it as did other foreign policy areas and issues during the 
prickly Cold War years. As a result, it has remained largely unexplored terrain, albeit with some 
important exceptions, which will become clear below. This dissertation intends to help to address 
that lacuna given the increasing interest among historians in the history of aid and development, 
and its specific importance to the Canadian-Indian foreign affairs during this period.
48
  
Some have focused more specifically on the history of Canadian foreign aid, although not 
many.  Nigerian historian Ademola Adeleke’s unpublished University of Toronto dissertation, 
“Ties without Strings? The Colombo Plan and the Geopolitics of International Aid, 1950-1980,” 
and his subsequent articles on the subject are still the most comprehensive study of the Plan itself 
by an historian.
49
  Historian Ryan Touhey focuses on the Plan as an important component of his 
study of the larger history of Canadian-India relations in his unpublished dissertation, “Dealing 
with the Peacock: India in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1841-1976.”50  Bruce Muirhead and Ronald 
Harpelle’s book IDRC: 40 Years of Ideas, Innovation, and Impact tells the important story of one 
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of Canada’s original contributions to the field of development practice through the history of the 
International Development Research Centre.  While it discusses a later period of research, it is to 
date the only published monograph written by professional historians solely dedicated to the 
topic of Canadian international development practice.
51
 
Much more has been written about Canadian aid outside of the field of history.  Political 
scientist David Morrison also wrote an authoritative monograph which details the history of the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the then-newly established agency that 
inherited the Canadian aid program in 1968.  Although the book’s primary focus is on the post-
1968 history of the program, his second chapter, “The Early Years, 1950-1966” does provide a 
brief, although detailed, survey of the first years of the program.
52
  It established an important 
precedent for this dissertation.  In the 1960s, Keith Spicer wrote a dissertation in the Department 
of Political Science at the University of Toronto, and went on to publish one of the most 
important, and certainly the first, monograph on the subject, A Samaritan State? External Aid in 
Canada’s Foreign Policy.53  Douglas LePan, a former Canadian diplomat who worked in the 
Department of External Affairs, published one of the most important primary sources on the 
founding of the Plan in his memoir Bright Glass of Memory: A Set of Four Memoirs in 1979.
54
  
Patricia Jean Appavoo wrote a 1989 PhD dissertation comparing Swedish and Canadian “small 
state” donor policies between 1960 and 1976, and does briefly look at the pre-1960 period as 
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well.
55
  Since the emergence of Canadian international development studies programs in the 
1980s, a number of scholars, primarily representing the field of political science, have written 
about Canadian aid.  These works, however, tend to be focused on current and possible future aid 
policy, rather than examining the history of the aid program.
56
 
While all very useful and important works, this dissertation will depart from their 
example in two significant ways.  Firstly, scholarship on the Canadian aid program, or the 
Colombo Plan more generally, has tended to focus primarily on the motivations behind aid 
expenditure or on the overall foreign policy context and how it fit into our relationship with 
important diplomatic partners.  While those subjects will be examined as well, particularly in the 
second chapter that looks at Canada’s initiation into the Plan, its primary focus will be on 
detailing the decision-making process around aid projects and describing the results of those 
decisions.  It will not be an “on the ground” perspective, as most of the work that Canadian aid 
funded was carried out by the Indian government, as well as by a variety of Indian and Canadian 
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companies and professionals. This project has drawn primarily on governmental documentary 
evidence found in Library and Archives Canada as well as a variety of other archives, including 
the National Archives of India, and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. The vast majority 
of Canadian aid was spent on capital projects and commodities purchases, which fall in the realm 
of government procurement and oversight, and this will be the focus.
57
 
Further, this work will be part of a growing field of literature emerging primarily out of 
the United States, which presents the history of aid in the context of the larger field of 
international development studies (IDS).  IDS has traditionally been the domain of social 
scientists, ranging from highly theoretical discourse analysis to very practical research into best 
practices.  Many development theorists have been keenly interested in the past.  Much of the 
initial work done by the early development economists was aimed at uncovering what made 
development happen in industrialized countries, and in seeking a formula to recreate that same 
process, only much more quickly, in the context of what they viewed as “underdeveloped” or 
“backward” countries.58  Many of those who worked within the Marxist backlash to mainstream 
development theory also focused on examining the past, although they did so in order explain 
how the success of the industrialized world hinged on oppressive political and economic 
systems. 
It is only recently that archival documentation in parts of the Global South and in the 
West have become open and available, allowing for more standard historical approaches to the 
practice of development.  Amy L.S. Staples, David Ekbladh, and Nick Cullather are all historians 
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who have published monographs on US and international foreign aid programs in the past ten 
years.
59
  Staples traces what she calls the birth of development, “when discrete groups of people 
with international stature, expertise, money, power, influence, and the best of intentions began 
working to better the lives of other human beings whom they had never met or known, for no 
reason other than the desire to improve the fate of the human race.”60  She traces the history of 
the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the World Health Organization 
between 1945 and 1965.  Although Staples acknowledges that the records of all of these 
organizations have been mixed, she has an optimistic view of their greatest achievement which 
is, in her assessment, the creation of an “obligation with respect to aiding people living in 
poverty and illness around the world.”61   
Ekbladh takes the history of an “American style of development” back to 1914, 
discovering its origins in the work of both state and non-state actors in the reconstruction of the 
Philippines and in inter-war China, depression-era modernization projects via the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), through to the post-war technical assistance programs of the 1950s and 
large US-funded modernization projects. Ekbladh outlines the trajectory of the rise of 
modernization as a social and political norm in the United States, and that country’s attempts to 
mold the rest of the world in its own image through “development.”62  Nick Cullather’s history 
of the Green Revolution in Asia not only tracks the American-led efforts to end hunger in parts 
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of that continent, but also the necessary shifts in worldview required in the United States to allow 
for such a sustained effort, one “in which hunger and poverty were no longer seen as the 
universal human condition but as a danger to international stability.”63 
All of these books ambitiously track not only the mechanics of the various organizations 
and projects that they survey, but also expose the philosophical underpinnings of an American 
understanding of “development,” which they deem to be essential to understanding why and how 
the United States engaged in the practice in the first place.  Modernization and all that the term 
implies – a faith in the indomitable march of progress, a keen belief in positivism, and the 
ascension of science and technology in American society – plays the dominant role in their 
analyses of how post-war development came to be. Their role is not to place a normative 
judgement on aid or the practice of development, although Staples takes a much less critical view 
of the enterprise than do Ekbladh or Cullather, but to examine why it exists at all. This 
dissertation shares a motivation with the works of these other authors not simply to relate the 
day-to-day history of the subject in question, although that will be covered, but it also seeks to 
illuminate the hidden assumptions upon which the Canadian aid program was based.  That these 
were founded on the same modernization ethic as outlined by these American histories is not 
surprising, given the easy transference and dominance of American culture on the North 
American continent, and a shared European political and social heritage.  
The Outline 
The first chapter will examine the immediate pre-aid years in both Canada and India in 
order to uncover how Canada and India came to their roles as “donor” and “recipient” in 1950, 
and to discover what economic development and aid meant to these countries at that time.  
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Chapter 2 will investigate the origins of the Colombo Plan, and the reasons for Canada’s decision 
to join, emphasizing the UK’s role in influencing Canada’s decision to join the Plan.  Chapter 3 
will examine the first year of the program in detail, and outline some of the challenges that the 
program faced which will be surprisingly familiar to those who study contemporary ODA.  
Chapters 4 and 5 will look at the important role played by High Commissioner Escott Reid, his 
vision for the Canadian aid program, and his failure to convince those in Ottawa of the rightness 
of that vision.  Chapter 6 will detail the histories of two of the most important Canadian aid 
projects of the 1950s, the Canada-India nuclear reactor project and the Mayurakshi dam.  It will 
contrast the Mayurakshi project with the reactor in order to show the uniqueness of the Canada-
India reactor, highlighting that project’s political importance.  Chapter 7 will look at the impact 
the change from a Liberal to Progressive Conservative administration had on the Canadian aid 
program, particularly because of Diefenbaker’s focus on using the Colombo Plan as a way to 
export Prairie wheat to fulfill his political ambitions.  Chapter 8 will examine the formation of 
the External Aid Office, and what role the Diefenbaker administration played in the creation of 
the EAO.   
A Note about Sources 
This is a work of Canadian history, although one also informed by the history of India.  
To that end, this dissertation includes, where possible, primary sources in India from the 
National Archives of India, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Archive, and the Central 
Secretariat Library.  However, as anyone who has worked in those archives and libraries can 
attest, there are a number of challenges associated with research in these institutions that limit the 
ability of the researcher to access relevant files.  For example, although many sources that would 
have been useful had been catalogued in the National Archives of India, very few had been 
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transferred to the Archives itself. While this paper makes use of Indian primary and secondly 
sources as much as possible, much of the Indian “voice” is actually found in the letters and 
documents from Indian officials to Canadian officials housed at Library and Archives Canada. 
By focusing on the donor in the donor-recipient relationship, the charge could be levelled 
that this dissertation is reproducing the very structures of dominance that many have criticized as 
an aspect of mainstream aid practice. However, there are two defenses to this criticism.  The first 
is that without a proper record of, or inhibited access to, Indian primary sources, it would not 
have been intellectually honest to try to put the Canadian and Indian records on equal footing.  
The second is that India did not take a subservient position within the donor-recipient 
relationship, and as it has already been stated, negotiation and reciprocity are themes in this 
work.  It is remarkable how clearly the Government of India’s point of view does come through 
in Canadian documentation, although this only reflected the thinking of a particular Indian elite. 
This, however, would be the case even if there had been better access to Indian documentation. 
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Chapter 1: Development, Modernization, and the Creation of “Donors” and “Recipients” 
When Canadian and Indian officials met at the Colombo foreign ministers’ meeting in 
January of 1950, a conference that would lead to the creation of the Colombo Plan for 
Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, little in the way of an official 
diplomatic history existed between the two nations.  Indeed India, only independent since 15 
August 1947, had little history of independent statehood, at least since Great Britain made it an 
official part of its empire in 1857.  India’s role as the jewel of the British Empire contrasted 
sharply with Canada’s former status as a collection of unprofitable and neglected settler colonies.  
As such, the two countries were linked only peripherally.  Indeed, aside from certain examples of 
Canadian racism against Indian nationals, as seen in certain episodes such as the infamous 
Komagata Maru incident, contact between Canada and India had been practically non-existent.
64
  
Only in August 1932 was there any significant official contact, when the Government of India 
(GOI) signed the Ottawa Agreements after an imperial conference in Canada’s capital city, 
making it part of an official trading area with the benefits of imperial preferences.
65
   
The Second World War brought about some changes to the relationship between Canada 
and colonial India.  In addition to a meagre trade relationship, Canada supplied to India, under its 
Mutual Aid program to the United Kingdom, Montreal-built locomotives, motor transport 
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supplies, and wheat following a severe famine in Bengal in 1943.
66
  Moreover, the importance of 
India’s place in the world, and the ever-greater possibility that it would gain its independence 
following the war, seemed to make India more visible in the minds of officials in the DEA 
throughout the 1940s.  As early as 1941, Ottawa began to contemplate an official diplomatic 
relationship through the exchange of high commissioners but postponed implementation for 
several years, partly as a result of the embarrassing problem of the disenfranchisement of the 
Indian immigrant population in British Columbia.
67
  Eventually, the exchange took place before 
independence in June of 1947.
68
  India’s independence also prompted Canada and the other 
governments of the Commonwealth into a shared bout of soul-searching over what shape the 
organization would take in the new era of post-war international relations.  India’s eventual 
decision to remain in the Commonwealth, and Canada’s role in that discussion, is reviewed in 
the next chapter.   
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made a brief but highly successful visit to Ottawa in 
October of 1949.  The trip received extensive coverage in Canada’s national media, and the high 
commissioner for India in Ottawa, S.K. Kirpalani, celebrated it as “a highlight of Canadian social 
and political life.”69  Yet while the relationship grew steadily throughout the 1940s, admittedly 
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from a very low point, and a new friendliness began to develop between the two former British 
colonies after 1947, it could hardly be said that any real closeness existed between the two 
nations.  In January 1950 Kirpalani reported to his government that “Canadians are ‘beginning’ 
to evince a new interest in and a new warmth of relationship with India;” but he also noted that 
“It is amazing how little knowledge of India there is in this country even amongst the intelligent 
and educated people.” However, there was, he thought, a great desire to learn more.70   
Despite these hopeful trends in the 1940s, there is little in the pre-1950 Canada-India 
relationship to suggest the economic and diplomatic partnership that developed between the two 
nations a few short years later through ODA.  The Commonwealth played a siginificant role in 
bringing these two countries together in an aid relationship, and this will be reviewed in the next 
chapter.  For those interested in the history of the idea of “development,” however, it is useful to 
explore each country’s background more deeply in order to understand why Canada and India 
became aid partners.  Two questions of the countries’ individual histories may be asked: how 
was economic development understood by policy-makers prior to 1950; and what was the 
purpose of foreign aid prior to 1950? This chapter will review, very briefly, how both India and 
Canada separately came to their roles as recipient and donor in the field of international 
development aid in the 1950s.   
The ideal of economic development that Nehru’s government strove to obtain was the 
product of at least fifty years of Indian colonial history.  The Congress Party’s struggle for 
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independence had hinged on the belief that political and economic independence were crucially 
intertwined, and that no forward movement toward economic development could take place 
without political freedom.  How Nehru and his supporters within the party defined “economic 
development” resulted from a complex interplay between nationalists, industrialists, the imperial 
and colonial governments, as well as ideas coming from abroad.  The new government gave 
itself a strong role in managing India’s economy, but despite a belief in “self-help,” the stresses 
imposed by the drive to achieve an industrialized country made it predisposed toward accepting 
aid.   
In contrast, despite the trauma of the Great Depression, by the Second World War 
Canada was becoming a modern, and quickly industrializing, country.  It was able to exploit the 
economic opportunities that the war had provided, situated as it was outside of the combat areas.  
It had also benefitted from a strong natural resource sector, agricultural expansion, and an ever-
larger manufacturing capability.  The hardships that war did produce in Canada paled beside the 
utter cataclysm suffered by the populations and governments living in the war zones.  In 
addition, the government had a strong economic interest in rebuilding European prosperity to 
provide a market for post-war Canadian goods.  Canada came to its role as an international donor 
propelled by these dual forces, and while this role initially focused on Europe, the ethics, ideas 
and practices surrounding war and post-war aid did feed into what became a Canadian 
international development program.   
India Becomes a Recipient  
 The notion that British mercantilist practices in the colonial era had had a negative impact 
on India’s domestic economy, prevented the growth of native industry, and worsened poverty 
proved compelling for India’s political nationalists in the early twentieth century.  Known as the 
36 
 
“drain” theory, it originated in the late nineteenth century when economic nationalists such as 
R.C. Dutt and Dadabhai Naoriji argued that Britain’s economic practices in India made it rich at 
the expense of India’s economic well-being.71  It was a version of history that certainly appealed 
to young nationalist Jawaharlal Nehru, when, during a trip to Europe due to his wife’s illness, he 
wrote to the editor of Journal de Geneve and articulated the theory to a European audience: “To 
understand how this terrible impoverishment has taken place it is necessary to know, apart from 
the admittedly predatory period of British rule, something of the land policy and of the trade and 
economic policy, and of how Indian industries were crushed out of existence for the benefit of 
British manufacturers.”72  In addition to drawing attention to the problems caused by British 
industry, Nehru scolded the British government for the lack of attention paid to “nation-building 
departments such as education, sanitation, medical relief, etc.”73  Indian nationalists would 
continue to exploit this argument throughout the independence movement, with Britain’s role in 
the Indian economy forming a key part of the argument for complete swadeshi, or self-
sufficiency/self-reliance, among nationalists of all stripes.  The concept of swadeshi inspired the 
boycott movements against British manufactured goods that so famously characterized Gandhi’s 
independence struggle. 
In the first part of the twentieth century, Indian nationalists looked forward to the day 
when India would be in complete control of its own destiny.  Although reductive, it would be fair 
to say that two general lines of thought about that future emerged within the Indian National 
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Congress (INC).
74
  One came out of the philosophy of Congress’ spiritual leader, Mohandas 
Gandhi, also known as the Mahatma, a title of respect meaning “great soul.”  It is well known 
that his critiques of British economic policy in India formed a basis for the success of his non-
violent movement.
75
  Two of the Mahatma’s most (in)famous satyagraha movements centred 
around the economic injustices of British control in the form of the boycott of British cloth and 
the Salt March against the taxation of, and the colonial control over, this common ingredient.
76
  
He held a deeply conservative, yet egalitarian viewpoint.   
His focus centred on the village, which he imagined could be economically self-sufficient 
by relying on traditional cottage industries.  Swadeshi was fundamental to Gandhi’s non-violent 
strategy against British control because he believed this concept would allow Indians to extricate 
themselves from the economic and political bondage of British rule.  Gandhi’s message 
influenced modernists like Nehru.  He cast off his Western lounge suit and began to wear khadi, 
or hand-made fabrics, and the “Gandhi cap” as a symbol of his allegiance to Gandhian 
philosophy and opposition to British rule.  The solution, for Nehru as for Gandhi, was complete 
swaraj or self-rule.  In a speech in Zaidpur in 1946, Nehru said: “To win freedom and to abolish 
poverty are the main issues before the country.  Unless Swaraj is achieved, there can be no 
solution of other problems.”77 In this view, it was a necessary precondition to economic success. 
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 However, their viewpoints on how to achieve this drastically differed.  Gandhi valorized 
poverty and viewed village subsistence life as a remedy to an alienating industrialization.
78
 
While Nehru adopted ideas of economic self-sufficiency from Gandhian thought, his perspective 
on the goals of economic progress could not have been more different.  Nehru’s biographer, 
Sarvepalli Gopal, emphasizes that Nehru was not particularly caught up in intellectual or 
political pursuits during his young student days in England, first at Harrow, then at Cambridge.
79
  
However, something about Fabian socialism clearly caught his interest, as he wrote and asked his 
father permission to attend the London School of Economics in 1910.
80
  When Nehru returned to 
India in 1912 he became caught up in nationalist politics and began a long career of occasional 
imprisonment for his nationalist activities.  In the 1920s, he returned to Europe in order to 
address his wife’s ill health, and began to crystallize his thinking about the relationship between 
socialism and anti-imperialism, participating in an International Congress against Colonial 
Oppression and Imperialism in the winter of 1927, and coming into contact with European 
socialists and communists.
81
  Nehru and his father, Motilal, visited Moscow for four days in the 
summer of 1927, and were impressed with what they saw.
82
  Nehru’s return to active politics in 
India in the late 1920s included a commitment to bring socialism to post-independence India: 
“India’s immediate goal can … only be considered in terms of the ending of exploitation of her 
people.  Politically, it must mean independence and the severance of the British connection, 
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which means imperialist dominion; economically and socially it must mean the end of all special 
class privileges and vested interests.”83  He wanted egalitarianism to be achieved through shared 
wealth, not shared poverty. 
 Nor did the Gandhian viewpoint win the day within Congress.  Many supported the idea 
of a modern, industrialized India, if not necessarily a socialist one.  The INC’s 1931 Karachi 
Resolution reflected this concern with India’s industrial future.  The document included such 
phrases as “A living wage for industrial workers,” “Right of labour to form unions,” and, 
“Control by the state of key industries and ownership of mineral resources.”84  In the official 
memory of Congress, the document came to represent a commitment to a policy of 
industrialization for a future independent India and in particular, a state-controlled approach to 
that policy.  On the basis of state planning for a modern economy, Congress, under the 
Presidency of Subhas Chandra Bose, set up a National Planning Committee (NPC) in 1938 with 
Nehru as chair and whose membership included industrialists, professors, scientists, trade 
unionists, and representatives of the Village Industries Association.
85
   
 The dominant thinking that informed economic nationalism in India held that colonialism 
had suffocated indigenous industrialization in India.  Indeed, for decades following India’s 
independence, Indian history was largely viewed through the prism of this nationalist narrative.  
Yet the very ideas that informed this viewpoint partially came as a result of the political 
dominance of Indian industrialists.  In the early 1980s, Cambridge University Press published 
two volumes of The Cambridge Economic History of India which argued for a more nuanced 
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approach to the effects of colonial occupation in India.  The Cambridge History argues that 
empirical evidence simply did not support the view that British colonialism impeded native 
industrial development in India, and that formerly universally accepted notions, such as the 
belief that the exceptional economic impoverishment of India during the inter-war years spurred 
the nationalist cause, were not factual.  These ideas have found support in more recent 
scholarship, led by Tirthankar Roy, who argues that “an exclusive focus on colonialism as the 
driver of India’s economic history misses those continuities that arise from economic structure or 
local conditions.”86   
 The debate generated by this scholarship has dramatically complicated the picture painted 
by early twentieth-century nationalists about why independence and its relationship with 
economic development.  From the perspective of a historian interested in tracing the path of the 
idea of “development” in India, it also offers insights into what that term meant to the GOI at the 
precipice of independence in the middle of the twentieth century.  While Indian nationalists 
argued that British industry seriously impeded the growth of native Indian industry, the 
exhaustive research presented in the Cambridge Economic History of India shows that in fact, 
some key pre-independence industries, such as the famous cotton mills of Bombay or iron and 
steel of the ingenious Tata family, were almost entirely driven by native Indian investors and 
owners.
87
  This, economic historian Morris D. Morris argues, puts paid to the idea that the 
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Lancashire cotton mill industry in England completely dominated and controlled Indian colonial 
policy to snuff out indigenous cotton production.
88
  Morris’ research also troubles the Gandhian 
argument that British imports or industrialization forced the khadi, or handicrafts, production out 
of business, finding that there is no straightforward relationship between the two.  In fact, he 
finds that British imports and industrialization may have even encouraged the growth of khadi 
production in certain sectors.
89
 Finally, he also challenges the assumption that the Great 
Depression had a profound effect on the Indian economy, arguing that when compared to the 
world context, India prospered, and that total manufacturing, both Indian and British-controlled, 
grew at a rate above the world average in the inter-war period.
90
  In all, Morris argues that no 
single explanation can be found for India’s slow rate of industrial growth in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century.  Rather a “web of relationships... dampened the absolute level of 
performance and inhibited the rate of change.”91  While it may have been politically useful for 
Indian nationalists to emphasize Britain’s absolute power, research shows that Indian-owned 
industry, while a comparatively small part of the overall national economy, became an 
increasingly powerful force in the early twentieth century. 
Scholars have also emphasized the complicated relationships generated in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century by a weakening imperial 
power, a stronger indigenous industrial base and business community, and a gradually more 
autonomous and indigenized GOI.  Historians John Gallagher and Anil Seal write that as time 
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went on, while Calcutta and London were a “part of the same imperial system,” more and more 
their priorities differed.
92
  They argue that by the late nineteenth century and certainly following 
the First World War, imperial rule in India was fraught by tensions resulting from the continuing 
objective of maintaining a profitable enterprise for Great Britain while securing British rule in 
India, mostly through an increasingly expensive standing army.  The GOI was powerless to 
improve their own financial position, and initiate “the ideals of progress, more material than 
moral,” as the army spent larger and larger portions of the national budget while the government 
struggled to rule an increasingly politicized population.
93
 
 In this respect, India’s history differs quite drastically from that of other British colonies, 
especially in Africa, where new ideas of “colonial development” took hold in the 1930s and 
1940s.  During the Great War, Britain experienced an unprecedented level of government 
intervention in the economy in order to mobilize resources for total war.  Following the war, 
many blamed the government’s return to the practices of traditional laissez-faire policies for the 
onset of an economic depression in 1919.  These ideas permeated the Colonial Office, with 
some, such as the Secretary for the State for the Colonies between 1924 and 1929, Leopold 
Amery, convinced that an active policy of colonial development could contribute to England’s 
financial recovery.
94
  His tenure led to the Colonial Development Act of 1929, which empowered 
the British treasury to “advance money to any territory for the purpose of aiding and developing 
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agriculture and industry and ‘thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United 
Kingdom.’”95  The stock market crash of 1929 seemed only to underline the point, and by the 
1930s, a revolution in thinking about the state’s role in the economy was underway as 
politicians, economists and scholars debated the merits of a new, if rather vague, idea: 
planning.
96
  By the late 1930s, pressures on the colonial development office to shift from 
“protective” to “constructive” trusteeship had an effect, and culminated in the 1940 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act which focused not only on agricultural and industrial 
development in the colonies but also on social services. Rather than benefitting Britain, the Act 
was intended to “promote the prosperity and happiness of the peoples of the Colonial Empire.”97   
 However, the India Office was far more conservative than the Colonial Office, and these 
ideas seeped slowly into the administration of the jewel of the Empire.  By this time, Britain’s 
most important colony was also the most unruly, and the GOI found itself paying for a large 
security presence, with less to spare for colonial development, while nationalists such as Gandhi 
and Nehru continued to make the point that Britain did not care for the material welfare of the 
Indian people.
98
  In many ways, their analysis was correct.  While perhaps British colonial 
development did not impede the growth of industry and khadi manufactures as much as had been 
previously thought, not much could be said for imperial Britain’s focus on economic 
development and social services in India.  Conservative historians such as Lawrence James laud 
the contribution the Raj’s presence made to infrastructure such as roads, bridges, railways and 
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telegraphs in India.
99
  Indeed, it is futile to argue that these efforts made no contribution to the 
eventual economic growth and industrialization of post-independence India.  However, this does 
not negate the important point that whatever infrastructure in which Britain chose to invest was 
for the purpose of enriching the metropole, not the periphery, a necessity of colonial logic.  The 
materials to build railways and industries were almost always imported from Great Britain, 
leaving post-independence India with an industrial sector almost bereft of capital industries.  
Where the GOI chose to build roads and railways also depended primarily on the purposes of 
British economic, governmental and military interests, rather than any particular concern for the 
“public good.”100  Although a tiny, albeit growing, minority did benefit from a British education, 
and although some efforts were made at the national and provincial levels to improve social 
services, the ability to spend on these aspects of “development” was quite limited.101  While the 
idea of colonial development had emerged in both the imperial and colonial governments, its 
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application left much to be desired.  Nonetheless the concept remained.  It was this concept of 
colonial development that the GOI was in part left with in 1947. 
  Likewise, the idea of planning for economic development has been strongly associated 
with the INC and Nehru given the post-independence history of India. However, the concept 
broadly permeated the thinking of Indian elites in the 1930s and 1940s.  The idea of planning and 
an activist state had, by the 1930s, come to dominate political thinking in Great Britain given the 
economic horror of the Great Depression, and a more extreme form of these ideas had been 
rigorously applied in the USSR, something Nehru had approvingly observed first-hand.  Indian 
thinkers were not immune to these trends.  In 1934, an engineer and future member of the NPC, 
Sir M. Visvesvarayya, published a book, Planned Economy for India, which heavily focused on 
industrialization for economic development.
102
 On 8 December 1933, the United Provinces’ 
legislature passed a resolution to create a committee to draw up five year plans.  After three years 
that committee reported, emphasizing “agriculture, rural uplift, sanitation, and education,” but 
little came of their work.
103
  By the 1940s, “plans” came fast and furious, including S.N. 
Agarwal’s “Gandhian” plan, M.N. Roy’s “People’s” plan, and the famous “Bombay” plan of 
1944, which had the backing of seven of the most important industrialists in India, including 
J.R.D. Tata and G.D. Birla.
104
 
 As historian Niriaki Nakazato argues, it was actually a partnership between India’s 
eminent industrialists and the GOI that entrenched the planning movement into India’s 
government in the 1940s.  Following the “Quit India” movement of 1942, the majority of the 
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most important INC figures were in jail.  Nakazato shows that it fell to the great industrialists of 
India, whose feelings toward the GOI fell on a spectrum between a generalized support for 
increasing and even full independence, and a generalized distaste with socialism and leftist 
thinking, to shape the economic policy that would deliver India into an independent age.  While 
the GOI and the India Office had neglected the welfare aspect of the doctrine of colonial 
development in the 1930s, in 1940 one of the architects of the original policy, Leopold Amery, 
became Secretary of State for India.  As a supporter of non-socialist planning, Amery was open 
to views about economic policy from the Indian business community; and in the context of 
complete wartime mobilization, government interference in the economy was an everyday fact of 
life. Via the GOI’s Reconstruction committees, and the creation of a Planning and Development 
Department in 1944, there was an extensive exchange of ideas between those of the Bombay 
industrialists and the government.
105
  Nakazato shows that following Nehru’s release from prison 
and his resumption as leader of the INC’s economic policy development initiative, he shifted 
from a conception of planning that imagined a completely closed economy to one that left room 
for commerce and international trade.  This, Nakazato argues, was the result of the compromise 
forged between British and Indian business leaders during Nehru’s imprisonment that established 
many of India’s post-independence economic policies, particularly around the objective of rapid 
industrialization.  At independence, Nehru’s government pragmatically adopted these goals.106  
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 This outline of early to mid-twentieth century Indian economic and political history has 
been brief and necessarily superficial.  Its objective has been show that when India became 
independent in 1947, the ideas among Indian leadership about what constituted “development” 
had been fomenting for some time.  Indian nationalists, with the exception of those that closely 
adhered to Gandhian philosophy, and the British administration had come to a large measure of 
agreement about this idea.  “Development” meant economic growth in the formal economy; it 
had to be encouraged and led by a powerful state that would guide growth through detailed and 
meticulous planning; and it required rapid industrialization, particularly in the capital goods 
sector.  The ethic of high modernism had been firmly established as an underlying principle of 
Indian development.  For nationalists who had bemoaned the British lack of concern for social 
services, an improvement in literacy through formal and mass education, health, and living 
standards was certainly implied in the concept of development, and had to be specifically 
encouraged by government.  However, it was only through the mechanism of economic growth 
that these elements of well-being could be achieved, or so it was believed.   
 Many who examine the early field of development tend to point to the work of 
development economists who were just getting their start in the 1940s.  All of the proposed 
“plans” throughout the 1940s had high standards, predicting incredible, and, according to 
economic historian A.H. Hanson, unrealistic, rates of growth for the Indian economy, 
particularly in the industrial sector.  This was asking much of an economy deprived of a strong 
capital-goods sector.  It does, however, give an indication of the optimism felt by Indian elites, 
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both within politics and business.  While some political commentators commented on the 
ambitious nature of the Indian development strategy within the five-year plans of the 1950s, it is 
worth noting that the growth objectives of these plans was not, in general, as optimistic as those 
proposed by these earlier documents.
107
  Although the Indian government, and Nehru in 
particular, felt a strong attachment to the Gandhian ideal of “self-help” and independence, albeit 
applied on a national and not village-level scale, India’s ambitions also created a strong need for 
the tools of industrialization.  It was this focus on the future, combined with a troublesome 
climate and extensive poverty, which eventually turned India into a recipient of aid. 
Canada Becomes a Donor 
 Given that hindsight can be 20/20 vision, it is easy to forget the uneasiness which with 
Canadian policy-makers faced the immediate post-war world.  Certainly, everyone was relieved 
the bloodshed was over, but even before the war ended officials began to make plans for post-
war economic realities, participating in the Bretton Woods conference that established new 
organizations and rules for a more interconnected economic world.  In a well-known story of the 
history of Canadian foreign policy, this concern helped push Canada out of the pre-war 
isolationist impulses that had guided MacKenzie King’s Liberal government, and toward a 
multilateralism that became associated with the Liberal party and especially Lester Pearson in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Historian Hector Mackenzie points out that initially there was no 
doctrinal adherence to a principle of “multilateralism” within the Canadian government, but 
rather an “opportunistic or pragmatic approach” focused on securing Canada’s international 
financial position, especially within the US-UK triangle.
108
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 Whether for the noble purpose of supporting the war effort or more practical concerns 
about Canada’s economy – and certainly both apply – World War II did move the Canadian 
government toward a new focus on multilateral relationships with its allies, and toward a new 
role as an aid-provider.  In the context of war, this assistance primarily came in the form of 
mutual aid, which assisted primarily the UK and parts of the Commonwealth to buy Canadian 
arms, foodstuffs, manufactured goods and commodities.  Mutual aid, along with other forms of 
assistance, represented a C$5 billion contribution to the British war effort.
109
  Although 
balancing British needs, Canadian assets, and the strength of Canadian economy was a complex 
task for the Canadian government and the Mutual Aid Board, chaired by minister of Trade and 
Commerce, C.D. Howe, it was, as Mackenzie describes it, an act of “enlightened self-interest.”110  
Further acts of enlightened self-interest would follow, including a C$500 million advance under 
the Export Credits Insurance Act which went mostly to France and the Netherlands in 1944, and 
the extraordinary C$1.25 billion loan to Britain in early 1946.
111
  The minister of Finance, J.L. 
Ilsley, told Parliament that this loan was no act of charity, but rather “an investment in the future 
of Canadian trade.”112  Policymakers believed that Canada’s economic prosperity depended on 
European recovery, and the Canadian government did all it could to ensure that this would 
happen as quickly as possible. 
 The more subjective concept of humanitarianism was implied in these economically-
minded gestures.  It is through the contributions to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
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Administration (UNRRA) that this aspect of Canada’s growing role as an aid donor is more 
transparent.  Canada’s decision to sign the UNRRA agreement, along with forty-three other 
nations in 1943, can be explained by the same enlightened self-interest that motivated its other 
contributions to European recovery.  UNRRA’s job was to finance relief and rehabilitation in 
liberated countries that both requested the help and which lacked the means to help 
themselves.
113
  It operated in both Europe and Asia.  Brooke Claxton, the minister assigned to 
lobby Parliament on UNRRA’s behalf, explained to the legislature that a vote for UNRRA was a 
vote for the future stability of Canada, as recipients of relief would be the future customers of 
Canadian exports.
114
  Canada became the third-largest contributor to UNRRA, and played an 
important role in ensuring its success as an organization.
115
  Hundreds of Canadian 
“UNRRAIDS,” or relief volunteers, also worked overseas for the organization.116  Historians 
Susan Armstrong-Reid and David Murray argue that not only was Canada’s participation in 
UNRRA, and the wide range of goods that Canada supplied crucial to its success, UNRRA also 
had an effect on Canada.  It reinforced Pearson’s view, then at the Canadian embassy in 
Washington, that “strengthening the collective sense of a community of interests would help to 
forge a habit of international cooperation” which would carry on throughout his career as a 
politician.
117
  It also led to the articulation of the “functional principle,” a term developed by 
Hume Wrong, which demanded a greater role for middle powers in areas where they occupied 
major power responsibility.
118
 For example, in Canada this meant demands to join the big powers 
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on the Inter-Allied Combined Boards. In 1944, Canada contributed the equivalent of one percent 
of its national income to UNRRA, an expenditure on aid that Canada has never come close to 
approaching again.
119
  
 Given this history as an international donor to Europe’s economic recovery, the 
progression to a donor for development in the Global South was a logical, although not a certain, 
outcome for Canada.  David Ekbladh has explored the relationship between post-war 
“reconstruction” through UNRRA and the growth of economic assistance to the Global South in 
the American context.  Exploring the idea of modernization which underpinned economic 
development efforts in the twentieth century, Ekbladh traces a direct line between the 
modernization projects of the depression-era New Deal, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA), through UNRRA, to ODA during the Cold War.  For Ekbladh, UNRRA’s obvious 
successes helped justify active modernization efforts as a form of economic development in the 
post-war era:  
Into the 1960s, UNRRA was seen by many as a defining moment in post-World War II 
aid efforts.  While modernization had not been an explicit goal of UNRRA at its 
inception, in operation it was seen as a logical outgrowth of the agricultural, public 
health, and industrial reconstruction the organization had performed ... Its example 
tutored those who continued to work in the expanding field of international development.  
It not only justified conceptually that development could be performed on a global scale 
but was instructive on the practical elements of development.  UNRRA drove home 
existing beliefs that technical assistance was not merely desirable but “an indispensable 
element” of any large program to remake societies.120 
 
In the American context, these linkages are more obvious than in the Canadian.  Some of the 
same employees that worked for the TVA went on to work for UNRRA and later, the UN 
Expanded Program for Technical Assistance in the Global South, and new developmentally-
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focused UN organizations specifically took the TVA as an inspiration for some of their 
programs.
121
   
Ekbladh’s central point – that the successes that UNRRA, or the European Recovery 
Program (the ERP or Marshall Plan) remained as an example for aid-funded economic 
development programs in the post-war mindset of donor governments – is salient for the 
Canadian example.  The postwar mindset that these examples expose within the Canadian 
government provides an important background to understand the early days of Canadian aid in 
the Global South.  Securing export markets was an important consideration in determining the 
destination of aid, and ministers within the Canadian government felt it important to highlight 
this aspect when “selling” aid to parliamentarians and Canadians.  The most intangible yet most 
crucial aspect of the postwar donor mindset was that officials felt that aid could help create the 
necessary conditions for economic development. While the post-war economic situation within 
Europe and South and Southeast Asia were obviously radically different, the mechanism of aid 
itself had been found to be useful.   
 As Canada began its aid program in 1951, some of the remnants of this post-war mindset 
were apparent.  One such example was the placement of the administration of the aid program 
within the DTC.  For policy-makers in the immediate post-war period, aid was obviously tied to 
Canadian commerce and external trade.  Procuring Canadian goods for shipment overseas was to 
be a major part of the program, as had been the case during the Second World War.  These were 
areas over which the DTC had responsibility.  In 1946, the Mutual Aid Board became the 
Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), which held responsibility for exports and imports.
122
  
This organization would also play a role in the Canadian aid program.  The inter-departmental 
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nature of the war-time Mutual Aid Board also carried over when Canada eventually established 
the Colombo Plan Group, and the same tensions between the DEA, the DTC, and the Department 
of Finance (DF) over fiscal responsibilities vs. international commitments, also followed the aid 
program into the 1950s.
123
  Finally, and as will become apparent in the following chapter, the 
entire tenor of the Colombo Plan meetings was overshadowed by the consequences and financial 
realities facing the Commonwealth in the post-war era.  
Conclusion 
 In the post-war period, Canada and the newly independent government of India would 
come to know each other.  However, during the first half of the twentieth century, their contact 
was fleeting and irregular, and mostly bounded by a common Commonwealth bond, which aside 
from some small amount of trade, meant very little in practice.
124
  In India a new government, 
buttressed by financial and political elites who coveted their country’s rapid modernization, set 
high expectations for the economic growth of the country.  The huge gap between the reality of 
the Indian economy, and the wishes of many of the most important leaders within Congress and 
in industry, combined with the vagaries of the monsoon and the poverty of the new country, put 
India in a position of need. Perhaps most importantly, however, it was the idea of what 
constituted “development” itself that brought the two countries into a new economic partnership.  
India’s colonial history had led the political elites of the country to imagine development as rapid 
industrialization, an idea supported by a growing number of development economists.  The war, 
with its impact on international relations, put Canada in the role of a donor nation, given that the 
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country was one of two that exited the conflict in a significantly strengthened state.  While aid 
had previously been thought of in terms of its role for post-war reconstruction, many aspects of 
this – in particular, its role as a promoter of Canadian exports and the use of structures within the 
Department of Trade and Commerce that had overseen that role – was carried over into the new 
international development aid of the 1950s.   It was the tenuous Commonwealth relationship that 
eventually brought Canada and India together in a closer diplomatic relationship as the former 
colonies struggled to define a new relationship with each other in the post-war era, and it was 
this tenuous relationship that would also bring the two together as donor and recipient in 1950. 
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Chapter 2: The Colombo Plan 
The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia 
was the first large-scale economic development program undertaken by Canada in the 
developing world.  The Plan evolved from a suggestion first made at a meeting of 
Commonwealth foreign ministers in Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950.
125
  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Canada had participated in assistance programs both during the Second World 
War and its immediate aftermath, but these had operated primarily in Europe, and had been 
focused on reconstruction, not development.  Shortly after making its Colombo commitments, 
Canada also contributed to economic development projects in the Global South through the 
United Nations Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance, a part of the Truman 
administration’s Point Four Plan for technical assistance.126  With the hindsight that six decades 
provides, it is now reasonable to view the Colombo Plan as just one measure that the Canadian 
government took in forming a more assertive and participatory foreign policy program following 
the war.  While perhaps not a “golden age” of foreign policy, many scholars point to the post-
war period as an era in which Canada had a greater international stature than its population size 
or strategic importance might suggest.
127
  As the narrative goes, Canada accepted a larger 
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measure of shared responsibility for global peace, and began to participate in a multilateral 
program for economic aid to former British colonies, drawing on old imperial ties but firmly 
pushing into a new era of cooperative international relations. Canada’s entry into the Colombo 
Plan fits nicely into this view of foreign policy history.
128
 
In the long run, this picture is largely correct.  Yet viewed from the vantage point of 
1950, the scene is quite different. Nobody involved in the creation of the Colombo Plan 
predicted the long-term nature of the commitment.  They imagined just the opposite.  Officials 
working within the DEA who guided Canada into a new era of international relations had no 
reason to expect that it would permanently alter the nature of Canada’s foreign policy.  Canada 
joined the Plan, thereby launching its ODA program, as a result of diplomatic pressures created 
by the unique circumstances of the post-war and Cold War eras.  This chapter argues that while 
fear of the spread of communism in South and Southeast Asia eventually came to dominate 
Canada’s motivations for adopting the Colombo Plan, initially, Canada was drawn into the 
scheme in order to appease British concerns about the pressure that an independent South Asia, 
and particularly India, put on the sterling area. 
The Commonwealth provided the common link between Canada and India that 
eventually brought the two into a shared aid relationship.  It was the continuing Indian and 
Pakistani economic linkages with the UK, and the lingering consequences of the costly Second 
World War, that put pressure on far-away Canada to join a Commonwealth aid scheme.  The 
Colombo Plan offered an opportunity to officials in the DEA to participate in a strategy to help 
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relieve pressures on the sterling area without becoming more involved in the former empire’s 
financial woes than they already were.  Officials working in the DEA saw the Colombo Plan as a 
method of addressing short-term diplomatic goals.  Of course, the result was a much broader 
achievement; it was Canada’s most important entry-point into the practice of giving aid to the 
developing world.  Yet as this and later chapters will demonstrate, Canada entered the program 
hesitantly, and it was years before the practice of aid-giving became a fully integrated part of the 
Canadian government’s foreign policy.  While the topic of Canada’s role in re-framing the new 
Commonwealth, and the strained post-war economic relationship between Canada and the UK 
have both been extensively explored, this chapter will examine how the two issues came together 
to make the Colombo Plan a reality.  Scholars have, in the past, neglected the importance of the 
Canada-UK relationship in providing the impetus for Canada to join the Colombo Plan, 
especially in the early stages of the negotiations.
129
 
A Changing Commonwealth 
 When Commonwealth foreign ministers met in Colombo in 1950, it represented a new 
generation for the organization.  The Commonwealth relationship had already weakened as a 
result of the Second World War.  The post-war Anglo-American economic negotiations alienated 
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the dominions by leaving them largely out of discussions which affected their financial future, 
while the United States was clearly now also the world’s most powerful country.130 Although 
both the United States and the USSR had emerged as victors from the Second World War in a 
newly “bipolar” context, America’s power vastly exceeded that of any other nation. America had 
already taken an economic lead over the UK in terms of output per capita even prior to World 
War I.
131
  In the aftermath of the Second World War the UK was facing “starvation corner,” and 
only had an output per capita three-quarters that of the US.
132
  It was also now forced to detach 
itself from significant parts of its empire, including the Indian subcontinent, and granted India its 
independence in August 1947.  Following this, the Commonwealth struggled to redefine its 
relationship with India as the former colony inched ever closer to becoming a republic.
133
 It was 
a contentious time. Indians could not abide a continuing link to Britain, the colonial oppressor of 
more than a century, but the August enactment of independence was not complete. Dominion 
status, which prevailed until 26 January 1950, meant that George VI remained King of India, and 
his representative in the country was the governor-general. More than two years of negotiations 
resulted in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in April of 1949 and the “London 
Declaration” which spelled out the terms of the new Commonwealth.  The Declaration stated 
that the countries of the Commonwealth “owe a common allegiance to the Crown, which is a 
symbol of their free association,” thereby liberating members from the obligation of making the 
British King their head of state.  New Delhi quickly enacted its new constitution making it a 
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republic in early 1950.
134
  As Hector Mackenzie has shown, Canada played a unique role in 
creating the new Commonwealth.  Throughout the negotiations British officials encountered 
difficulties in reconceptualising their historically dominant role, and the antipodean governments 
worried about weakening Commonwealth ties.  While Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister and 
minister of External Affairs for India supported a continuing relationship with the 
Commonwealth, he encountered resistance both in his own government and in opposition.  
Canada, concerned with remaining supportive but also independent from Britain, steadfastly 
encouraged the idea of an independent India in the Commonwealth.  This willingness to find a 
compromise greatly aided the success of the negotiations.
135
 
Canada invested time and energy into ensuring the success of the Commonwealth.  
However, part of the motivations for doing so rested on what Mackenzie refers to as a “sense of 
detachment and distinction.”136  The DEA supported the concept of “free association” because it 
also directed the Commonwealth away from alternatives it found detrimental to Canada, such as 
any sort of defence or citizenship obligations inherent in membership.
137
   
As the autumn of 1949 came to an end and the conference in Colombo drew nearer, 
officials in the DEA felt that they were in an awkward position.  Canada had helped to make the 
new Commonwealth a reality.  However, the country differed from the rest of the 
Commonwealth in one important way.  It was not part of the sterling area which used the 
inconvertible pound sterling as its international unit of account, tied as the country was to the 
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hard dollar area dominated by the United States.
138
  Since 1945, the UK had faced a challenging 
financial position as it attempted to rebuild following the destruction of the Second World War.  
In addition to securing a massive US$3.75 billion loan from the United States, Britain looked to 
Canada for help.
139
  Canada loaned C$1.25 billion to the UK in 1946, an amount that was 
designed not only to help Britain re-establish itself financially, but also to continue the essential 
export market for Canadian goods that had grown up over time.
140
  This healthy export market 
was one of the reasons Canada emerged from the war in an economically stable position. As 
common wisdom had it in Ottawa at the time, Canada thrived under a regime that R.S. Sayers 
was to later call “a bilateral unbalance within a balanced ‘North Atlantic triangle’” where a 
surplus of trade with Britain paid for a deficit with the US.
141
  Although over the following two 
decades the British market lost importance for Canada, in the immediate post-war period the 
government still viewed it as an essential outlet for Canadian goods.
142
  Efforts to secure this 
market competed with the sterling area’s balance of payments problems. 
Reconstruction efforts had led to a severe balance of payments problem as the UK, and 
indeed, the rest of the world, needed goods and supplies from a healthy and productive North 
America.  This resulted in a sterling crisis in 1947, as Britain experienced a run on the pound as 
it made its currency convertible, reflecting the terms of the Anglo-American loan agreement. The 
result was a massive sale of soft British pounds for hard US dollars. Before London put an end to 
it, making the pound inconvertible, hundreds of millions of its dollars disappeared into French, 
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Belgian and Dutch banks, among others, as they seized the opportunity to get US dollars for 
practically nothing. It had been a disaster. Meanwhile, the UK had used up its massive 
reconstruction loan from the US and, to a lesser extent, from Canada, but had yet to receive 
Marshall Plan aid.
143
 Britain devalued its currency in 1949, and by 1950 the situation, while 
stable, remained uneasy; Britain’s financial and economic position remained precarious, which 
made any demands from India problematic.   
From the UK perspective, India’s needs were particularly troublesome.  A tense fiscal 
relationship existed between India and the UK in 1949 and 1950, complicated by several matters.  
The heavy demands of the Second World War had resulted in a pooled currency system in the 
sterling area, marked by inconvertible currency, a shared dollar reserve, and most importantly, 
the ability of Britain to import much-needed supplies on credit from its sterling area partners.  By 
the end of the war, the UK had built up vast sterling balances, or debt in the form of sterling 
credits, to its Commonwealth partners and colonies, and owed the most – £1,134 million – to 
India.
144
  That country’s independence, its legitimate demands for food and capital goods 
imports, and the continuing hangover of the sterling area system, all converged to make matters 
difficult. 
While Britain acted as the central banker and technically controlled sterling releases, 
India proceeded to quickly draw down on their balances through liberalized import controls, but 
also through more mundane purchases such as surplus military stores, pension annuities to 
former British residents of India, and giving what was owed to Pakistan after partition.
145
  By 
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1949, India had drawn down its sterling balances to £621 million.  To the chagrin of the British, 
India also ran dollar deficits, and had spent releases beyond the promised amounts negotiated by 
the two countries in August of 1947.
146
  Of course, from India’s viewpoint, they were merely 
using what was owed to them, and what was very much needed as a newly developing country.  
Britain had a different perspective, naming them as war-time debts which India should consider 
forgiving, at least in part.
147
  Britain had, after all, defended India from the Japanese menace, or 
so went the British refrain.  While India and the UK privately negotiated their own financial 
relationship, there is no doubt that India’s perceived role in causing perturbations in the sterling 
area, unfair as that characterization might have been, was known at the Colombo meeting in 
January of 1950. 
Officially, the conference provided foreign ministers with a chance to discuss, in general 
terms, the pressing international issues of the day, such as the formal recognition of the newly-
established People’s Republic of China, which the UK had granted immediately before the 
conference to the chagrin of Australia and New Zealand.  They were also scheduled to talk about 
the situation in Indo-China where the French were fighting what would be a losing war for their 
empire, which irritated the nationalist leaders of the newly independent nations.  However, at the 
UK’s request, the conference also hosted a meeting of senior economic officials to discuss the 
sterling balances problem and try to advance a solution.
148
   
Canada was reluctant to become involved in these discussions.  It rightly felt it had 
already given its share to helping post-war economic recovery through its reconstruction loans 
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and contributions to UNRRA.  Also, Canada had already participated in discussions on this issue 
through the Tripartite talks in Washington, when it met with the United States and the UK in 
September 1949 to discuss measures to ameliorate the UK’s currency problems and find ways 
for that country to save and earn more precious US dollars.  Despite Canadian recalcitrance, and 
tensions between the UK and Canada over trade in the context of a new economic and power 
dynamic between the two nations, the former rightly believed Canada to be a dependable 
diplomatic partner with the UK’s financial interests at heart.149  London exerted diplomatic 
pressure on the Canadian government not only to attend the conference, but also to ensure that 
top officials would be present.  The UK high commissioner in Ottawa, Sir Alex Clutterbuck, 
personally visited Prime Minister St-Laurent and outlined Ceylon’s proposal for the conference. 
As well, he asked for Pearson’s presence at the meeting.  Clutterbuck reported that the prime 
minister’s attitude was “cautious and non-committal.”150  Despite this initial reserve, the pressure 
succeeded.  Officials in the UK government noted that it was “excellent news that Mr. Pearson 
himself will be going.”151  The UK also sent a message about the importance that it attached to 
the conference with the large number of officials it sent to Colombo.  Clutterbuck noted in a 
telegram to the secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations that the Canadians were 
“impressed” by the size of the UK delegation.152  Escott Reid, the deputy under-secretary of state 
for external affairs (USSEA), later wrote that fear of offending Commonwealth sensibilities, 
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rather than any particular concern with what might be discussed, was probably the primary 
motivating factor for Canadian participation in the conference.
153
 
The British keenly wanted to foster discussions at Colombo about the sterling balances 
problem, but as historian Nicholas Tarling has argued, the Colombo discussions were also the 
focal point for a wider British foreign policy strategy.  Both economically and strategically, 
South and Southeast Asia was important for the UK. Of course, South Asia held a sterling 
balance reserve and the British government worried about communist China’s seemingly 
growing power, its potential linkages to the Soviet government, and its ability to assert an 
aggressive communism in the region.  The Second World War had already demonstrated that the 
UK could not protect the region independently.  Britain wanted to encourage regionalism in the 
area as a way of shoring up these countries against the threat of communism, and believed that 
its former colonies, particularly India, needed support in order to avoid falling into the 
communist sphere.  It also aimed to encourage a much greater level of American involvement in 
the region, both militarily and by providing the dollars that the sterling area so desperately 
needed.
154
 
Although the Canadian government agreed to attend the conference with Pearson as its 
leading representative, External Affairs still remained cautious about the potential level of its 
commitment.  Officials in the DF and the DEA worried that the economic discussions of the 
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Colombo Plan meeting, focused as they were on the sterling balances problem, might 
concentrate on strategies to restrict imports from the dollar area, a solution in direct contradiction 
to Canada’s economic interests.  As preparations for the meetings were underway in December 
of 1949, the finance minister, Douglas Abbot, warned that his officials could not participate in 
such discussions.
155
  USSEA Arnold Heeney agreed, letting the deputy minister of finance, W.C. 
Clark, know that the DEA concurred with this decision since the proposed economic discussions 
to be held concurrently with the foreign ministers’ meeting would likely focus on restrictions to 
the dollar area; Canada, they firmly believed, could not “be implicated in any way” with that 
program.  Clark also noted that Pearson was satisfied with that decision.
156
 
A message sent later in the month from Pearson’s office to the Canadian high 
commissioner in London, Dana Wilgress, expressed reservations about the ideas that other 
Commonwealth countries developed in preparation for the meeting.  The government of Pakistan 
had sent a telegram to Commonwealth countries suggesting that wealthier countries should 
extend credits to underdeveloped countries through a Commonwealth organization.  Pearson’s 
office gave this view to the high commissioner: 
[Y]ou should make it clear that the Canadian Government would not be prepared to 
encourage the establishment of a new Commonwealth organization for the promotion of 
economic development and investment.  Nor does it believe that such an approach to the 
problem would lead to useful results. ... You may recall that in the course of the 
Commonwealth Conference of Finance Ministers last summer, Mr. [Douglas] Abbott [the 
Finance Minister] stated, “Canada has gone as far, if not farther, than any other country in 
the Commonwealth in granting credits and she is not in a position to make any further 
grants.”157 
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The telegram went on to note that “the problems of the underdeveloped countries” should be 
tackled by specialized agencies such as the UN, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
158
 Strapped by loans to Britain 
and parts of Europe and still cautiously finding its way in the post-war world, Canada was not 
anxious to give any new financial commitments to aid.
159
   
Internal documents show that officials in the DEA and other departments were aware and 
concerned about the UK’s financial position, and the direct connection between the pressure on 
sterling balances and the needs of underdeveloped countries in the Commonwealth, especially 
India.  A memorandum written by A.F.W. Plumptre, the Director of Economic Affairs in the 
DEA, to the undersecretary of state of external affairs, references a recommendation by Bank of 
Canada governor Graham Towers that all Commonwealth countries should provide their balance 
of payments information at the upcoming conference in Colombo.  Plumptre wrote, perhaps 
unfairly under these circumstances, that “Mr. Towers no doubt has in mind the fact that the 
financial difficulties of the UK have been caused in large measure by the overall deficits of some 
sterling area countries, notably India and South Africa.  If this could be brought home to the 
members of the sterling area, it might be easier to reach a solution of the UK’s financial 
difficulties.”160  Despite the advantage that Towers’ suggestion might provide for the UK, 
Plumptre advised against it since the decision had already been made to minimize Canada’s 
participation in the financial discussions.  Under these circumstances, Plumptre advised not 
showing “too great a curiosity about the balance of payments statistics of other participants.”161  
While aware of the UK’s financial position, and bowing to that country’s request to attend and 
                                                          
158
 Ibid. 
159
 See Muirhead, The Development of Post-War Canadian Trade Policy, 18-29. 
160
 LAC, Douglas LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Vol. 2, File 11, Memorandum for Mr. Heeney, 15 December 1949, 1. 
161
 Ibid. 
67 
 
participate in discussions about the sterling balance problem, the Canadian position leading up 
the conference could be characterized in this way: it wanted to show itself as a good partner by 
attending and sending high-level officials, but it did not want to involve itself too deeply in either 
the discussion or a solution which might jeopardize Canada’s post-war economic boom.  
Notably, it was definitely against a Commonwealth economic development organization.   
The Conference 
“[T]here was something accidental about the convergence of the two meetings at 
Colombo,” LePan later wrote in his memoirs, referring to separate meetings of the foreign 
ministers and economic officials: 
The economic officials were there on very different business than were the foreign 
ministers, although it had been foreseen that, under some circumstances, their services 
might be helpful to those upstairs.  There was something, then, accidental about the 
juncture of the two meetings.  But it had a very important effect on the successful 
launching of the Colombo Plan, I believe.  It meant that both foreign ministries and 
finance ministries were implicated in the initiative from the beginning.
162
    
 
As it has been shown, however, the connection between the drain on the UK’s reserves and the 
underdeveloped countries of the Commonwealth, primarily India, had already been established.  
Also, the idea that the wealthier nations of the Commonwealth could help to provide financial 
assistance to the poorer countries had already emerged from Pakistan.  While the convergence 
was not as accidental as LePan suggests, it was crucial to the success of the Colombo Plan.  
 J.R. Jayawardene of Ceylon and Percy Spender, Australia’s foreign minister, initially put 
forward the resolutions for what would later become the Colombo Plan.  It was Spender, 
however, who quickly adopted a Commonwealth initiative for aid to underdeveloped countries in 
South and Southeast Asia as his project.  Draft resolutions introduced by the Ceylonese and 
Australian delegations early in the meeting were revised behind the scenes under Spender’s 
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direction, resulting in a final resolution to ministers, sponsored jointly by New Zealand, Ceylon 
and Australia.
163
  Spender, who had only been minister for two weeks, threw his considerable 
energy into the project.
164
  His travels in Southeast Asia had convinced him of the need of a 
program of development to address the area’s poverty.165  However, the minister was also 
concerned particularly about the direct link between this poverty, the influence of communism 
among the poor, and Australia’s security.166  This made the Colombo Plan’s success crucial for 
his political life.  His strong personality at times imperilled the success of the Plan, as it did 
during the difficult negotiations at the Sydney conference several months later, but it also 
ensured that the idea became something material.
167
  He also believed in the Plan’s role for 
sustaining and building Asian democracy.
168
 
 Spender’s enthusiasm for the project closely associated his name with the Colombo Plan, 
and it briefly earned the moniker the “Spender Plan” as a result.  However, Canadian officials 
generally agreed that the proposal would most probably have come to naught without the support 
of the UK government and specifically the UK’s ailing Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, a great 
anti-Communist member of the Labour government.  As Reid noted, regardless of the new multi-
racial character of the Commonwealth, old power dynamics persisted: “In spite of his health, Mr. 
Bevin still carried much weight in the discussions because of British prestige among members of 
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the Commonwealth, because of his intimate personal knowledge of high level international 
negotiations during the four uneasy post-war years and his great breadth of view and constructive 
approach.”169 Despite arranging the economic discussions, LePan observed to Escott Reid on the 
first full day of meetings that “the British had no particular plans to put forward and that the 
economic discussions were not much more than a continuation of the discussions which take 
place in London at the Commonwealth Liaison Committee.”170  Perhaps that is why the British 
seized on Spender’s proposals and supported them in the foreign ministers’ meeting.  This was 
certainly Pearson’s sense as he reported back to Canada on the proposal: 
In the Foreign Ministers’ meetings Bevin was able to pick up and turn to account 
suggestions made by Spender of Australia and (in a somewhat different form) by 
Jayawardene of Ceylon at an early stage in the Conference that the Commonwealth 
should extend economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries of South and 
Southeast Asia.  Although the British did not arrive with any settled tactical intentions, 
they hoped that in the course of the Conference action could be initiated which would 
make it easier for the United States later to participate in some kind of economic 
assistance plan for Asia.  This would have the result not only of strengthening the 
economies of the recipient countries and so of helping them to combat the spread of 
communism, but also of supplying the sterling area as a whole with a flow of dollars 
which might be expected to continue after the end of the European Recovery 
Programme.
171
 
 
Pearson was aware that the UK’s support of the program rested on the potential for such an 
assistance plan to help relieve the pressure on sterling balances.  Jayawardene and Spender also 
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knew that this was a crucial selling point, and both included this feature in their initial 
proposals.
172
   
 There is no doubt that one of the UK’s primary interests in supporting the Colombo Plan 
was related to sterling balances and the dollar shortage. It allowed the UK to release sterling to 
India and Pakistan in the guise of an aid program and, as Pearson observed, it held out the 
potential for US government involvement and therefore an infusion of US dollars into the 
sterling area.  Such a program would therefore align itself with Britain’s foreign policy strategy 
in South and Southeast Asia.  A cabinet discussion produced later that year confirms this: “It has 
been implicit in our plans from the beginning that the UK contribution to India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon would take the form of releases from sterling balances over a six-year period.”173  The 
British hoped that wealthy Commonwealth partners would give as much as possible. This related 
to the stated goal,  “a major objective of UK policy at the moment is to bring about a state of 
affairs in which during the next year or two the UK’s financial contribution to the Colombo Plan 
will be nil or negligible.”174  
 During the first Consultative Committee (CC) meeting in Sydney in May of 1950, the 
UK urged that the committee immediately begin to prepare development plans for the countries 
of South and Southeast Asia as “a matter of urgency.”175  The delegation recommended that the 
plans be finished no later than the end of October.  The reasoning for this deadline was two-fold: 
that other nations would be watching the progress of the Colombo Plan with keen interest, and it 
was necessary to show momentum. As well, and probably most importantly from the UK 
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perspective, in order for the United States to join the program, its Congress would need to vote 
on it during the first half of 1951.  Therefore, the program had to be submitted to the US 
administration no later than November.
176
  The delegation also submitted a detailed appendix on 
which to base the development plans.  Again, the UK demonstrated its keenness to get the Plan 
underway, and especially, to get the US involved.   
  The UK played a central role of leadership in giving its support to the idea of the 
Colombo Plan through the series of negotiations.  They encouraged partners to attend, and sent a 
large delegation to the conference.
177
  They legitimated the early proposals with their support and 
worked to convince wealthy Commonwealth partners that they were serious about the Plan by 
offering specific numbers for their own contributions before others had done so.
178
  Even in a 
reworked Commonwealth where all nations were supposed to be equal, the weight of the UK’s 
support was crucial for the creation of the Plan. 
A Cautious Acceptance 
Although the DEA had initially specifically recommended against a Commonwealth 
development organization, by the time Pearson’s team arrived home from the meetings, the 
minister tentatively supported plans for such an initiative.  While there is no record of Pearson’s 
personal thoughts regarding this change of attitude, archival documents show that in the initial 
stages, officials in the DEA viewed the Colombo Plan not only as an anti-communist program, 
but also as an opportunity to support the UK’s financial position at relatively little cost to 
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Canada.  However, the department remained cautious and it is clear that during the first few 
years of Canada’s participation in the Plan, the DEA saw Canadian aid for development in the 
region as a temporary initiative, not dissimilar to Canadian participation in post-war European 
and British reconstruction. 
 Some insight into Pearson’s thinking is found in a telegram he sent to Heeney from the 
conference.  Pearson wrote, “[t]he establishment of the proposed consultative committee is, of 
course, merely a first step but if this first step is followed by other necessary steps in the right 
direction, a great deal may be done not only to solve the problem of the sterling balances but also 
to shore up our defences in the area against the tide of Soviet expansionism.”179  The idea that 
the Plan could help to address both of these issues clearly appealed to Pearson, even as he 
suggested that the scope would be limited: “There is a danger, of course, that too great hopes 
may be aroused by the Colombo meeting’s recommendations on this subject and it would 
certainly be dangerous and misleading at this time to speak of a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Asia.”180  
While hopeful, Pearson also voiced Canadian caution about overseas financial commitments. 
Canadian participation hinged on a Plan that would only make limited demands on Canada’s 
financial resources. 
Similarly, on his return Douglas LePan summarized the idea for a Consultative 
Committee for South and Southeast Asia for the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade 
Policy (ICETP), a high-level venue for deputy ministers to meet and discuss policy 
recommendations for ministers.  Along with other Commonwealth partners, Canada adopted 
guarded resolutions. The first was to “examine the possibility of making financial assistance 
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available for essential productive purposes in South and South-East Asia, taking into account 
their existing commitments.”181  LePan sold the program mostly in economic terms, referring 
specifically to the UK’s financial woes, and also for the possibility that it might improve 
Canadian trade: 
It is hoped that the establishment of a Consultative Committee for South and South-East 
Asia may make it easier for the United States to participate later in some kind of 
economic assistance plan for Asia.  This would have the result not only of strengthening 
the economies of the recipient countries, and so of helping them to combat the spread of 
Communism, but also of supplying the sterling area, as a whole with a flow of dollars 
which might be expected to continue after the end of the European Recovery Programme. 
… In view of the possibility that the establishment of a Consultative Committee for South 
and South-East Asia might eventually lead to steps which would relieve the world-wide 
shortage [of] United States dollars, and so improve Canada’s trade prospects, it is 
recommended that the recommendations of the Conference of Commonwealth Foreign 
Ministers on this subject should be approved by the Canadian government.
182
 
 
Although LePan does not specifically mention the UK, the implications of “supplying the 
sterling area” after the “end of the European Recovery Programme” would have been obvious to 
contemporary readers of this document.  Officials at the ICETP meeting believed that the 
Colombo Plan might help address some of the issues that had plagued Canadian trade with the 
UK in the post-war period, primarily its shortage of hard currency.  Even years later, officials 
involved in the Colombo Plan remembered this first objective.  In 1953, Escott Reid, writing 
from his post as high commissioner to India, wrote “I recall...at the original Colombo Meeting in 
January 1950 that the Colombo Plan was first thought of both by the British and, I think, by 
ourselves, as a possible helpful way of increasing the flow of United States dollars to the United 
Kingdom.”183  In these early stages, Canadian officials viewed the Plan much less in terms of its 
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impact in South Asia, and much more in terms of its diplomatic and financial impact in London 
and Ottawa. 
The Korean War and Communism in Asia 
However, had the Plan been designed merely to shore up the UK’s financial position, it is 
doubtful whether it would have gained the necessary political currency to become the 
comprehensive development program that it did.  It took a greater objective to provide the 
traction that made it a major initiative. As shown above, Pearson’s telegram to Heeney during 
the first conference, and LePan’s recommendation of the Plan to the Canadian government, 
included both potential financial and anti-communist benefits as positive aspects of the program.  
As Canada prepared to attend the second conference in Sydney, this time officially a meeting of 
the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, UK financial problems were not as prominent. 
Instead, a concern about the sub-continent’s poverty and vastly under-developed economic 
infrastructure, and its susceptibility to communism, found its way into official instructions at 
least partly in reaction to the perceived Communist threat: “The Government are aware of the 
urgency of at least making a start in improving the standard of living in the Indian sub-continent 
and in Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Indonesia and Thailand if…the spread of communism is to 
be prevented.”184   
The Sydney conference began in May of 1950, and the anti-Communist message only 
increased in intensity in June as North Korean troops invaded the South, intent upon the forcible 
reunification of the Korean peninsula.  The London Conference, which ended successfully with a 
final agreement outlining the nature of the plan, was held in September with the war as a 
constant reminder of the perfidy of international communism. That had its use.  For example, 
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LePan, in his report following the conclusion of the conference, offered that while the Sydney 
conference had been characterized by “confusion and acrimony,” the London conference had 
been tightly focused by world events: 
The attack in June [1950] on the Republic of Korea and the lively reaction which that 
provoked throughout the whole of the free world, had made much more visible than 
previously the importance of Asia to the West and the way in which Western countries 
could not escape becoming involved in the event of Communist aggression in the Far 
East…. As a result, there was no need in London to argue that the West must take 
whatever steps were open to it to prevent any further large segments of the Eurasian 
landmass from falling under Communist domination; and there was also general 
agreement that this could be done only if the peoples of Asia were given some real hope 
of an improved standard of living, which would involve financial assistance from outside 
the area.
185
 
 
In this view, poverty was fertile ground for the spread of international Communism, and 
Colombo would help to address that issue by helping to “develop” the countries of the region. 
 In a draft report of the London conference, LePan noted that Canadian officials actually 
worried that the improved position of the sterling area resulting from the 1949 devaluation of the 
currency might cause the UK to remove their support for the Plan: “One of the chief reasons why 
the United Kingdom had welcomed the proposals ... was that they offered some promise of 
resulting in a new injection of United States dollars into the stream of world trade, most of which 
might have found their way into the central reserves of the sterling area.”186 They were relieved 
that the UK continued to support the Plan despite the sterling area’s improved situation.  
Apparently, LePan noted, the British had more than just financial reasons for supporting the 
Plan, although rearmament, perhaps a looming necessity given the war in Korea, still posed a 
threat to the sterling area due to inflation.
187
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 Despite these factors, given the emphasis that scholars have traditionally placed on the 
role of anti-communism in the formation of the Plan, it is surprising how rarely concerns about 
combating the communist menace, and how often the Second World War and general issues of 
trade in the South and Southeast Asian region, ended up appearing in the final document signed 
in London in September.  It does say that the “improvements of the welfare of the South and 
South-East Asian people is a vast human endeavour, and the community of free nations stands to 
gain immensely by it.  The policy stability of the countries of the area is possible only in 
conditions of economic progress.” However, it also has an entire chapter on “The War and its 
Aftermath” which details the massive economic dislocation the region suffered due to war.188  
The impact of the war on India is particularly emphasized, both in this chapter, and in the chapter 
detailing India’s development program.189  On balance, the picture that emerges is less about a 
region under threat by communist forces and more about one that has suffered an economic 
trauma brought on by the strains of the Second World War, and the imbalances that that event 
brought to the trading relationships the region traditionally maintained, particularly with the UK.  
Canada joined a Plan that sought to bring economic stability to a region threatened by 
communism, but equally it joined a Plan that sought to heal the economic wounds caused by a 
war with fascism. 
By the end of 1950, the die had been cast, although a few important issues remained 
unresolved, including the role of the US and exactly how much Canada would be able to 
contribute. A December 1950 memo to Pearson encouraged him to “decide at once” whether or 
not Canada would join with its Commonwealth members in asking the US to attend the next 
meeting of the Consultative Committee in January of 1951.  The memo also encouraged Pearson 
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to secure an agreement from cabinet about Canada’s financial contribution to the Plan: “The 
need for such an understanding … arises from the fact that further Canadian contribution in the 
work of the Consultative Committee now that the Colombo Report has been published and the 
United States has indicated its willingness to join the Committee might well be construed as 
constituting some measure of a moral commitment.” 190 Pearson managed to overcome 
opposition within cabinet to secure an initial C$25 million annual commitment.
191
   
Although economic tensions between the UK and India continued, the interest that the 
former colonial master showed in promoting the Plan did pay off to some degree.  In discussions 
between the Indian finance minister, C.D. Deshmukh, and the UK chancellor of the exchequer, 
R.A. Butler, in January of 1952, the latter continued to urge the Indian government to “reduce 
her deficit with the non-sterling area by £29 million during the second half of 1952.”192  While 
Krishna Menon, the high commissioner for India in London, admitted that this would be a 
difficult task for India as “her ability to improve the balance of payments was limited by the 
over-riding need for food imports,” Deshmukh reassured the chancellor that the government was 
working on combating inflation and restricting imports from the non-sterling area.  He also 
stated that “The main direction in which India expected an improvement in the balance of 
payments over the figures as forecast for 1952 was by way of loans and foreign assistance.  The 
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Government of Canada had already agreed to grant economic aid of £5 million under the 
Colombo Plan arrangements” and that other aid deals, especially with the United States, were 
also concluded and others were being negotiated.
193
  In a convoluted way, it was India’s financial 
position via the UK that brought Canada and India into a stronger relationship with each other. 
A View from India 
 Without the relevant documents, which are unavailable in Indian archives, it is difficult to 
get a full picture of how Indian officials prepared for and thought about the Colombo Plan.  The 
documents that are available show that their administration was prepared to welcome the Plan as 
long as it respected Indian sovereignty, and that they rejected the idea that the Plan was an anti-
communist tool. During the sixth plenary session of the Colombo meeting, Nehru showed some 
ambivalence toward the proposed scheme, noting that while the region was in urgent need of 
economic development, he was not entirely sure how assistance could best be made available.  In 
addressing the proposals already on the table, he said that he was “not clear to him how this plan 
was to be implemented” and that “detailed plans would have to be worked out by each individual 
country for itself.”194   
Yet he was open to the concept and sent a rather large delegation of seven officials to the 
Sydney consultative committee meeting in May.
195
  In a circular summary of one of the working 
party committees in Sydney sent around at the request of India, one of their officials noted that 
India had been satisfied with the UN technical assistance program and assistance received from 
the World Health Organization, and so it followed that India was open to new sources for these 
                                                          
193
 Ibid, 16-17. 
194
 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Minutes of the Sixth Meeting,” in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, ed. S. 
Gopal, vol. 14, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992) 529. 
195
 The head official, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, said that the “size and composition of the delegation was an 
indication of the interest which his country showed in the problem and its desire for realistic results.”  LAC, Douglas 
LePan Papers, MG 31 E6, Volume 9, File 3, “Consultative Committee: Third Plenary Session,” 16 May 1950, 9. 
79 
 
programs.
196
  The Sydney conference had been difficult, with Canada and Australia at odds 
throughout due to Spender’s tendency to push the Colombo Plan commitments beyond what 
Canada felt comfortable providing.
197
  Despite this tense atmosphere, India still managed to 
actively participate in the conference.  During the fourth session of the meeting, India’s chief 
representative, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, expressed discontent over the proceedings thus far, 
noting that “the time had come for the Committee to have a clear idea of what it was trying to 
do,” noting that despite claims of urgency, he was unclear about their intent.198  He spoke of his 
impatience with the idea that the future plan would be anti-communist in nature, since “All the 
present governments in those countries [India, Pakistan and Ceylon] had been successful in 
arresting communism so far and hoped to be able to continue to do so.”199 He urged the group to 
focus on the real needs of the region, which were capital goods, long-term credit, and 
expertise.
200
  Perhaps this is part of the reason that the final document contained so little open 
discussion of the Plan as it related to communism.  This emphasis is India’s influence speaking 
through the report. 
Conclusion 
 In the early days of the formulation of the Colombo Plan, Canadian officials worried 
primarily about the consequences of the Commonwealth foreign ministers’ meeting on Canada’s 
financial dealings with the UK.  This chapter in the history of Canada-UK relations in the 
immediate post-war era fits in well with a story that is complex and often contradictory.  While 
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ties had weakened, a measure of obligatory feeling did linger in the air between the countries, 
particularly as Canada tried to regain the formerly robust export market that it had previously 
had with the UK.
201
  Given the tense international political situation that developed in the months 
following the first foreign ministers’ meeting in January 1950, it is easy to write off the Plan as 
merely Canada “pitching in” with the work of anti-communism in the new Cold War 
environment of the early 1950s.  Certainly, full credit for the political success of the Plan must 
go to its anti-communist strategy and the Korean War, which brought the United States fully into 
the realm of the Asian strategic environment.  However, initially it was not the threat of 
communism that preoccupied officials in the Department of External Affairs as they discussed 
the potential of a Commonwealth economic development program.  Rather, it was the dull yet 
pressing concerns of the Commonwealth economy. 
 For those present at the creation, these pedestrian concerns obscured the entirely novel 
nature of the Colombo Plan.  As Douglas LePan wrote in the late 1970s of his experience 
working toward the genesis of the Plan, he had no idea of its implications.  While modern 
development theory tends to emphasize the work of development economists working from the 
1940s as originators of modern development practice, as LePan writes of the Colombo 
conference, “The fact is that there was little or no economic theory to assist with such problems.  
The great spate of articles and monographs by economists on the problems of economic 
development as to come later, in the more than twenty-five years that have intervened since.”202  
Those working on the Colombo Plan, then, had no playbook to guide their efforts.  Instead, they 
only had their instincts and their own “knowledge” of what did, and did not, constitute 
development.  LePan notes that it was the colonial governments themselves that had the most 
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experience in dealing with the “problem of underdevelopment,” but this experience was felt to be 
inherently inapplicable since the newly independent countries were trying to leave their colonial 
pasts behind.  Officials did not, and indeed could not, have known that an initiative like the 
Colombo Plan would become a part of a massive post-war aid infrastructure: 
What we didn’t know, or at least didn’t fully appreciate, as we were drawing up the 
Colombo Plan, was perhaps more significant than what we did know.  As I have said, we 
were lacking in any relevant theory of economic development or any paradigm that 
would be applicable to the poverty-ridden countries of South and South-East Asia.  We 
were ignorant of the mischief that might be done by projects of economic development, 
such as multi-purpose high dams, unless their ecological or other consequences were 
carefully researched and weighed in advance.  We would have been amazed if we had 
been told that twenty years later the countries of the Third World would be clamouring at 
the United Nations and elsewhere for new and radically different programmes to help 
them overcome their still intractable economic problems.
203
 
 
As officials set about making the Plan into a reality of Canadian government, they looked 
to the structures of war-time and post-war aid and relief to Europe to guide their work.  They 
rarely stopped to reflect on the novelty of their work, because it was, for them, not entirely novel, 
and they rarely stopped to reflect on the enormity of the objective before them.  As the following 
chapter will demonstrate, for most officials working on the Plan, the work of aid and 
development in 1951-1952 was rarely more than a series of tasks which needed to be 
accomplished. 
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Chapter 3: The First Year 
 By the end of 1950, Pearson had won the political battle within the cabinet to invest in 
the Colombo Plan, which represented the first serious attempt at a Canadian aid program focused 
on the Global South.  While approval for aid expenditure would continue to need ministerial and 
cabinet approval, it now fell on the shoulders of the Canadian bureaucracy, primarily within the 
Department of External Affairs and in the Department of Trade and Commerce, to work out the 
specifics of how aid would be spent and managed, and how the relationship with recipient 
countries would proceed.   
The first official year of Canadian aid expenditure, not including the initial C$400,000 
for administrative set-up, was the fiscal year 1951-1952 and then continued into 1953 when aid 
funds could not be disbursed quickly enough.  In the first year, Canadians spent C$25 million on 
the Colombo Plan, and a full C$15 million of that within India.  Officials working on the aid file 
encountered a remarkably comprehensive set of challenges in their first year operating the 
Colombo Plan program.  These included communication issues within government and between 
Canada and India, the difficulty of syncing a new and sometimes chaotic Indian administration 
with the staid Canadian bureaucracy, disagreements between Indian and Canadian officials on 
how the aid should be spent, matching donor and recipient priorities, and avoiding the internal 
politics of India and building expertise on the aid file.  Remarkably, most, if not all of these 
challenges continue to be prominent in the field of ODA to this day.  What rarely appears in this 
first year is any deeper reflection or interrogation about the fundamental purposes of the aid 
program.  The context of high modernism meant that the link between aid, growth, and 
developmental goals had already been strongly ingrained into the way that they thought about 
economics.   
83 
 
The Set-Up 
 The first order of business for the aid program was to set up the administrative machinery 
necessary to operate it.  Due to the interdepartmental nature of aid, which included not only the 
expenditure of Canadian funds but also logistical considerations, trade implications and 
diplomacy, the first organization for the program was also interdepartmental in nature.  The main 
administrative body was set up within the DTC as the International Economic and Technical 
Cooperation Division (IETCD) in September of 1951.
204
  Reginald George Nik Cavell, a former 
businessman with prior experience in South and Southeast Asia with the Indian Army, headed 
this organization with the position of director of the IETCD, although his correspondence always 
referred to him as “administrator.”205  The belief in the temporary nature of the program was 
reflected in his hiring, which was for a period of only two years, even though the Colombo Plan 
was already deemed to be a six-year program.
206
  This organization was charged with 
coordinating all activities related to technical assistance.  Primarily, its function related to duties 
within the Colombo Plan.  In order to coordinate effectively, a Colombo Plan Group was also 
established to meet regularly with representatives from Finance, External Affairs, Trade and 
Commerce, and the IETCD.  Cabinet had the final authority with respect to expenditure 
approval, although by the time memos reached cabinet, they simply approved the 
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recommendations made at lower levels by various committees of officials, and these only 
occasionally elicited interest and discussion at the ministerial level.  
 On paper, the Department of Trade and Commerce seemed to hold much of the 
responsibility for aid.  In practice, the majority of aid policy was coordinated within External 
Affairs, in the office of the under-secretary for external affairs, headed by A.D.P. Heeney, and 
within the Economic Division of the DEA, headed by A.F.W. Plumptre, in cooperation with 
Cavell.  This was due to the role that diplomacy played in aid-giving in the early 1950s.  While 
the Colombo Plan was a Commonwealth invention, in reality the Secretariat of the Colombo 
Plan, which was still finding its way, played little role in the day-to-day operation of aid. The 
Colombo Plan was a title assigned to a wide array of bilateral aid arrangements made directly 
between the donor and recipient countries.  As a result, in these early days the diplomatic 
missions in Ottawa and New Delhi played a crucial role in communication about the specifics of 
these arrangements.  In the first year of Canadian aid to India, this high-level form of 
communication between the two countries was one of the major challenges that officials in both 
countries faced in trying to bring form to the Plan. 
 On 10 September 1951, Canada and India exchanged notes outlining the “Statement of 
Principles Agreed Between the Two Countries for Co-operative Economic Development of 
India.”  It was a short, simple, and vague document establishing the general bilateral nature of 
the Plan, with the first principles being that “All economic aid supplied by the Government of 
Canada to the Government of India under the Colombo Plan shall consist of goods and services 
in accordance with specific programmes agreed upon from time to time between the two 
governments.”207  It stated that Canadian aid would be available either as loans or grants and 
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established provisions for the use of counterpart funds.  This was the most specific part of the 
statement, which directed the GOI to set up a special account for counterpart funds, to keep a 
separate record of that account, to inform the Government of Canada of the position of that 
account and to occasionally supply an official certificate verifying that information.
208
  The 
statement of principles was imprecise with respect to the overarching goals and program’s ideals. 
The only phrase that even began to address something other than the nuts and bolts of program 
development noted that “The Governments of Canada and India now desire to co-operate for 
their mutual benefit, and in particular for the achievement of the purposes of the Colombo Plan, 
by promoting the economic development of India.”209 
 The first fiscal year’s budget of C$15 million eventually broke down into three main 
expenditures: the government spent C$10 million on wheat for India; the counterpart funds 
generated by wheat would be given to the Mayurakshi dam project in West Bengal, which was 
already under construction as a part of India’s first Five-Year Plan; and a further C$4.5 million 
went to providing chassis to the Bombay State Transport Company.  Although the government 
voted C$400,000 for technical assistance, it spent C$285,000 on technical cooperation, which 
included funding 28 students to come to Canada to study, and three technical missions, also from 
India to Canada.
210
    
The Bombay State Transport Company 
 The provision of chassis to the Bombay State Transport Company (BSTC) represents the 
Canadian government’s first original aid project to India.  Rather than simply shipping a 
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commodity, like wheat, or providing funds to an already formulated project, the expenditure on 
the BSTC was a stand-alone project.  It required a proposal from the Indian government, a 
decision on the part of the Canadian government to fund the project, and plans to build and ship 
the necessary components.  When it finally ended, officials attempted to learn from the mistakes 
that had been made in carrying it out, and to build on those.  In this way, it was a crude version 
what aid practitioners now refer to as the “project cycle,” although without the acronyms or 
sophisticated management techniques that now are attached to that term. 
 It also provides an interesting example of the numerous challenges that Canadian and 
Indian officials faced during their first year of the Colombo Plan.  The development of projects 
under the Colombo Plan was supposed to, and generally did, follow a certain pattern in the 
1950s.  The Indian government was responsible for officially proposing a specific project to the 
Canadian government via their high commissioner in Ottawa.  The latter preferred to receive a 
“batch” of project ideas so that it could choose those which best suited Canada’s abilities.  When 
Canadian officials had chosen a project, they would need to propose it to cabinet in order to 
receive official approval for the expenditure.  Once that had been received, the Canadian and 
Indian governments could then undertake an exchange of notes which would outline the specifics 
of the project which each government agreed to against the background of the Statement of 
Principles which had originally been signed by the two countries.  Then it could be carried out as 
specified. 
 It turned out that the work that Pearson had done to get the cabinet to approve the initial 
C$25 million expenditure had been the easy part.  Despite the massive needs of the region, 
actually spending the allotted money within the rigid accounting practices of the fiscal year 
proved challenging.  Since the IETCD had only been established as of September 1951, and 
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cabinet only approved the C$15 million figure for India in that same month, the program started 
late if aid expenditure was to be met by the fiscal year ending in March 1952.  Strangely, it 
seems that officials originally expected that this deadline would be met, regardless of their late 
start.  If the money was not spent by the fiscal deadline, the remaining funds would have to go 
through another vote in Parliament, a politically undesirable path. In 1952 the C$10 million for 
wheat, purchased from the Canadian Wheat Board, shipped out in the S.S. Houston from 
Vancouver.
211
  The remaining funds, however, remained in a state of flux.   
The Indian government first proposed that Canada provide chassis for the BSTC late in 
the summer of 1951, then dropped the idea, then revived it again late in the year.  In December 
the Indian government proposed that Canada supply of 1,000 bus chassis via a letter from the 
Indian Department of External Affairs to their high commissioner in Ottawa, R. R. Saksena.
212
  
The BSTC emerged as an attractive possibility early in 1952 because the Indian government 
approved of it and its outputs lay within the ambit of Canadian industry. Perhaps more pointedly, 
it had the distinction of being the only material idea available to both governments.  The 
Commercial Counsellor of Bombay for Canada, Bruce Rankin, noted that while it would not be 
as appealing an aid project for Canada as “irrigation, hydro-electric and similar other 
undertakings” this was “balanced by the fact that we have capacity in our automobile industry in 
Canada at the moment.”213   
 On January 23, Blanche Margaret Meagher of the Economic Division in the DEA 
prepared a draft memo to cabinet which justified Colombo Plan aid for the BSTC on the 
following grounds:  
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The establishment of an efficient transportation service is considered to be the most 
urgent project for Bombay State at the present time.  The Central Government of India 
also regards the project as an integral part of the general economic development plan for 
India.  Enquiries reveal that the Canadian automotive industry is in a position to 
undertake the manufacture of 3,000 chassis and would be interested in doing so.  The 
order would be of some assistance to the present employment situation and the supply of 
Canadian built chassis to India at this time could lead to beneficial results in terms of 
future markets.
214
 
 
Yet time was growing short and by February, India had not provided any formal specifications 
about the project details.  On February 11, Warwick Chipman sent a letter to Heeney expressing 
reservations about the project.  Not only was the fiscal deadline approaching, but he also had “a 
certain misgiving about the project simply on the general ground that it would seem preferable, 
where possible, to spend Canadian dollars on projects which will effect a lasting improvement in 
the Indian economy.  I am not sure in my own mind that the Transport project really qualifies on 
this basis.”215  Two weeks later, Meagher wrote Plumptre to say that no progress had been made 
on the Indian program.
216
  With a month to go before the end of the fiscal year, the Indian 
Ministry for External Affairs sent their high commission in Ottawa an express letter outlining 
that they could accept 3,000 chassis from the Canadian government for diesel “lorries,” or 
transport trucks as part of the transportation nationalisation project for Bombay.
217
  Despite 
Chipman’s hesitations about the programme, it was the only real option. 
 A final agreement simply could not be concluded in time.  Finance grew impatient, 
especially considering that the other part of the 1951 Colombo Plan expenditure for Pakistan was 
proceeding at a similarly slow pace.  On March 20, with eleven days to go until the end of the 
                                                          
214
 LAC, RG 25, “Draft Memorandum to Cabinet, Colombo Plan – Programme for India,” 23 January 1952, Volume 
6577, File 11038-1-40, part 2, 2.   
215
 LAC, RG 25, High Commissioner for Canada in India, New Delhi to The Under-Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, 11 February 1952, Volume 6577, File 11038-1-40, part 2, 1. 
216
 LAC, RG 25, B.M. Meagher, “Memorandum for Mr. Plumptre, Colombo Plan Programme,” Volume 6577, File 
11038-1-40, part 2, 1. 
217
 LAC, RG 25, Express Letter (No. F. 22-4/51 – Emi) From Foreign, New Delhi to Hicomind, Ottawa, 28 
February 1952, Volume 6577, File 11038-1-40, part 2, 1. 
89 
 
fiscal year, Heeney sent a memo to Pearson which outlined the challenges and a solution to this 
problem.  He wrote that the programs for India and Pakistan had reached the stage where some 
projects were definitely going ahead and tenders were being sought, while other were only 
tentatively approved.  Douglas Abbott, the finance minister, was “anxious to avoid a revote of 
the unspent balance.”218  The reason for this reluctance was due to a feeling of insecurity in 
cabinet to the perceived risk of drawing too much attention to the Colombo Plan.  The prime 
minister told the cabinet that if the funds were left to lapse, it might be seen as a negative 
“reflection on Canadian support for Colombo Plan programs” while “difficulties” might arise if 
they asked parliament to re-vote the funds.
219
  Although he does not spell out what these 
difficulties might be, presumably he did not want to draw attention to the fact that money 
allocated the year before had yet to be spent.   
Since the money was designated for aid to India and Pakistan, it needed to be transferred 
to these countries in some way.  But doing so without maintaining control over the funds was a 
nonstarter: “There is, of course, no question of handing over C$15 million to the Governments of 
India and Pakistan to use as they like,” cabinet concluded, perhaps reflecting colonial attitudes 
which New Delhi surely would have disliked.
220
  In order to avoid such a revote but remain 
within the law, Heeney wrote that the Department of Finance created a plan wherein the unspent 
money would be technically be “given” to the Colombo Plan countries, but via the Canadian 
Commercial Corporation (CCC), which would act as agent of the recipient countries.
221
  The 
CCC would hold the funds in trust for Colombo Plan countries until it was ready to be spent, in 
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most cases back in Canada.  In this way, the government resolved the logistical problem.  
However, the paradox of finding appropriate projects on which to spend Colombo Plan aid in a 
country with seemingly infinite needs would continue for many years. 
Politics 
 Officials also encountered internal Indian politics in the BSTC program.  Early in the 
planning stages political conflict attached to the project became apparent.  Initially both parties 
assumed that Ford would be the natural choice to provide the chassis. The company could supply 
the desired equipment and, perhaps more importantly, it had representation in both Canada and 
India, which was particularly important for maintenance and spare parts in India.  The country 
faced challenges with Western-made vehicles because of poor road infrastructure, and so it was 
imperative that the BSTC have easy access to spare parts.
222
  However,  a politically well-
connected man within the Congress Party owned the company that represented Chrysler in India, 
Premier Automobiles.
223
  Officials faced a perplexing problem. If they did not open up the 
bidding process to other vehicle manufacturers, the Canadian government risked looking bad, but 
more importantly, the officials working within BSTC risked their careers. If they did open up the 
bidding process, not only would it further slow the project down, but they risked losing the 
contract to a company neither the BTSC nor officials in Canada felt had the necessary experience 
to manage the contract .
224
 In April, Rankin wrote the Director of the Trade Commissioner 
Service asking for official clarification from the Canadian government that they would be calling 
for tenders rather than specifying the supplier as Ford.  A bidding process did ensue, and 
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contracts came in from Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler.  Ford, much to the relief of everyone 
except the owner of Premier Automobiles, won the contract by quoting a lower price.
225
 
Still, the political issue continued to drag into May, much to the frustration of Cavell.  He 
worried that the obvious political implications of the program would deter Ottawa in terms of 
enhancing the aid program, writing the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Escott Reid, that 
“[t]here is a danger of various people becoming unduly alarmed and irritated about political 
interference in Colombo Plan matters in Asia, and seeming to expect a higher ethical standard in 
India and elsewhere than in fact we maintain here on the North American continent.”226 Cavell’s 
remark about the “political” objectives of national contracts let in Canada could not have been 
more apt. Still, by the end of May, he felt that the issue had dragged out long enough, frustrated 
by Premier Automobiles’ representative who “has haunted my office and that of Mr. Saksena, 
and is thinking up every monkey wrench possible to throw into the present negotiations.”227  
According to Saksena, Premier Automobiles had even threatened a newspaper campaign 
accusing Canada of “economic imperialism” and of using the Colombo Plan to force Indian 
companies out of business for the benefit of Canadian exports.”228  The time had come, argued 
Cavell, to be decisive: “we should say to the Government of India that we will supply a certain 
number of vehicles to be manufactured by Ford, at the prices at which Ford was the successful 
bidder, and that the Government of India either accepts our offer of aid on that basis or we 
withdraw the offer and seek some other method of spending C$4,500,000 of Colombo Plan aid 
involved.”229  Whether or not this happened in the manner that Cavell suggested, the program did 
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go ahead with Ford as a partner.  By 4 July, a final agreement had been reached 
“interdepartmentally and with the Indians” on the requirements of the project and the order could 
be placed as soon as the signatures of the three relevant ministers had been obtained.
230
  Cavell 
reported to the Colombo Group meeting on 11 August that the last of the equipment for the 
BSTC had been ordered, although problems and misunderstandings continued to plague the 
project.
231
 
Communication, or a Lack Thereof 
A number of communication issues hampered progress in the first year.  A significant 
problem was that information had to pass through so many layers in order for any progress to be 
achieved.  Within Canada, there had to be interdepartmental communication, communication 
with the Indian mission in Ottawa, and communication with the Canadian mission in New Delhi.  
The Canadian mission in New Delhi had to communicate with the Canadian government, the 
Indian government, state governments, and other relevant Canadian missions, such as the 
consulate in Bombay for the BSTC project. At times the consulate communicated directly with 
the Canadian government.
232
  From the Indian perspective, there was also interdepartmental 
communication, as well as the matter of navigating the federal structure.  The aid relationship 
between India and Canada was a bilateral one – Canada negotiated only with the central 
government.  However, the BSTC was a state government operation.  From the perspective of 
the BSTC and what was then the state of Bombay, the Canadian aid was not free.  Canada 
purchased the chassis and the associated equipment, such as spare parts, as a grant to the 
government of India.  India then transferred the chassis to the BSTC on a loan basis, albeit on a 
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very lengthy, flexible and low-interest term.  Both governments assumed the trucks would 
eventually generate a profit for the BSTC, which it could use to repay the Indian government. 
For a time in early 1952, the negotiations about financing devolved into a state of 
confusion as information passed through the various layers of government. An example of this 
confusion, not unusual given larger context, was with the BSTC contract.  According to the 
General Manager of the BSTC, General G.D. Young, the Indian government informed the BSTC 
in January of 1952 that the Canadian government had requested payment at the time of delivery 
of the chassis, and that therefore the nature of the project, which hinged on the idea of the long-
term loan from the Centre, was nullified.  He contacted the Canadian Consulate in Bombay to 
complain that it would be impossible to pay for the chassis before the lorries had done any 
income-generating activity.
233
  Rankin wrote Paul Bridle, the first secretary of the Canadian High 
Commission in New Delhi, to point out that such a plan would defeat the purpose of aid, since 
the point of helping the BSTC in the first place was that it lacked the necessary capital to expand 
their services, and therefore the transportation network of Bombay.
234
  It seems that the 
confusion about repayment led the Canadian high commissioner to question the whole nature of 
the financing.  On February 11, Warwick Chipman wrote Heeney’s office for clarification:  
I recall that, after they submitted the project to us, the Indian authorities explained that 
they hoped that the money which the Corporation would progressively repay would be 
available at the end of the period to the Government of India for subsequent use in 
financing economic development.  This seemed to us to imply a Canadian grant, or at any 
rate a very long-term loan.  It is not clear to me, from the correspondence I have seen, 
whether you may now be considering a grant or whether you are adhering to your earlier 
view that a loan would be preferable.
235
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On February 26, Reid answered that he was not sure where the confusion had originated, 
since he believed that no one had ever indicated to the Indians that the project would be carried 
out on a loan basis.  He believed that the Canadian government had made it clear to Saksena “on 
more than one occasion” that the chassis would be provided on a grant basis.236  Reid further 
clarified that although the Canadian government had not yet fully sorted out the details of the 
financing with the Indian government, the general lines along which financing would proceed 
had been decided.  First the chassis would be given to the GOI on a grant basis, which it would 
then hand over to the BSTC on a loan basis, and that the counterpart funds generated from the 
repayment of that loan would be used for “suitable development projects in India”.237  Although 
pressing issues warranted telegrams, the governments sometimes conducted correspondence via 
surface mail, a slow process in the early 1950s.  This only added to the confusion.  While the 
issue was resolved in the manner which Reid outlined, this experience shows that one piece of 
misinformation could impede negotiations for two months.   
The most frustrating problem for Canadian officials in the first year was the lack of 
information coming from the Indian government about its plans to use provided aid.  As the 1951 
program came to an end in August of 1952, the government was already behind schedule on its 
planning for 1952-53.  On 24 July, Albert Edgar Ritchie, the head of the economic division in the 
DEA, wrote Saksena to urge him to provide details about India’s plans for the next year’s 
program.
238
  The Colombo Plan Group heard in its meeting on 11 August  that “No progress 
whatsoever had been made on the Indian programme,” even though the Indian high 
commissioner had been reminded of the Canadian government’s wish to see more information 
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on how to use counterpart funds generated by further grants of wheat and capital aid.
239
  In late 
August, the high commission in New Delhi provided some insight into thinking within the Indian 
government when they met with P.C. Bhattacharyya, the head of aid programming.
240
  Chipman 
complained about the lack of necessary information:  
It should be emphasized that as we had no documentation beyond the minutes of the June 
19 meeting of the Colombo Group, we were placed in the position of having to ask 
Bhattacharyya for much of the information that it would have been helpful for us to have 
previously possessed.  I should also make it clear that although Bhattacharyya undertook, 
from now on to furnish this Mission with copies of relevant outgoing correspondence, we 
have for the past three and a half months received no such correspondence and we 
therefore have no documentation for the statements which follow.
241
 
 
In this meeting the Canadians discovered that India wanted another large grant of wheat, 
worth at least C$10 million from the 1952-53 appropriation.
242
  Bhattacharyya also suggested 
further funding for the Mayurakshi project and for the Umtru project, another hydro-electric 
project in the northeastern state of Assam.  Chipman noted that Bhattacharyya “agreed that 
progress had been slow up until now but did not seem to be unduly alarmed.  He said that he 
hoped that negotiations would be completed within the next three months and that we would not 
have to resort to a device similar to that used at the end of 1951-52, for holding over 
unencumbered funds to the next fiscal year.”243 
Different Priorities 
 Despite Bhattacharyya’s optimism, throughout September and October, Canadian 
officials continued to be frustrated at the pace with which they received information from the 
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Indian government.  An ongoing lack of communication continued to be a problem, as the 
Canadian high commission’s complaint that the Indian government did not provide them with 
copies of the outgoing correspondence to Saksena illustrates.
244
  However, this problem extended 
into another, deeper, issue.  This was a basic difference between both governments about their 
priorities for the aid funding.  Canadian officials pressed India for suggestions for aid programs 
that used Canadian capital equipment, such as the BSTC.  Canadian officials believed that capital 
projects, rather than commodities, represented the best use of Canadian Colombo Plan funds for 
reasons that will be outlined below.  Ottawa soon began to perceive that the lack of information 
emanating from the Indian government was actually a symptom of a larger problem.  On 8 
September, Dana Wilgress, who had become USSEA in April, wrote Pearson a memo outlining 
their suspicions: “Although the Indian authorities have been pressed to suggest alternative 
projects to which at least part of the present Canadian contribution could be devoted, they have 
not come up with any promising items.  The likelihood is, in fact that, so long as they have any 
hope of securing the whole contribution in wheat, they will not be anxious to suggest alternative 
projects to us.”245  In this case, the lack of information and communication was not a logistical 
problem.  As Canadian officials perceived, it was a stalling tactic by the Indian government.  
Wilgress urged Pearson to put a C$5 million cap on the wheat that would be included in the 
1952-53 program in order to encourage the Indian government to suggest alternative projects.
246
 
 While Canadian officials complained loudly about how slowly work proceeded within 
the Indian government, the experience of providing Canadian capital aid to the BSTC could not 
have been viewed as an auspicious beginning to observers within the Indian government either.  
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There were the political issues as outlined above, of course, which likely caused consternation to 
allies of Premier Automobiles within government.  There were other problems associated with 
bringing Canadian capital equipment to India.  One was matching the donor capabilities with the 
recipient needs.  The BSTC wanted truck chassis with diesel engines.  The BSTC’s General 
Young, probably not surprisingly, assumed that complete vehicles could be provided by the 
Canadian government.  The problem was that Canada did not then manufacture diesel engines, 
and the truck chassis built in Canada were designed to hold gasoline engines.  Canadian officials 
urged Young and D.D. Sathe of the BTSC to consider buying some gasoline engines, but this 
was not considered practical given the Indian context.  The BTSC desired a British-built, Perkins 
diesel engine.  This meant that the Indian government would need to provide a loan to the BTSC 
to buy the engines, in addition to paying for the cost of the freight to get the vehicle parts to 
India.  In April, P.V.R. Rao of the Indian high commission in Ottawa wrote Nik Cavell to ask if 
Canada could reconsider paying for the diesel engines and the freight costs.
247
  By December 
1952, Canada had agreed to fund the engines, but refused to pay for engines that were not 
Canadian-built, despite the preference of the BSTC for diesel.
248
 In the collective mind of the 
Ottawa mandarinate, the whole point about aid was to help Canadian producers, an impossibility 
if the product demanded was not made in Canada. Ottawa stuck hard to the notion that its 
provision of aid meant tangible benefit to Canadian industry, but, eventually, after months of 
delay, the Canadians gave up and agreed to pay for the British engines.
249
  There seemed to be no 
other course as chassis without engines were not exactly useful. While a C$4.5 million 
represented a considerable investment in the BTSC, its partial nature meant additional expenses 
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for the Indian government.  O.K. Ghosh, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Economic 
Affairs in the Indian Ministry of Finance, pointed this out in a combined meeting of the 
Interdepartmental Group on Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan Group in October 1952:  
“counterpart funds have accomplished results that are beginning to show.  One difficulty, in 
India, is that the equipment to be supplied by an outside source such as Canada is usually only 
part of the project.  The aided country must find supplementary local funds to enable the project 
to proceed.  The supply of local currency can be increased by counterpart funds.”250  In other 
words, a “free” gift was not necessarily without cost for India. 
The desire for wheat in place of capital equipment should not have come as a surprise to 
the Canadian government.  In March 1952, India had sent Canada a list of possible projects for 
the second year to Cavell, emphasizing their preference for wheat.  Chipman summarized the 
Indian argument for wheat in a memo to Pearson:  
Because wheat is in short supply in Australia and Pakistan, India’s current wheat 
purchases from the dollar area cannot be reduced and may have to be increased.  Gift 
wheat from this area would save India precious foreign exchange and indirectly improve 
the balance-of-payments position of the sterling area.  Also, the counterpart funds from 
the sale of wheat would be welcome in India.
251
 
 
From the perspective of the Indian government in 1952, the most helpful thing that Canada could 
do was to give them an essential commodity which they normally would have to purchase with 
their meagre foreign currency reserves.  Chipman concurred with the Indian position, writing “I 
think this argument is sound.”252  Yet months later, Ottawa seemed surprised at India’s insistence 
that the majority of the 1952-53 program be composed of wheat. 
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 Canada believed that meeting Indian development demands through wheat in the second 
year of the program risked reducing the value of the Colombo Plan as an economic development 
tool that would help India meet the future requirements of its citizens.  This was the concern that 
the C.D. Howe, the powerful minister for Trade and Commerce, expressed to his staff.  In a 
meeting on 11 September 1952 between Reid and W.F. Bull, the deputy minister of Trade and 
Commerce, the latter told Reid that his minister worried that “the Colombo Plan would become 
little more than a scheme for providing India with grain.”253  Although reminded that counterpart 
funds generated by wheat did fund development projects, “Mr. Howe, nevertheless, feels that 
giving India wheat under the Colombo Plan defeats the original purpose of the Plan – to foster 
economic development in India by providing capital goods.”254  Howe followed up on this in a 
letter to Pearson the following day: “we in the Department agreed to recommend five million 
dollars for wheat, with a definite understanding that in future Colombo Plan funds could not be 
used to buy wheat.  We would seem to be in complete agreement in the matter.”255 The fact that 
Colombo Plan goods could help Canadian business was surely a consideration, especially for 
Howe who had spent his political career exploring these very possibilities.  Shortly after Howe’s 
intervention, the government issued a press release stating that only C$5 million of the 1952-53 
program would be dedicated to wheat. The rest of the aid would better reflect Canadian industrial 
needs. 
 Needless to say, the Indian government was unhappy with this development, naturally 
believing that it knew its own needs better.  Bhattacharyya wrote Saksena on 10 October, urging 
him to bring it up with responsible officials in Ottawa: “We were surprised that the Canadian 
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Government should have made a Press announcement in this regard without securing our 
concurrence to the same. ... I think it might be well if you would point this out tactfully to the 
Canadian Government.”256 That was certainly understated.  He noted the problems with 
accepting Canadian capital equipment, especially so late in the year.  In his view, since most 
projects in the first Five Year Plan were already underway, finding enough of them to absorb 
C$8 million worth of equipment was probably out of the question.  Bhattacharyya insisted that 
these projects had already procured the necessary equipment.  Also, “not much of the equipment 
available in Canada is suitable for such projects.  If therefore the Canadian Government do desire 
that we should fully avail of their contribution, I think, they will have to reconsider this decision 
either now or later in the course of the year.”257  Bhattacharyya wrote that it was not just that the 
Indian government was upset that Ottawa had issued a press release without consultation, or that 
the wheat would not be provided.  It was also that the government had ignored the advice and 
needs as presented by the Indian government: “[I]n our discussions with Canadian Government 
representatives in Delhi and Karachi, we have explained why this is the best way in which any 
other country can assist us.  We are thus really disappointed that in spite of these explanations, 
the Canadian Government has not only disregarded this suggestion partially this year but are 
considering the complete non-supply of wheat in the future years.”258  In a response to these 
suggestions, Richard Grew wrote to the USSEA that he did not believe that Canadian equipment 
was unsuitable for Indian projects, but “[W]hat is more disturbing is that at this late date with the 
fiscal year half gone, there should still be a basic misunderstanding between the Indian and the 
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Canadian authorities as to the objects of expenditure of Colombo Plan capital development 
funds.”259  
 Planning for the 1952-53 program once again dragged into the new year.  It was not until 
the winter of 1953, just months before the end of the fiscal year, that real progress was made on 
deciding the projects for Canadian aid.  One difference was that the high commission in New 
Delhi took a more active role, meeting with Indian officials personally to pressure them to make 
decisions.  In February, Graham McInnes of the high commissioner’s office wrote A.E. Ritchie 
to reassure him that negotiations were proceeding, despite being slow and troublesome: “To say 
that it is one of frustration is to underestimate it.”260  Nonetheless, he advised the Canadian 
government not to be discouraged by the pace with which the negotiations proceeded.
261
  In 
January, the C$5 million worth of wheat was shipped, and project requests began to appear for 
generating and transmission equipment for the Mayurakshi dam, for locomotive boilers, and for 
equipment for the All-India Medical Institute.  By May, the new high commissioner for India, 
Escott Reid, was able to send to Pearson’s office a list of approved projects, totalling C$8.5 
million, and a list of suggested projects totalling C$15,980,000, as well as a suggested C$3 
million of industrial commodity assistance, such as aluminum.
262
  At this point, the fiscal year 
had already passed, and so the memo was entitled “Colombo Plan: Canadian Capital Aid to 
India, 1952-54.”   
Evaluation 
 As planning for the 1952-53 fiscal year dragged out, officials within the Canadian 
government began to reflect on what had gone wrong with the Colombo program for a second 
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year in a row, and how it was that for a second time Canada was facing the possibility that the 
only expenditure on aid to be accomplished by the fiscal deadline would be a shipment of wheat.  
The disappointment expressed by officials at the slowness at which negotiations and aid 
expenditure proceeded reveals that the Canadian government was unrealistically optimistic about 
how aid would function in the Global South.  In August of 1952, the USSEA wrote to Warwick 
Chipman, a letter that says as much about Canadian perceptions and activity as it does about 
Indian:  
We are becoming increasingly concerned with the slow pace at which we are moving 
ahead on the actual execution of our Colombo Plan programme.  It was inevitable that 
there should have been delays in getting this brand new type of programme off the 
ground and we were not unduly disturbed, though admittedly disappointed, at our record 
of definite achievements in the first year.  However, the present status of our 1952-53 
programmes, which we had expected to be well advanced by this time is, in fact, pretty 
discouraging.
263
 
 
He added that after consulting officials in the “interested departments,” it had been decided that 
one of the biggest problems was the lack of information coming from the Indian government 
about possible projects for aid expenditure.  He suggested to Chipman that perhaps the high 
commission in New Delhi could take a more active role in undertaking informal and formal 
discussions and negotiations about such projects, so that the Canadian government could start 
receiving information as soon as possible, asking Chipman to “prod” government officials into 
supplying the material they needed.
264
  The USSEA outlined that officials within the Canadian 
government believed that the primary problem with the Colombo Plan program in India was a 
lack of experience with administering the new program, and a lack of efficient communication 
and information. 
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 Chipman responded with an interesting despatch that framed the problem quite 
differently.  He acknowledged that a lack of experience with aid and a closer liaison with the 
Indian government in New Delhi could make a difference.  However, he also wrote that “this is 
only a very partial answer.”265 The problem, as Chipman described it, was the nature of India 
itself, and the government that operated within India.  The first was cultural:  
There is an Indian way of doing things.  By our standards, it is slow, hesitant and 
confused, and is based on a fundamental lack of planning and tendency continually to 
make ad hoc decisions.  This attitude, which is thoroughly familiar to the English, who 
have lived and worked in this country for 200 years, is regarded by them with a tolerant 
and good-natured cynicism.  They do not attempt to force the Indians to meet their pace 
or to comply with their ideas of efficiency.  They are prepared to let nature take its 
course, as it were, in the knowledge that eventually any given project will be completed. 
... For ourselves, the Australians, and the Americans, being newer to the sub-continent, it 
is much more difficult to accept this: but it is something which cannot be changed simply 
by a closer liaison.
266
 
 
This was not the first time that culture had been used as an explanation for Indian behaviour 
relating to aid.  When Canada shipped wheat, at least until the 1951-52 program, it offered India 
a rather unappealing option between “No. 4 tough and No. 5 damp.”267  Only these lower grades 
were available, and Canada preferred to give the lowest grade, No. 5.  A memorandum to Ritchie 
in July 1952 summarized that India preferred No. 4 because the No. 5 wheat, when milled, would 
turn the chapatti, the staple food of large parts of India, a distasteful black colour.  Indians would 
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refuse to buy it.  The author of the memo explains this not in terms of normal consumer 
behaviour, but rather as a result of the deficiency of the culture: “[T]he average Indian, who is 
unsophisticated to the point of being superstitious and who in any case is paying a high price for 
his grain nowadays, would be reluctant to buy such wheat.”268  Chipman was making a more 
sophisticated point than the author of this crude assessment of Indian behaviour, however.  He 
argued that while the culture may be at fault for defeating Western ideals of accountability and 
efficiency, it was the responsibility of the Canadian government, as the British before it, to 
attempt to adapt to this culture, and not the other way around.   
 The second problem Chipman presented was the lack of experience among the Indian 
bureaucracy, at least as he perceived it, since those who had been trained in the British Indian 
Civil Service (ICS) were now in their late thirties, and younger bureaucrats felt insecure about 
taking initiative.
269
  As a result, Chipman explained, the ICS men that did remain were in such 
high demand that they were strenuously over-worked.  For example, Bhattacharyya, in addition 
to being deputy head of the International Economic Division of the Ministry of Finance, was 
responsible for all foreign aid programs, did much of the minister’s work while he was away, 
while also serving on many interdepartmental committees.
270
  The heavy workload of 
responsible civil servants would continue to be a theme in the 1950s.  Chipman went on to list a 
number of other problems: inter-departmental jealously, political considerations, such as the one 
that the BSTC ran into with Premier Automobiles, the cumbersome manner in which the centre 
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and states worked together, and a shortage of the basic supplies needed for governmental work, 
such as typewriters and stationery.
271
   
 Chipman concludes this list by re-emphasizing his earlier point.  The real work for the 
Canadian government would probably not be in eliminating the problems that slowed the work 
of aid in India; it would be in managing Canadian expectations about what could realistically be 
accomplished given the drastically different environments within which both governments 
worked:   
In India one has to work twice as hard to avoid slipping backward, let along making 
progress.  The progress will be made, but it will not be made in terms of Western ideas of 
time schedules and efficiency.  It will be made at the Indians’ own pace and we should 
face the fact that we may have to find, at the end of each fiscal year, devices for holding 
over unspent funds, as we did in the fiscal year 1951-52; that we shall encounter, at all 
times, all sorts of disheartening delays, misunderstandings, bungling and inefficiencies.  
But the will, and the goodwill, are there; how they are exercised is a matter for the 
Indians to determine.
272
 
 
In this despatch, Chipman attempts to communicate the reality of the Indian environment, as he 
saw it, to an audience in Ottawa who, for the most part, had never travelled or worked in a 
developing country.  Those who had worked outside of Canada had usually gained experience in 
Europe or the United States.  Chipman tried to make it clear that the expectations that those 
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working in Ottawa had about the way that aid should function were far too “Western,” and that 
while the system could always be improved, it would probably, at least for the foreseeable future, 
always fall short of their ideal. 
 Nevertheless, Ottawa’s suggestion that the high commission should take a more active 
role in aid negotiations did make an impact.  In the winter of 1953, rather than waiting for 
Saksena to deliver the Indian government’s list of possible projects to Ottawa, Graham McInnes 
at the high commission in New Delhi scheduled meetings with officials from the Indian 
government to try to bring the 1952-53 program to fruition.  Chipman’s despatch set the tone for 
how mission officials would communicate with Ottawa in explaining why work was not 
proceeding at the expected pace.  In reporting about his negotiations, McInnes wrote to Ritchie 
to explain that certain peculiarities were holding up their work, including “administrative 
inefficacies, extremely over-worked senior civil servants; interminable correspondence between 
the Centre and the States; empire building as between government departments; the Planning 
Commission and functional departments being sometimes at cross purposes; local political 
considerations and the lassitude induced by the hot weather.”273 As one American critic of this 
process later wrote, India’s development was dominated by New Delhi’s bureaucrats and 
“certain left-leaning economists … ‘License Raj’ was a vast system of national and state-level 
licenses and quotas [that] allowed the government to enforce policies of statism and economic 
autarky.”274 Given Indian development needs, it was very difficult for Western governments to 
understand why the country would not simply fall in with developed country prescriptions that 
would mean economic growth, at least so long as they took Western manufactured goods. Yet, 
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McInnes advised patience: “[T]hough these conditions will persist, I think, and I am sure Nik 
Cavell and Hume Wright would agree with this, we should not be discouraged ...They always do 
take action in the end; but what even a single year in this country has taught me is that it takes a 
great deal of effort to get them to move even at their own pace, and that to move at our pace is 
simply not to be expected.”275  This example of the difference in opinion between those “on-the-
ground” in India and those working in Ottawa was only the first of many to come. 
 Another example of evaluation can be found in a letter that Bruce Rankin, the 
Commercial Secretary in Bombay, wrote to the high commission, which was then forwarded to 
the office of the USSEA by the high commissioner in January 1953.  Rankin had spent many 
stressful hours working on the BSTC project, and he attempted to sum up what this experience 
had taught him about working in the area of aid.  He wrote a list of fourteen suggestions, mostly 
beginning with the sentence “we should avoid...” giving the impression that those dealing with 
aid in India should do precisely the opposite of what had been done with the BSTC.  Among the 
list of problems and solutions he suggests were “ designating clearly the State Officials 
responsible for the discussion of details” to avoid a  breakdown in communication between the 
Centre, the state, and Canadian officials; avoiding the “provision of equipment from Canada 
where an indigenous industry exists,” no doubt as a result of the Premier Automobiles debacle; 
to avoid projects “which in part rely on other equipment not available in Canada,” referring to 
the delays brought on by the request for diesel engines, and so forth.
276
   
In some cases, Rankin proposed avoiding projects for reasons that could not possibly 
have been foreseen, suggesting that “We should avoid a project because of high regarded 
personnel in the management whose association may be suddenly terminated.” In this, he refers 
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to the case of General G.D. Young, the General Manager of the BTSC, a European who had been 
recruited to take the position.  In December 1952, a new chairman of the BTSC, Chotabha S. 
Patel, a wealthy industrialist and supporter of the Congress Party, took over.  While the position 
of chairman had hitherto been honorary, Patel asserted his dominance and decided to reorganize 
the BTSC, starting with firing Young.  The only other official with whom Rankin had worked, 
D.D. Sathe, also left the corporation. Rankin also recommended that Canada “should avoid 
projects where our aid may be used upon receipt in ways other than originally intended.”277  It 
turns out that the entire intent of the project to the BTSC had also been scrapped by the new 
Chairman.  He was using the trucks not as part of a transport nationalization program for the 
State of Bombay, but on jobs within the city of Bombay, since private transport operators had 
threatened to strike in protest against nationalization.  A handwritten note, “[T]his is news!” next 
to this paragraph suggests that this was the first time that some in the DEA learned of the real use 
to which Canadian aid was being put.  Part of the problem was that of labour relations, which 
had apparently been damaged by the BTSC’s “contradictory dealings with the Ford Motor 
Company of India regarding the rate of delivery... [These have] seriously incommoded the 
Company in its employee relationships.”278  The other problem was that the new Chairman, 
Patel, believed that no less than eight to twelve thousand vehicles would be needed to nationalize 
the freight transport in Bombay, which in his view made the 835 trucks provided by Canada too 
small to be of real use for the program in his view.
279
  Rankin concludes his memo by suggesting 
that “[A] greater flow of information from Ottawa and speedier replies would be of assistance to 
all of us in India.”  While officials in Ottawa might complain about the slow pace of information 
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flowing from India, they could be guilty of this fault as well.
280
  In this assessment, Rankin 
perhaps overestimated the priority India that the DEA placed on India. 
Conclusion 
 As Canadians began to plan for the 1953-54 fiscal year, simultaneously continuing to 
work on 1952-53, their memos and correspondence show that they were on the whole unhappy 
with how the first year, and planning for the second, had progressed.  Slow communication, lack 
of information and cooperation, internal political realities and lack of expertise in India seemed 
to stall the efforts the Canadian government was making to bring its aid into India.  However, 
Canada could not claim that India was wholly to blame for the lack of progress.  Expectations 
around the pace of the work had been set too high, considering the difficult environment in 
which the Indian bureaucracy laboured.  Canada had not listened when Indian officials attempted 
to explain their priorities and needs for development, and then were surprised when Indian 
officials tried to defend these priorities and refuse aid they felt was not helpful.  The BSTC 
experience had shown that the capital aid that the Canadian government prioritized could come 
with baggage and could incur extra costs, and even strife, where it was implemented.  The 
“economic” staff of the Canadian missions who ended up with the actual work of aid projects 
were oriented toward trade and commerce beneficial for Canada, not necessarily economic 
development for India, as Rankin himself admitted.
281
    
In the late winter and early spring of 1953, Nik Cavell and Hume Wright travelled to 
South Asia to conduct a review of Canada’s Colombo Plan program and to search out the 
viability of possible future projects for consideration.  Cavell wrote a remarkable letter, marked 
“personal” to John Deutsch, who worked with the Colombo Plan in the Department of Finance.  
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Cavell stated bluntly that Canadian aid had not been welcome in India, partly because of the 
frustrations that the states had in dealing with the central government.  He noted that during his 
travels in southern India governmental officials would welcome Canadian aid except that it 
meant “getting tangled up in the red tape of the Central Government.  In any case, the Central 
Government makes them pay counter-part funds to the full extent of every nut and bolt.”282  This 
disconnect between the centre and the states had significant implications for the effectiveness of 
Canadian aid: “It is the same story in every State: Canadian aid is just a bothersome, restricting, 
and very expensive business for them.  It is no wonder that Canada makes no friends from her 
aid programme.”283  Cavell not only felt this had negative consequences for Canada’s aid 
programme - he genuinely believed in the greater goal of the entire aid project in South Asia, and 
particularly in India:  
Each time I come here I am more and more seized with a sense of the great urgency of 
the cause upon which we have embarked.  Unfortunately, time is not on our side.  The 
two countries which are vital are China and India, and I believe that the cause of human 
freedom in Asia – and perhaps eventually elsewhere – will be won or lost in the race 
which must now obviously take place to decide the pattern upon which the whole of Asia 
will eventually industrialize.  More and more it seems to me that we absolutely cannot let 
the Indian Five Year Plan to fail – if we do, (we meaning the Western World) there will 
be chaos here in India which might lead anywhere, but will almost certainly end the 
present democratic experiment.
284
 
 
The stakes could not be higher in Cavell’s view.  Getting Canadian aid “right” in India 
was not just a matter of administration, it was a matter of sustaining democracy in the world.  
Canadian aid, thus far, had failed: “I am personally appalled at the almost complete lack of any 
evidence that what we are trying to do is winning us any friends, and I believe that winning the 
very real friendship of these people is vital.”285  Nonetheless, Cavell carried on.  Clearly, it was 
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not just a job for him; he was passionate regarding the success of his work.  This was an 
uncharacteristic statement of that emotion, which was not much in evidence in the wider 
community of bureaucrats with whom he worked in Ottawa. 
One can easily see the shape of the process of modern development practice emerging out 
of the new aid program in 1951-52.  One can even see some sociological analysis on the part of 
officials, who looked to India’s cultural context for an explanation for why the program ran into 
so many initial difficulties.  However, while officials reflected on how the program could be 
changed to run more smoothly in the future, they did not reflect on deeper questions that the aid 
program might have provoked.  Cavell did think about its political impact, but other more basic 
issues are nonexistent.  For example, they accepted without question the GOI’s explanations for 
why they should support the BSTC.  Modernization and industrialization demanded 
transportation networks, supposedly an obvious contribution to potential economic growth for 
the country.  The mechanics of how transportation could translate into growth was either not 
considered, or left up to the Indian government to sort out.  Rankin noted the discord that 
Canadian aid had brought to the BTSC, but this made little impact on how the Canadian 
government conducted future business in the country. 
Despite a slow start and many frustrations, the Canadian government had committed to 
the Colombo Plan.  A letter from Wright to Deutsch in 1953 notes that a year earlier, he had been 
so frustrated with the progress of the Colombo Plan operation that he had advised the Canadian 
government should consider suspending its operation or completely changing its nature.
286
  
However, this unhappiness was related to a frustration about process rather than about results. In 
all of the many letters and memos relating to the work of the Plan in India in its first year, very 
little thought is given by officials working in Ottawa and India as to the over-arching goals of the 
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Plan, or the benefits that Canadian aid were supposed to provide to the people of India.  Nor 
could it have been expected of them.  They already had an overwhelming number of details to 
manage.  However, a newly-appointed high commissioner would soon give a great deal of 
thought to the lofty goals of the Colombo Plan.  When Escott Reid took up his post late in 1952, 
he focused on absorbing the intricacies of the Plan; he would soon become its champion. 
  
113 
 
Chapter 4: The Reid Years, Part 1 - Escott Reid Encounters India 
If Canadian officials working in the DEA wanted staff in the New Delhi mission to 
become more involved in working on the aid file, their wish was granted.  In the years that 
followed Reid’s appointment, the old adage “be careful what you wish for” may have occurred to 
some officials in Ottawa as he not only took a personal interest in the Colombo Plan and the 
issue of economic development more generally, but attempted to have a direct influence over the 
program.  While Reid’s assertion in his memoir, Envoy to Nehru, that he oversaw a “special 
relationship” between India and Canada has been debunked by historian Ryan Touhey, there is 
little doubt that he did oversee the most active and congenial years of the Canada-India 
relationship.
287
  
There are many factors that contributed to this positive exchange, not least the fine 
impression that Lester Pearson’s activities in negotiating the new Commonwealth in 1949 had 
made on Prime Minister Nehru.
288
  There was also the inevitable comparison that Nehru drew 
between Canada and the US which, according to Reid’s account of a conversation between 
Canadian Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent and the Indian prime minister, portrayed Canada in a 
favourable light.
289
  The political report that R.R. Saksena, the Indian high commissioner in 
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Ottawa, sent to New Delhi for 1953 also showed a genuine esteem for Canada, particularly the 
Canadian government’s efforts to cope with India’s non-aligned status:  
Even more, there is a breadth of vision in the outlook of the Canadian statesmen towards 
the problems which the emergence of the erstwhile subjected nations of Asia has created 
which is very refreshing and which may well exert a powerful influence in favour of the 
maintenance of peace in the world …. The Canadian Government is greatly impressed 
with the efforts which have been made by India since the attainment of independence to 
solve the herculean problems political, economic and social, with which she is faced, and 
has a much better understanding than many other states in the world of the fundamental 
principles and objectives of our foreign policy.  Our policy of non-involvement is not 
regarded here with the same suspicions and bitterness as in the United States.
290
 
 
Reid came into the job in a milieu of general positivity in the diplomatic relations between 
Canada and India. 
However, Reid’s energy and whole-hearted enthusiasm for his job as high commissioner 
also made an impact.  He developed personal relationships with the political elite in India and 
tried hard, often through lengthy despatches, not only to represent Canada in India but to 
interpret India, and particularly the actions of its prime minister, to Canada.  Reid combined the 
traits of a Cold War realist and a liberal in the emerging post-colonial reality to arrive at a 
strongly Indian-centric world view in which winning India – and through it the non-communist 
Afro-Asian world - for the West through negotiation and compromise.  In this worldview, 
western aid was a determining factor in winning the Cold War. 
It is telling that Reid entitled his memoir on his years in India Envoy to Nehru, rather than 
something like High Commissioner for Canada.  Reid greatly admired Nehru as a statesman, and 
felt that not only did Canada and India have a special relationship, but also that he as high 
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commissioner, spoke with Nehru’s voice to the Canadian administration.  In particular, Reid 
tried to explain to Canada the problems that India faced in administering aid and creating 
economic development; he also tried to interpret what many in the West, and some within the 
Canadian government itself, saw as Nehru’s ingratitude in accepting aid. India’s seeming 
reluctance to accept western aid made sense to Reid, and he understood the fine line that Nehru 
walked in both holding to his political ideals of self-sufficiency, and developing good diplomatic 
partnerships and supporting the economic development of his country.   
  This chapter will review Reid’s influences prior to and during his time as high 
commissioner.  It will argue that he was particularly swayed by the American approach toward 
its own growing aid program, and especially the style of American Ambassador Chester Bowles, 
who closely oversaw the establishment of the Point Four program in India.  In addition to 
explaining the background of the GOI’s complicated relationship with its status as a recipient of 
aid, it will also show how Reid’s thinking about Canadian aid in India evolved in the first year, 
culminating in a set of recommendations about the aid program he sent to the Canadian 
government six months into his term, which framed how he saw the Colombo Plan for the entire 
duration of his posting.  These influences led Reid to view India’s future and its relationship with 
aid less in terms of Canadian wants and needs, and more in terms of a developmental framework 
that prioritized India’s economic “progress.” The resistance Reid met following his first 
comprehensive review of the Canadian program anticipated the struggle that he would 
continually face throughout his time as high commissioner in attempting to convey his views 
about ODA to the government in Ottawa.  Both of these issues will be further explored in the 
following chapter. 
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Escott Reid becomes a diplomat 
Escott Reid grew up in Toronto, a son of an Anglican minister of modest means.  His 
mother, however, was a child of Rosedale and insisted on a quality education.
291
  As a result, 
Reid was privately educated and this, combined with his own natural intelligence, ambition, and 
determination, allowed him to enter the University of Toronto and eventually become a Rhodes 
Scholar; he earned a first class degree at Oxford.  Interestingly, Reid was taught by Roy Harrod, 
who became one of the first economists to propose an economic development theory in the early 
1940s, although there is nothing to suggest that this made an impact on Reid’s long-term 
thinking about development.  Informed by his father’s concern for egalitarianism and the 
prevalence of moralist and socialist ideals in the milieu of higher education during the 1920s and 
1930s, and a preoccupation with internationalism in opposition to the isolationism that 
characterized the Canadian government at the time, Escott Reid gravitated toward progressivism 
and eventually the socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation.
292
  After a time as national 
secretary of the newly formed Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Reid joined the 
Department of External Affairs in 1939 as the second secretary at the Canadian legation in 
Washington.
293
   
 Reid’s bright mind and work ethic brought him up the chain of command in the 1940s.  
He became the head of the Second Political Division, and later acting and then deputy under-
secretary of state for External Affairs.  In a defining moment of his career in August 1947, Reid 
wrote and circulated a memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Committee which analyzed the 
possibility of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and the implications for 
Canadian foreign policy.  The memorandum showed External Affairs’ awareness of the real 
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possibility of a third world war, the importance of the Western alliance in preventing such a war, 
and an unusual sensitivity to the colonized world.  Reid wrote that to diminish the possibility of 
war, “the first requirement is that the western Powers maintain an overwhelming balance of force 
relative to that of the Soviet Union” through a series of measures, both economic and political.  
Foreign assistance to non-communist Europe, in the spirit of the recently formulated Marshall 
Plan, was first among these measures as were economic measures to prevent another 
depression.
294
  Reid concurred with the Truman administration’s goal to create what historian 
Melvyn Leffler calls a “preponderance of power” in the new Cold War world.295  While the 
Americans wanted to shore up their strength for the possibility of war, however, the Canadian 
memorandum looked for mitigation strategies through a “balance of force.”  This would come 
about in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
296
  A strong Western alliance, the 
maintenance of American power, and a prosperous Europe were the crucial factors in staving off 
war, and ultimately defeating the potential of Soviet ideology. 
 Reid’s memorandum shared another characteristic of the Truman administration.  Leffler 
writes that the U.S. government also had a keen interest in the “periphery.”  This definition 
included not only the periphery of Soviet power in Europe and Central Asia, but the world-wide 
periphery of the colonized world.
297
  Reid’s liberalism is revealed in the memo’s call for the 
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“removal of racial discriminations” in the English-speaking world.298  It points to the Soviet 
Union’s claims to be “a defender of the oppressed” and “the champion of the poorer classes in all 
countries and of all racial minorities.”299  While it warns of the dangers of giving colonized 
peoples self-government before they are ready for it, it also says that “the dangers of not giving 
them self-government quickly are probably greater, since the longer independence is delayed the 
greater are the chances that the colonial independence movements may come under Soviet 
influence or control.”300  In this memo, Reid reveals his preoccupation with the colonies, and the 
possibility that their peoples could be exploited by Soviets to tip the balance of power 
worldwide. 
 The trip Reid took to the Colombo meeting in January 1950 also made a significant 
impact on his thinking.  He had already been greatly impressed by Nehru during the prime 
minister’s visit in October 1949, noting in a memoir that the “audience was touched in a way I 
have never before or since seen an audience of that kind at that kind of official function 
touched.”301  By all accounts, Nehru was in his finest form at the Colombo meetings and once 
again impressed Reid with his eloquence and intelligence.
302
  Reid’s sympathy for the diversity 
of the post-war Commonwealth fostered a deep interest in its new nature.  In the clumsy racialist 
language of the day, Reid reflected with enthusiasm after the meeting: 
It is a pity that there is not a newspaper man at the conference with a gift of description.  
Of the twenty-two people who were seated at the conference table, ten were coloured and 
the coloured members on the whole were much more good-looking than the non-coloured 
members.  There were various shades of colour among the coloured members, even 
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within delegations.  Most of the Ceylonese are dark chocolate with pitch-black hair and 
usually fine featured.  The Indians vary from Mr. Nehru’s pale gray to Mr. Menon’s dark 
black.
303
 
 
His delight in the multi-racial nature of the Commonwealth meeting, implied by his 
description, shows an enthusiastic welcome of this new era in international relations.  On a 
subsequent trip to New Delhi following the meeting in Colombo, the Indian minister of Health 
accompanied the Canadian delegation on a visit to some villages outside Delhi which Pearson 
referred to as “one of the most interesting of the whole trip.”  This focus on village life, and what 
this trip demonstrated in terms of poverty and want, stayed with Reid for the rest of his career.  
As he said in a speech in 1955, “I have found no one, no matter how much he has read about 
India’s poverty, who is not profoundly shocked by the poverty of the first Indian village he sees.  
It is so much worse than he expected.”304   
The Influence of Chester Bowles 
Reid landed in Delhi in November 1952, nearing the untimely end of Chester Bowles’ 
tenure as Ambassador to India from the United States, whose stay in India was cut short by his 
strong Democratic attachments and the election of a Republican, Dwight Eisenhower, to the 
presidency.  Bowles and Reid shared many similarities.  Both were prototypical liberals of their 
era, both were ambitious and worked to make their mark in government, and both were 
workaholics and had a predilection for writing long and, to their readers, occasionally 
exasperating despatches. They also could be insensitive to political nuance, which ultimately 
damaged both of their careers in government.  While Bowles had come to government from 
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business, he carried a certain antipathy to that world and was of a strongly progressive mind.
305
  
Bowles held similar views about the importance of anti-racism as well, and was sensitive to that 
particular preoccupation in India.
306
  Reid openly sympathized with the Democratic Party, and 
although not much exists in the way of correspondence between the two, it is clear that Bowles’ 
approach as ambassador had a strong influence on Reid’s career as high commissioner. 
Bowles came to India late in Truman’s administration in 1951.  He later reprised his role 
as ambassador to India under the Kennedy/Johnson administrations between 1963 and 1969, 
after an unhappy experience as under-secretary of state.  While it is impossible to know how 
much Bowles’ actions influenced Reid and how much of the similarity in their approaches was 
coincidental, it is worth considering the parallels between the two.  Bowles’ attempts to make his 
government understand the importance of India to worldwide international stability, as well as 
the function of aid in that mandate, may have influenced Reid.  Also, Bowles’ close involvement 
and personal oversight of the US aid program also probably made an impact on Reid. 
 Bowles’ strongly advocated for aid during his time as ambassador.  He lobbied the 
president and the Senate Foreign Relations’ Committee directly to appeal for greater amounts of 
ODA.  His primary argument – a refrain that would become familiar for readers of Reid’s 
despatches to Ottawa – was that aid was essential to “win” India against the tide of communism, 
and that India represented the key to securing all of South and Southeast Asia for the non-
communist side of the Cold War.  He also argued, like Reid would do, that it was important not 
                                                          
305
 In his political memoir, Bowles seems unusually reluctant to discuss his extraordinary success in business as an 
ad executive on Madison Avenue, commenting that he believed that he would have “been happier and more 
effective if I had gone into public service immediately following my graduation from college.” Chester Bowles, 
Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 10.  Perhaps he worried 
that revealing too much about his success in business would undermine his liberal credentials. 
306
 For example, he noted in one letter in 1951 that “Every time I speak at a university gathering or group, the negro 
question inevitably absorbs half the question period. … If we are unable to tackle this problem in an all-out manner, 
I can only say that we cannot expect to hold or to win the friendship of the one billion human beings who live in 
Asia.” Yale University Archives, Chester Bowles papers, Chester Bowles to Howland H. Sargeant, 24 December 
1951, Box 96, 4. 
121 
 
to censure India for their non-aligned position, but to accept and work with it. In December 
1951, he wrote letters to Howland Sargeant, deputy assistant secretary of state, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson, and President Truman to lobby for increased aid.  To the President he wrote:   
If India goes in the next few years, it is likely that all of South Asia and the Middle East 
will also go.  If India, on the other hand, under a democratic government grows stronger, 
all of the free nations of the South Asia and the Middle East will be buttressed and the 
effects may be felt in China…. And yet I do not believe that our chances of maintaining 
an independent, democratic India are particularly good unless we are willing to take a 
long-range view.  This would involve greater acceptance of the position which India is 
striving to maintain, much as we may disagree with that position.  It also calls for some 
far-sighted although relatively modest economic aid, which is essential if India is to 
provide a fundamental answer to her food problem.  An economic investment in India, no 
greater than our present economic and military investment in Formosa, on an annual basis 
for five years could produce startling results.
307
 
 
He continued these lobbying efforts with some success, but not to the extent that he had hoped.  
Between 1952 and 1957, the US invested an average of US$65.5 million in foreign assistance in 
India.  This was a dramatic increase from the US$4.5 million of the Indo-American Technical 
Agreement signed in 1950, but a far cry from the US$200 to US$250 million per year he 
proposed.
308
   
In what would also become a feature of Escott Reid’s time in India, Bowles took very 
direct authority over all aspects of the American embassy in New Delhi, and tried to become 
acquainted with the country outside of the normal diplomatic circles.  When he agreed to become 
ambassador, Bowles had made two requests of Truman: 
First, I would want not only to deal officially with India’s central government but also to 
meet and know the regional and local government leadership and, indeed, the Indian 
people themselves; this meant that I should be free to travel extensively throughout India.  
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Second, since I would be responsible for the effectiveness of all U.S. Government 
programs there—the United States Information Service, our economic development 
program and other activities—I should be authorized to select all key personnel and 
generally to direct their operations.  Truman had agreed on both of these points, and as a 
result, my role had been considerably broader than that of most other American 
ambassadors.
309
 
 
His commitment to knowing the people of India, and travelling outside of the capital, made him 
a well-liked ambassador.  He sent his children to an Indian, rather than an international school, 
and could even be seen riding on bicycles with his family around New Delhi.
310
  His strong 
oversight of the embassy, and of the aid program in particular, is reflected in the sheer volume of 
documents related to foreign assistance in his personal papers.  Even when Bowles was able to 
secure an embassy official whose only job it was to look after the aid program, he still 
maintained strong control over the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) work in the 
mission.  When Clifford Wilson became Director of the Technical Cooperation mission in India 
late in 1951, the post was “under the administrative direction of the Chief of Mission and under 
the administrative direction of the Administrator in Washington” and that all “telegraphic 
correspondence with the Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration should be 
prepared for the signature of the Chief of Mission.”311     
 Bowles’ actions did not go unnoticed by Reid.  In addition to reporting on his meetings 
with Bowles in his despatches, the Canadian High Commission’s 1952 Annual Review stated 
that: 
[Indian] [r]elations with the United States continued to improve throughout the year, due 
largely to the energy and resourcefulness of Mr. Chester Bowles, who not only interested 
himself in community projects, the Five Year Plan and other developments dear to India, 
but also secured a unique place in the confidence of Mr. Nehru, replacing [UK high 
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commissioner] Sir Archibald Nye in that position.  Mr. Bowles was careful throughout 
his tenure of office to identify himself and his Mission prominently with the work of the 
TCA.
312
 
 
Reid also tried to identify himself and his mission prominently with the work of the Colombo 
Plan.  In his memoir, he mentions that in the immediate days after his arrival in India, Sir Girja 
Bajpai, the Governor of Bombay State, told him what he believed to be the success of Bowles’ 
tenure: “he had based his actions on four beliefs: India’s foreign policy was its own affair; 
United States help to India was not charity but was in the interests of the United States; when 
India differed from the United States on foreign policy, it was not necessarily being perverse; the 
way to detach China from the Soviet Union was to woo it.”313  While Reid does not go on to 
credit Bowles in his memoirs for having an influence on his thinking, it is apparent that the high 
commissioner valued the ambassador’s approach.  Throughout his time as high commissioner, he 
maintained a direct interest in the aid program, and frequently referred to the practices and habits 
of the US aid administration in India, as well as other US-based organizations, as examples for 
Canada to emulate. 
Reid the High Commissioner 
 During Reid’s time as high commissioner, Canada undertook a number of aid projects 
under the Colombo Plan.  He already had some knowledge and association with it, being present 
at its creation in his role as deputy under-secretary of state for External Affairs. He had also 
participated in the meetings of the Interdepartmental Group on Technical Assistance, the inter-
departmental group of officials that oversaw matters relating directly to technical assistance.  In 
addition to technical assistance, which included the training of Indian students at Canadian 
educational institutions, Canada participated in two dam projects, the Umtru dam in Assam, now 
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in the state of Meghalaya, and the Mayurakshi or Massanjore dam in West Bengal, now in the 
state of Jharkhand.  In addition to commodity assistance in the form of wheat, Canada had 
funded the provision of Canadian copper and aluminum to India while also giving Canadian-
built locomotives and participating in the now infamous donation of a nuclear research reactor to 
India.  To what extent these projects can be counted as “successes” depends very much on one’s 
perspective.  Delays, miscommunication, social turmoil and technical problems plagued those 
involved with these projects.  For example, in the case of the Mayurakshi project, 144 villages 
were submerged and 15,000 tribal Santhal peoples were forcibly relocated in order to make way 
for the dam in what must have been a devastating upheaval for those communities.
314
  However, 
they were successful in the sense that they were completed; the dams were built, the 
locomotives, wheat and other commodities were delivered, and the nuclear reactor came online, 
although only after Reid’s departure. 
Much of this can certainly be credited to Reid’s work.  In a draft of a letter of instruction 
given to Reid regarding economic development in India, the DEA noted that they considered that 
“the successful handling of Colombo Plan business is one of the more important responsibilities 
of the Mission.”  They also notified Reid of their intention to “call upon your office, far more 
than we have formerly, to co-operate actively in making the best possible use of the Canadian 
contribution to the Colombo Plan.”  As the previous chapter shows, appropriate communication 
was one of the most significant areas that needed work in conducting Colombo Plan operations.  
With a new high commissioner, the opportunity for a fresh start in how the Canadian government 
used the mission in New Delhi presented itself.  In the letter, the government noted that their 
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attempts to communicate with the GOI through the Indian mission had “proved challenging” and 
was “in general, unsatisfactory.” 315  As a result, the DEA decided to try a different approach and 
use the office of the Canadian high commission as the primary method of communication, which 
of course required mission staff to liaise and build stronger relationships with Indian officials.
316
 
Reid took on this challenge by holding meetings as regularly as possible, which he 
himself attended, with officials within the Indian Ministry of Finance responsible for conducting 
the affairs of the Colombo Plan.  He also engaged directly at the political level when he felt that 
the situation warranted it, meeting with and writing directly to the finance minister in order to 
hurry along the planning process and decision-making within the Indian government.  He wrote 
that it was necessary for the Canadian mission to “undertake a careful, friendly, but constant 
process of ‘needling’ of the Indian officials concerned,” in addition to doing some of the work 
for the Indians due to their extreme workloads.
317
  Like Warwick Chipman before him, Reid also 
cautioned Ottawa to be patient with India, noting that only two or three officials in the ministry 
were responsible for all the Colombo Plan work: “Sometimes, in fact, I have the impression that 
Colombo Plan matters do not receive close attention until we inform the Ministry of Finance that 
we are proposing to call on them.”318  Increasing the frequency of visits by the high 
commissioner and his mission staff probably did, then, make a difference to productivity. 
 It was this willingness to try to understand and interpret the Indian perspective that made 
Reid both an effective and ineffective high commissioner.  He was effective in improving the 
relationship between Canada and India, although that relationship was never as large or 
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important as he believed it to be.  Certainly, sometimes Reid’s overwhelming belief in his own 
familiarity with India, its leadership and its culture, led him to be clumsy and insensitive.
319
  
However, he did make a real attempt to come to grips with the Indian perspective on western aid, 
and to interpret that perspective to Ottawa.  He felt that it was essential to understand the Indian 
point of view and work with it.  For Reid, aid was an important tool in the fight against 
communist influence and in terms of convincing Nehru’s administration that support from the 
West was worthwhile.  This was a different perspective than that coming from some observers in 
the US and Canada who believed that Nehru was too friendly with the communist world and 
might be susceptible to its influence.  Reid’s time as high commissioner coincided with a crucial 
era in India’s economic history, one in which Nehru tried to strike a delicate balance between 
accepting aid, retaining political independence and non-alignment, and implementing his 
approach to economic development and planning. 
Reluctant Beneficiaries: India’s Approach toward Aid 
To Reid’s credit, he was always an active learner and truly tried to understand Indian 
history, society, and politics; the era in which he lived gave much to study.  His years in New 
Delhi were a time of great confidence for the INC, fresh off an overwhelming electoral victory 
and full of optimism for the many possibilities that independence seemed to offer. Soon after 
India’s independence in 1947, the National Planning Committee officially became the National 
Planning Commission (NPC), with Nehru remaining as chair. In 1952, the Commission released 
India’s First Five-Year Plan, although it was widely acknowledged not to represent a true “plan,” 
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but rather a summary of projects already in development.  One of the problems it faced from the 
beginning was a lack of reliable data about the state of the Indian economy.  The government 
attempted to resolve this concern by appointing Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis in 1949 as 
honorary adviser to the temporary Union cabinet.  Mahalanobis had already made a name for 
himself in India as its foremost statistician, founding the Indian Statistical Institute in Calcutta in 
1931.  He had quickly risen to prominence as not only the government’s statistician, but also the 
foremost economic adviser to the newly formed NPC.
320
 In the early 1950s, he began to develop 
and elaborate a simple model of economic growth he later compared to the Harrod-Domar 
model, developed by the UK economist and Reid’s former teacher, Roy Harrod and his 
Russian/American colleague, Evsey Domar.
321
 In 1954, Mahalanobis toured Western and 
Eastern Europe and North America, meeting economists and planners to learn how planning and 
economic growth were achieved elsewhere.
322
  The Norwegian economist, Ragnar Frisch, also 
came to the Indian Statistical Institute to advise Mahalanobis on the formulation of the plan, 
along with eminent economists such as John Strachey, Kenneth Galbraith, Nicholas Kaldor and 
Oscar Lange in what became known as the “Mahalanobis Zoo.”323  As will be discussed later in 
this chapter, Mahalanobis devised an extremely ambitious strategy for the second five-year plan. 
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Financial resources, and in particular foreign exchange resources, had been a contested 
issue within India, its government and within Congress since 1947.  In the early years of India’s 
independence, the policy of the government toward foreign aid can best be summarized, (and to 
paraphrase former Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s 1942 statement in parliament on 
conscription), as aid if necessary, but not necessarily aid; it welcomed foreign aid as a method to 
speed India’s development plans, but it would not welcome aid if it compromised its own foreign 
and domestic policies. Further, while aid might be necessary for Indian economic development, 
the sooner that it could be dispensed with the better.  In both public and private, Nehru stated this 
policy repeatedly.  In a speech to the US House of Representatives in 1949, for example, he said 
that “though our economic potential is great, its conversion into finished wealth will need much 
mechanical and technological aid.  We shall, therefore, gladly welcome such aid and cooperation 
on terms that are of mutual benefit.… But we do not seek any material advantage in exchange for 
any part of our hard-won freedom.”324  While accepting that aid was helpful and even at times 
necessary, Nehru worried that it would weaken the moral character of India by breeding a culture 
of dependence among India’s citizens.325  He also thought the Five-Year Plans should function 
independently of foreign aid.  This element of pride is evident in an anecdote told by C.D. 
Deshmukh about Nehru’s 1949 trip in an interview he gave in 1967.  Deshmukh had also been 
sent to the United States to negotiate a loan for wheat.  According to the former minister, the US 
Ambassador to India, Loy Henderson, told Deshmukh that Nehru simply had to ask then-
president, Harry Truman, for a loan to purchase wheat and it would be delivered, despite 
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Pakistan protests.  Nehru “never said the word.”  Deshmukh lamented that, “When they 
introduced point 4 and so on, he was very chary about this.  This was part of his set attitude.”326   
Nehru’s attitude toward aid, especially from the United States, did not change in the 
following years.  In 1951, The Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act of 1951 or the “Battle 
Act” as it was known after its sponsor, Representative Laurie C. Battle, directed the US to 
terminate aid to any country found to be shipping arms or strategic goods to Soviet-dominated 
areas, or countries which maintained friendly relations with the USSR.  Following this Act, the 
US government had sought an agreement with India to embargo goods prohibited by it.  Prime 
Minister Nehru responded negatively, writing that such an agreement “surely means a direct 
interference with our policy.”327  When the US tried to enforce the act after India shipped 
thorium nitrate to China, Nehru told the ambassador George Allen that the act would have 
absolutely no bearing on how India conducted its foreign policy.
328
  A far more major issue for 
Nehru and the GOI was the US relationship with Pakistan following Dwight Eisenhower’s 
election as president in November 1952. In May 1954, the US and Pakistan signed a Mutual 
Defence Assistance Agreement, which provided for extensive military assistance to India’s 
unfriendly neighbour, while in 1955, Pakistan was one of the founding members of the South 
East Asia Treaty Organization, backstopped by the US.
329
  This strengthened Nehru’s non-
aligned position and increased his suspicions of both American aid and any US-government 
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supported activity in the country.  He discouraged educational exchange programs between the 
United States and India, and became concerned about the increasing numbers of Americans in 
the country, particularly those he suspected of disseminating anti-communist propaganda.
330
   
Despite Nehru’s perspective on the issue, many within government felt that the resources 
were needed.  In a series of documents related to the Truman administration’s newly-developed 
Point Four program of technical assistance, this contradiction between the political and the 
policy levels of government is obvious.
331
  In 1949, B.K. Nehru, a high-ranking official in 
India’s Washington embassy and Jawaharlal Nehru’s nephew, met with Donald D. Kennedy, 
Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs at the State Department to discuss the Plan. 
Kennedy explained that his department would send out “highly qualified technical officers” from 
the United States to help India with various industries.  B.K. Nehru’s gave a negative response: 
“[o]ne thing, however, struck me prominently and that was that in my view it would be a waste 
of effort to give us a plethora of technical advice when we did not have the wherewithal to 
implement in action the advice that might be given to us.”332 India did not need technical advice, 
B.K. Nehru observed, saying to Kennedy that “it was not that we did not know what to do but 
that we did not have the means of doing it.”333  In contrast to this view, upon receiving B.K. 
Nehru’s report, the Secretariat of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet in New Delhi reported 
in its minutes that “it was the general opinion that an unduly pessimistic view of the possible 
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extent of assistance to India under the Point Four Programme need not be taken at this stage.”334  
Indeed, the cabinet committee took an opposing view, believing that technical assistance might 
be valuable. To that end, it asked each ministry to send the Economic Committee a list of 
priorities for technical advice in the case that India received Point Four Plan assistance.  This 
activity suggests a diversity of opinions about aid within the Indian government. It also reflected 
the seriousness of the Indian economic and financial situation in the years following 
independence.
335
   
This same opposition to Nehru’s attitude toward aid can be found in a gloomy letter that 
Gulzarilal Nanda, a member of the Planning Commission and twice acting prime minister during 
the 1960s, wrote to C.D. Deshmukh, the country’s new finance minister.  Nanda did not share 
the same optimism for India’s economy that so many others felt at that time:  
I may confess that I have been oppressed by our patent inability to discover adequate 
financial resources for meeting the needs of development on even a very modest scale.  In 
fact, so meagre are the resources in sight that with the unabating increase in population, 
there is hardly any prospect of economic progress for the country for some years ahead—
no appreciable rise in the standard of living and no substantial addition to our industrial 
potential.
336
  
 
Later in the letter, Nanda noted that “For any significant effort a somewhat massive dose of 
external aid seems an inescapable need of the economic situation of the country, but this matter 
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is now outside the ken of the Planning Commission.”337  Matters of foreign aid, Nanda implied, 
were a political problem for the external affairs ministry, not the NPC.  Political realities and the 
needs of development might conflict: “Much of what needs to be done in this country now is not 
the economists’ or the planners’ job.  No plan which does not match the political realities [and] 
fit into the political environment can have a chance.”338  It was this political reality, in particular 
the reality of the Cold War, which determined the GOI’s approach to foreign aid in Nehru’s 
India.   
 Deshmukh also seemed to have an ambivalent attitude toward receiving aid.  On the one 
hand, George Allen, the US ambassador who had replaced Bowles, observed to Reid that he had 
the impression that Deshmukh believed the US was “forcing aid” on India.339  However, as noted 
above, Deshmukh seemed frustrated with Nehru’s “chary” attitude toward aid.  He definitely had 
more open-minded views, as shown in the minutes of a consultative committee meeting held in 
Ottawa in September 1954.  Deshmukh said during the course of that meeting that without aid, 
“we would have to make a supreme attempt to reduce our own current consumption,” and that if 
there were no foreign assistance available, India would “get on as best as we can,” but rather 
than doubling the national income in 21 years as they had planned, they would have to do it in 
40.
340
  Reid wrote in a 1954 despatch that there were rumours that Deshmukh’s failed attempt to 
resign from government that year, (he had already tried to resign twice before), was a result of 
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Nehru’s wish to make an announcement that US aid would no longer be welcome.341  
Deshmukh’s own correspondence with the prime minister shows that more complex issues 
caused the erstwhile resignation attempt and involved a strong disagreement with the comptroller 
and auditor general, A.K. Chanda.
342
  However, there is no doubt that Deshmukh felt an 
extraordinary pressure to find the necessary resources for India’s development and felt that 
Nehru and his party were being unrealistic and irresponsible in their consideration of India’s 
finances.  Deshmukh felt that Nehru’s government was unwilling to accept the fiscal “discipline” 
and the central controls on spending that he felt should be implemented by the finance ministry. 
This is a theme that pervades all of his letters of resignation throughout his years as minister.
343
  
Therefore, while Nehru was reluctant about accepting aid, especially from the United States, not 
all of his colleagues, either at the political or administrative level, felt the same way.
344
 
 Reid was sensitive to the problems Nehru faced in trying to find a balance between 
funding economic development and remaining politically independent.  He understood Nehru’s 
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quest for self-sufficiency and the pride that went along with it.  He told Allen that he “could not 
but sympathize with the Indian reluctance to ask for aid” as Canadians took pride in the fact that 
they were the only allies of the US which had not taken lend lease aid, and that he admired this 
attitude.
345
  Reid also recognized that Nehru was under pressure within his country and party to 
divest India of western aid, particularly following various arms agreement between the US and 
Pakistan, and the American training of Pakistani military officers.  In a conversation with the 
secretary general of the ministry of external affairs, N.R. Pillai, in 1955, secretary general told 
the high commissioner that while he had historically supported western aid, he found it 
increasingly difficult to defend this policy.  Pillai also said that Nehru was feeling more “hurt” 
by criticism in western countries of the perception that India willingly accepted aid from the 
West but then opposed western foreign policy, such as a cartoon in the UK magazine Punch 
which showed Nehru with four hands, one of which was taking aid from the West and the other 
from the East.
346
 
 This dynamic was obviously more prominent in the US-India relationship than in the 
Canada-India relationship.  However, one incident did occur which showed that Canadian 
officials were not immune to this type of thinking, despite Reid’s efforts to prevent it from 
growing within the Canadian government.  In 1955 the Canadian and American governments 
observed with dismay the magnificent welcome that the government of India gave to the premier 
of the USSR, Nikolai Bulganin, and the First Secretary of the communist party, Nikita 
Khruschev, in 1955.  Following the visit, Pearson gave a press conference in New York in which 
he stated that he felt that India seemed to give more public credit to the tiny amount of aid 
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provided by the USSR than to the large amounts of aid provided by western countries such as the 
U.S.
347
  The public nature of this grievance displeased the Indian government.
348
  Still, India 
treated the matter gently.  Subimal Dutt, the foreign secretary, met with Reid not to “protest” the 
comments but to “clarify” that India did appreciate aid from the United States, but still felt free 
to criticize aspects of American foreign policy with which they disagreed.  Reid counselled 
patience to Pearson since he had “touched Nehru on a sensitive spot.”349  While Nehru had been 
“boorish” in not bothering to thank American Congressmen for aid when he had visited the 
statesmen, he also reminded Pearson of the internal pressure Nehru felt: “He is so afraid of 
giving the impression that the acceptance of aid limits India’s freedom of action that he has given 
the impression that India is not grateful for the aid.”350  Yet Reid also must have been aware, 
probably through his direct contact with officials in the Ministry of Finance, that an openness to 
aid also existed in the GOI.  He came to believe that, as he put it, “It is not only a question of 
giving more help; it is giving the help in the right way.”351  The Indians “don’t like getting help 
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from abroad.  They won’t ask for it and they are ungracious about receiving it.”352  Therefore, the 
answer was to give aid in the right way. 
Escott Reid’s Recommendations 
 It did not take long for Reid to come to some general conclusions about how he would 
like to see Canadian aid proceed.  By May 1953, only six months after taking up the position of 
high commissioner, he felt confident enough in his opinions about the aid program to begin 
advocating for a changed approach.  In a 4 May summary of Cavell’s recent visit to India, Reid 
warned that the Canadian focus on sending manufactured goods to India severely limited the 
scope of the program and imposed difficulties on India, writing that there was even a danger that 
the Indians could simply declare themselves unable to come up with any more projects to fund: 
“it became clear to us ... that the field for Canadian participation in development projects by the 
provision of equipment manufactured in Canada was, in fact, more limited than we had been 
inclined to think.”353  Since Canadian goods were generally more expensive than world market 
prices, Reid questioned the value of such aid to India.
354
  This closely echoed Bhattacharya’s 
sentiments, a sign that Reid took the Indian viewpoint seriously.   
On 13 May, Reid sent a thirteen-page despatch to the secretary of state for External 
Affairs (SSEA), with an additional a five-page annex, outlining his recommendations for the 
organizational aspects of the Colombo Plan.  The length and detail of the document shows Reid’s 
high level of involvement with the program, and also the impact his observations of the 
American program had made in his views, and perhaps the views of this staff, on the direction of 
Canadian aid.  Recommendations included: making the Canadian high commission in New Delhi 
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the only line of communication between the Indian and Canadian governments on Colombo Plan 
matters; creating a new Indo-Canadian agreement in place of the previous “Statement of 
Principles” signed in September of 1951 with “a more detailed agreement along the lines of the 
Indo-American Technical Cooperation Agreement of January 5, 1952”; following “the practice 
of the United States and the Ford Foundation” in replacing the traditional method of an exchange 
of letters on Canadian aid projects with more formal and detailed operational agreements; 
signing all these agreements in New Delhi for “maximum publicity”; and adding additional staff 
to the mission to cope with the increased work pertaining to the Colombo Plan.
355
 Reid also 
complained that Colombo Plan matters had taken up so much of his time in the preceding months 
that he had been “unable to discharge my other responsibilities as High Commissioner.”356  
There was no question that Reid focused a large part of his time solely on the Canadian aid 
program.  He also attached a short personal letter to Dana Wilgress, who was then finishing his 
time as USSEA, bringing attention particularly to the idea of operational agreements and an 
expanded mission. 
 Reid’s bold strategy for changing the aid program did not pay off.  He knew that the long 
despatch, with its many recommended changes to the program, might land hard in Ottawa, and 
come as a “shock” to those reading it.357  However, he also thought that the lengthy rationale he 
made for the alterations would persuade at least some of its recipients.  When he received a letter 
in late June from Wilgress that declined to entertain the changes that Reid recommended, he took 
it as a sign that he did not make his reasoning clear enough: “the more I try to explain the 
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problems as I see it from here, the more misunderstandings I seem to create in Ottawa among my 
old friends and colleagues … I feel sure that if we could meet up for one evening’s talk we could 
clear up the misunderstandings.”358  Reid then went on to explain that if Canada were to get 
value for its money in the Colombo Plan program, he needed increased staff, and publicity 
matters should be considered in a more rational way. 
359
   
On 28 July, Wilgress again responded negatively.  On 3 September the high 
commissioner wrote to Charles Ritchie, who had taken over from Wilgress as acting USSEA, re-
stating his position, and calling the correspondence with the former under-secretary “the most 
unsatisfactory… I have ever got involved in.”360  While he blamed himself for the problem, 
recognizing that his correspondence to the department had been too long for a busy official to 
successfully absorb, Reid still believed that the problem was one of misunderstanding.  He did 
not consider that officials in Ottawa understood his ideas and simply disagreed with them.
361
  
 Still, Reid did not give up on this method of persuasion, and on 6 August sent a rather 
lengthy fourteen-page personal letter to A.E. Ritchie, asking for “advice” on some ideas before 
he officially proposed them to Ottawa.  In this letter he introduced the idea of the “project 
approach” as a possible venue through which Canada could give aid.  The famed 
environmentalist and development economist, Barbara Ward, and her husband, Commander 
Robert Jackson, had proposed the idea to Reid and he felt it might be one way to increase the 
number of projects that might be of interest to Canada; the whole project approach proposed that 
the foreign donor would pay for the entire cost of a project, rather than assuming only part of the 
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cost along with the recipient government.
362
  He argued in favour of the whole project approach 
as being possibly superior to that of the capital equipment approach, which simply provided 
some equipment to be used on one or more projects.  Providing funds for the whole project, Reid 
asserted, would give Canada more flexibility and choice.
363
   
He also introduced a new idea to Ritchie, one that would soon become the hallmark of his 
lobbying efforts on the aid program: the idea of a line of credit to India in addition to, or in place 
of, the grant aid that Canada already gave.  Noting the gap between India’s projected spending 
and revenue in the First Five Year Plan, Reid proposed “a line of credit … in much the same way 
as we gave the United Kingdom a line of credit immediately after the war.”364  Reid then made a 
suggestion that perhaps Colombo Plan technical assistance activities could be transferred to the 
UN.  He ended on an ominous note, summarizing the argument of a new book he had recently 
received, Maurice Zinkin’s Asia and the West: “the interests of the West would be gravely 
endangered if India were to follow China into communism or anarchy.  India will probably go 
this way unless there is a steady, even though slow, rise in the standard of living of the mass of 
the people,” and that the Five Year Plan was the minimum needed to accomplish this.365  This 
lengthy and somewhat meandering letter is representative of Reid’s approach to aid.  Informed 
by the ideas of “experts” such as Ward, his own perceptions influenced by critics like Zinkin, 
and his own ideas gained from his experience in India, he felt well placed to give important 
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advice to officials operating in frosty, far-away Ottawa, who might not understand the real 
problems faced on the ground.     
Conclusion 
The distance between Reid and his audience in Ottawa was more than physical.  Their 
priorities and the scope of their ambitions were different.  Viewed from the perspective of 
Ottawa, where the DF, the Bank of Canada, and the Auditor General’s office sat much closer, 
officials working in the DTC and the DEA had a much more guarded approach to the entire 
program.  The objectives of the Canadian program were outlined clearly to Reid in a despatch to 
the high commissioner’s office on 18 August 1953.  In this document, the SSEA’s office 
authorized Reid to begin negotiations on future projects, clearly warning Reid to ensure that the 
conversations remained “exploratory.”366  They asked the high commissioner to keep in mind the 
following objectives: that aid should take the form of Canadian equipment, supplied from 
Canada; that each project was backed by a sound justification in “economic development terms”; 
to choose projects where “the identity of Canadian aid can be preserved”; and that specific 
proposals be made if any new counterpart funds were to be generated by these projects.
367
  The 
projects should be, in the opinion of the DEA, commercially appealing, rigorously sound, and 
visibly Canadian.  It was a pragmatic and limited approach.  Other than a shared concern that 
Canada get its due credit in India, by the summer of 1953 Reid and Ottawa were already thinking 
on fairly different trajectories about the purposes of Canadian aid. 
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Chapter 5: The Reid Years, Part 2 - Escott Reid Battles Ottawa 
Reid made a positive impact on the aid program by developing relationships with those 
political and bureaucratic members of the GOI who oversaw the aid program, particularly in the 
Indian Ministry of Finance.  Occasionally, he even used direct political pressure in order to 
ensure improved communication between Ottawa and New Delhi and faster results from aid 
expenditure. Reid’s approach and recommendations, which included a wholesale reorganization 
of the Colombo Plan program to make available large lines of credit in place of the small grants 
that Canada contributed, elicited some interest.  However, increasingly during his tenure these 
proposals met with opposition in Ottawa.  His tendency to look for inspiration from, and 
partnerships with, other aid agencies and organizations, usually American, and his predisposition 
to follow his own thoughts about aid projects and make decisions prior to consultation with 
officials in Ottawa ruffled feathers.   
In Ottawa, Canadian priorities surrounding aid were much more straightforward.  
Officials demanded efficiency, accountability, and fiscal responsibility from the aid program in 
India. It faced scrutiny in Ottawa; this was made clear, as this chapter will show, through the 
involvement of the auditor general’s office on the issue of counterpart funds between 1953 and 
1955.  Ottawa also desired new markets for Canadian goods and the potential to improve 
Canadian industry and employment through the aid program.  In particular, Nik Cavell believed 
that Colombo Plan spending should be distinctively Canadian, uncompromisingly bilateral, and 
combatted Reid’s multilateral approach.  Their very different views about aid led to a 
professional rivalry during their respective times as high commissioner and administrator, which 
will also be reviewed in this chapter. 
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Throughout his career in the civil service and as a diplomat, Reid’s dogged determination 
served him for both good and ill.  Arnold Heeney once wrote of Reid that he had a “natural 
disposition to carry the torch high in every direction simultaneously.”368  However, this 
enthusiasm, combined with ambition, was often tainted by pretension and arrogance.  He worked 
long hours, sometimes at the expense of his own health, and his high ideals occasionally guided 
him past the point of good sense.  His long despatches were at times marked by alarmism. In the 
1950s, good sense was perhaps the defining ideal of Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 
and partially as a result of his own nature, and partially as a result of international political 
circumstances, Reid never made the impact as high commissioner that he strongly coveted. 
Counterpart Funds: A View from Ottawa 
Officials in Ottawa had their own reasons for thinking more narrowly about Canadian 
ODA.  Although by 1953 the aid program had received a generalized political support, they were 
of course still obligated to use aid funds in a transparent and sensible way.  This sensibility was 
encouraged by the scrutiny of their colleagues, particularly in the DF and in the auditor general’s 
office.  The clearest example of the pressures that officials in Ottawa felt, and how it manifested 
in their treatment of aid, may be found in the battles that the IETCD and the DEA had with the 
auditor general over counterpart funds.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, every Colombo 
Plan expenditure had to be approved by cabinet.  Therefore, each project had to be rigorously 
justified in terms of its benefits to Canada and India before it could be presented to cabinet.  One 
area where this did not apply was that of counterpart fund expenditure which could be spent 
without cabinet approval.  Although this might have initially been thought of as liberating, 
counterpart funds gave no end of trouble to both Canadian and Indian officials.  
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Secondly, counterpart funds posed serious accounting challenges.  As stated previously, 
counterpart funds were generated by Canadian goods that had been freely granted to the Indian 
government but sold within India, either directly to the public or to a state government.  These 
funds were to be set aside in a separate account, as directed by the Statement of Principles signed 
between Canada and India.  Two problems appeared.  One was the difficulty in getting the Indian 
government to provide regular, detailed statements about the accounts.  The second was the 
problem that in theory, counterpart funds could go on ad infinitum.  The counterpart funds 
generated by the initial aid could then potentially be used to generate more revenue, for example, 
via interest on a loan.  Did Canada claim the revenue generated by this secondary use of 
counterpart funds, and should it try to control how those monies were spent?  If this secondary 
project also generated funds, should Canada claim control over that too?  These issues led the 
auditor general’s office to question the use and possible abuses of counterpart funds in the 
summer of 1953, at a time when the DTC and DEA were seeking to gain approval to use 
counterpart funds toward funding the Mayurakshi dam project.  On 24 August, Watson Seller, 
the auditor general, sent a letter to the under-secretary of state for external affairs (USSEA) 
suggesting that better accounting practices be implemented in order to control the use of the 
funds.  He also included the more serious statement that “This office entertains doubts ... of 
certain actions taken, and so will note the situation in the Report to the House.”369  These doubts 
pertained to the use of Colombo Plan assistance to provide help in the form of wheat.  The 
auditor general shared C.D. Howe’s concern that wheat did not really benefit Indian economic 
development.
370
  As promised, Sellar cast doubt on the extent to which the Colombo Plan was 
meeting its targets in the 1953 report: 
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Section 70 of the Financial Administration Act requires that attention be drawn to any 
case where an appropriation ‘was applied to a purpose or in a manner not authorized by 
Parliament’.  The case now referred to involved the application given to Vote 114, which 
reads: ‘To Provide for and authorize grants or loans to governments of countries in South 
and South East Asia to assist in the economic development of such countries, and special 
administrative expenses in connection therewith.  The Significant words are: “to assist in 
the economic development of such countries”.371 
 
He then went on to explain the counterpart funds process, but noted that the Indian government 
had not, as yet, sent any kind of certificate that would prove that the rupees generated from the 
wheat sale had been used toward economic development: “For these reasons, the charge to Vote 
687 [in] 1951-52 must still be regarded as having been made in connection with a purchase of 
wheat.”  In other words, without the certified reports, there was no way to prove that the money 
supposedly spent on the Colombo Plan had actually been spent for the purpose of economic 
development and could therefore be in violation of the law.  Certainly, Sellar’s 24 August letter 
to Wrong leaves some doubt about whether or not the expenditure could be considered 
legitimate. 
A reply dated several months later on 5 January 1954 explained that the high 
commissioner had been working on the Indian government to submit certified reports on the 
funds, and promises had been made by India to provide annual reports.  It also stated that 
counterpart funds in fact represented a “double contribution to development.”372  An unsigned 
memo attached to the letter detailed the instances where parliament had been informed of all the 
expenditures associated with the counterpart funds.
373
 
Skepticism about counterpart funds also came from the Department of Finance.  On 22 
February, Robert Bryce, then the clerk of the privy council but who had earlier been the assistant 
deputy minister of finance, wrote a letter to Ritchie critiquing the use of counterpart funds for the 
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Mayurakshi project: “the real effect of this application of counterpart funds must surely be 
simply to ease the budgetary problems of India and spare funds for other projects in regard to 
which we will have neither influence nor association.”374  A.E. Ritchie sent a four-page reply to 
Bryce, arguing that this reading of the situation was incorrect.  Ritchie asserted that since 
counterpart funds went to the GOI’s special development fund, and not to general revenue, they 
accelerated India’s economic development “without additional inflation.”375  Ritchie also argued 
that Canada did not have an unlimited choice of projects to contribute to since they were 
confined by India’s priorities through the Five Year Plan and that Mayurakshi was a “pretty good 
(even an excellent) project.”376  Counterpart funds were somewhat ephemeral and out of the 
direct control of Canadians, and this did not sit well with finance officials and accountants used 
to hard numbers and concerned with strict accountability of taxpayer dollars. 
With officials in Ottawa cognizant that the auditor general was looking over their 
shoulder, they communicated the necessity of careful accounting to Reid. By the end of 1953, the 
program had built up approximately C$15 million in counterpart funds which needed to be used 
toward development projects in India.  A resulting exchange between Ritchie, Plumptre and Reid 
clearly highlights the differences in approach toward aid by Ottawa and Reid.  In a despatch to 
the DEA on 9 April 1954, Reid proposed a meeting with Deshmukh in order to speed up 
proposals coming from the Indian government.  The high commissioner decided to highlight 
three criteria for the Indian Ministry of Finance, capturing Reid’s typical ambitions: they should 
increase the production of high priority goods and services and stimulate the expansion of the 
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Indian economy; they should be of a type that would help to increase public support for aid in 
Canada; and, they should allow the Indian population to recognize the project as a “cooperative 
effort” between India and Canada.377 These criteria apparently did not resonate with Ritchie, as 
Plumptre felt it necessary to write that he felt “a bit more charitable towards Mr. Reid’s 
proposals than you seem to be,” in a reply to the economic division head’s comments on the 
suggestions.
378
  Plumptre advised Ritchie that Reid was correct to emphasize the political aspect 
of Canadian aid and to seek Deshmukh’s help in putting forward potential projects.  However, 
Plumptre also asked Ritchie to emphasize the importance of receiving financial statements from 
the Indians on the use of those counterpart funds.  In the end, Ritchie sent a reply to Reid that 
asked him to focus on five, somewhat duller, aspects which highlighted the “Canadianness” of 
the project and accountability: 
(a) the extent to which the association of Canada’s name with the project (given its type, 
technical and administrative soundless, location, etc.) will have an immediate and lasting 
favourable impact on some sections or other of the Indian people ... (b) the degree of 
nominal participation by Canada which is required in order to have the best effect ... (c) 
the desirability of avoiding any impression that Canada is paying for the whole project ... 
(d) the interest which participation in the project might be expected to arouse in Canada; 
and (e) the problem of securing statements of expenditures attributed to our counterpart 
funds which will be satisfactory to the Canadian Auditor General.
379
 
 
Reid could have hardly found these points inspiring in comparison to his own, and it is 
interesting to note that Ritchie does not even have a clear sense of which sector of the Indian 
population the aid program intended to target.  From Ottawa’s perspective, it seems that any 
Indian would do, as long as Canada got the credit and all the accounts were in order. 
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The GOI of India did eventually deliver the promised accounts, but counterpart funds 
remained problematic.
380
  Much of Reid’s time was taken up with finding and getting approval 
for appropriate expenditures.  The Canadian government tried to negotiate with the GOI for 
greater control over the counterpart funds.  Beginning in 1955, the Indian government began to 
resist these attempts, arguing that Canada could hardly expect any degree of control over projects 
to which Canada was merely providing a fraction of the total cost.  Adding to this was the 
problem of time.  For commodity assistance, counterpart funds were fairly straightforward, as the 
commodities were sold quickly and generated a fixed amount of money almost immediately.  
These could be accounted for much more easily.  However, if counterpart funds were generated 
by a repayment of a loan from states to the central government, usually on generous, lengthier 
terms as dictated by the nature of aid, these funds would come in over a number of years.  Add to 
that potential problems caused by inefficient bookkeeping or non-payment of the loans, and 
counterpart funds could become quite complicated.  This type of counterpart funds were known 
as “notional,” since they only existed in the realm of possibility rather than in fact.381  Nik Cavell 
agreed with the Indians on this matter, believing these notional funds were “unreal” and that 
Canada had been and was still being “precious and unrealistic” about the amount of control the 
government could maintain over non-commodity counterpart funds.
382
  The auditor general 
continued to oversee how the funds were operated, however, and in his 1955 annual report to 
parliament, again criticized the way the government used counterpart funds.
383
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It is important to note that while Canadian officials stewed on what they felt to be 
inefficiencies on the part of the Indian government, GOI documents show that it was not only the 
Indian government that caused delays on matters of counterpart funds.  Prem Narain wrote a 
memo to the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Finance which stated that “the question of the 
utilisation of counterpart funds arising out of certain supplies from Canada … has been under 
consideration for some time.”384  Although they had come up with some tentative plans with 
Canadian officials in February and March of 1955, nothing had progressed: “Since then we have 
been reminding regularly the Canadian High Commission for an early reply but have not heard 
anything.  Obviously we cannot hold up schemes for want of confirmation or comments from the 
Canadians [sic] side.”385  The frustrations were on a two-way street. 
In 1956, the IETCD, the DEA and the DF made a concerted effort to make a policy for 
counterpart funds that all parties could agree upon. In May 1956, C.V. Narasimhan, the Joint 
Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Finance visited Ottawa, leaving behind an aide memoire 
outlining the GOI’s view on the issue.  Narasimhan reiterated that the Indian government 
believed that counterpart funds were only truly generated when commodities were sold, and that 
all other funds generated by Canadian aid were “notional” and that those receipts could not really 
be separated from the GOI’s consolidated fund.  Once an agreement about how to spend such 
money was made, and once the certificate of disbursement had been issued to the Canadian 
government, the GOI should not be forced to account for the funds “again and again.”386   
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Ritchie wrote to Narasimhan in June, agreeing with the general outline of his proposals, 
concurring that in the case of notional funds, “we would be satisfied with a general statement 
which would indicate that the Indian Government had designated certain amounts from their 
general Consolidated Fund as representing counterpart funds attributable to the sale or transfer of 
fabricated materials or equipment received from Canada under the Colombo Plan,” and that 
“counterpart funds shall be considered to arise only once” eliminating the potential for Canadian 
control over the funds in perpetuity.
387
  Although a few kinks remained to be worked out, such as 
what rate of exchange would be used for the certification of notional funds, in general, the now 
five-year old problem had been sorted out. 
The story of counterpart funds might be somewhat dry, but it does demonstrate two 
important aspects of the foreign aid program in India from Ottawa’s perspective.  First of all, 
spending money on foreign aid presented new and unique challenges to the Canadian 
government.  Ultimately Canada was at the mercy of the recipient government, in this case India, 
to apply any funds generated from its aid to problems of economic development, and to be 
honest in its accounting of those funds.  While Ottawa could demand a certain amount of 
accountability, at some point it had to let go.  India legitimately had cause to ask the Canadian 
government to back off, as at some point the “gift” aspect of the funds did have to mean 
something.  The second important lesson learned from the counterpart fund problem was that the 
aid program was being watched, and accountability was crucial in getting acceptance of aid 
expenditure not only from cabinet, but also from institutions like the auditor general’s office.  
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Little wonder that Reid’s views were miles apart, both literally and figuratively, from the 
officials for whom he worked in Ottawa. 
The Model Dairy Colony 
 Another problem which occasionally came up was an enthusiasm that Reid attached to 
certain projects, which occasionally led him to misjudge Ottawa’s support for particular 
programs.  Worse, at times he indicated his belief that Ottawa might support a project before he 
had received any sort of confirmation that this would be the case.  In December 1953, Reid sent a 
letter to the under-secretary of state for external affairs, but which was handled by A.E. Ritchie 
since aid was within his purview as head of the economic division.  Reid recommended using 
Colombo Plan aid to fund the establishment of a model dairy colony outside of New Delhi, 
which had been recommended by a representative of the World Health Organization (WHO).  
However, his mission did not wait for  tentative approval from the Group, and continued to meet 
on the issue.  On 12 February 1954 the high commissioner submitted a despatch to the USSEA 
stating that at a meeting of representatives from the WHO, Delhi state, and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “We intimated that the Canadian Government would probably give 
sympathetic consideration to any request for help along the lines indicated by [Delhi state 
Development Commissioner] Dr. Ramachandani which might be submitted to us through the 
Central Government.”388  The recipient of the document  in Ottawa, Jake Warren of the DEA, 
underlined this sentence and put large exclamation marks next to it.  Word had gotten out in New 
Delhi and the commission also sent a clipping from the paper The Statesman from January 22 
with the headline “Milk Supply Scheme of Delhi State: Canadian Aid Likely” and noted a 
similar report had appeared in the Times of India.  Reid good-naturedly noted “We have a feeling 
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that the shock of an unsolicited offer of possible external aid has put a strain on Dr. 
Ramachandi’s discretion and that most of the speculative reports which have appeared in the 
press have emanated from his office.”389   
 Warren did not receive this news in as jovial a fashion.  He wrote in a note to Ritchie that 
“The Mission seems to have got itself out on a bit of a limb .... I think that the project is one we 
could consider – but I am doubtful about its priority from the Indian point of view relative to 
other schemes.”  Ritchie, in a hand-written note on the despatch, concurred that it was 
“unfortunate” that Reid had encouraged the project so openly, but did not rule out funding 
either.”390  On 19 February, Reid sent another despatch reporting of a meeting that he had had 
with a representative of UNICEF, noting the agreement among all the experts in UNICEF, WHO 
and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) that safe milk was one of the highest economic 
priorities in India.  He felt that the commission had to take a more active role in promoting this 
cause.  “Needless to say,” he continued, “it would be helpful to us at this stage to have an 
indication from you whether or not a sound and well conceived project in this field was likely to 
receive a sympathetic consideration in Ottawa.” 391 Next to this sentence, a hand-written note 
appears, almost certainly written by Warren: “Good God!” 392    
The negative reaction to Reid’s activities probably has to do with Reid’s approach, which 
took liberties in guessing the likely response to the project of officials in Ottawa before receiving 
any concrete reply.  It is clear from the entire tone of Reid’s despatch that based on his own 
opinions, and those of the various UN organizations he mentions, he supports the idea and 
believes that he has good reason to suspect that Ottawa will back his suggestion.  He was wrong.  
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In a letter to the high commission sent on 21 April, Ritchie makes it clear that while Ottawa 
would consider the proposal if it came from the central government, he had many concerns, 
including a suspicion that the Indian government would not attach much importance to this small 
project, compared with others requiring industrial capital equipment.  He also wondered if the 
project might interfere with the local dairy business.  While the high commissioner continued to 
recommend that project as late as 2 August, later in that month New Zealand formally decided to 
support the scheme and Reid abandoned his campaign.
393
    
This was a marginal incident.  However, it does illustrate the nature of Reid’s work with 
the aid program and his relationship with officials in Ottawa.  The high commissioner valued the 
opinions of the growing number of experts on economic development coming to India through 
the aegis of organizations like the FAO, UNICEF, and the WHO, and let their advice guide him 
in his work with the Canadian aid program as he looked for opportunities to Canada to work 
jointly with other organizations.  He also had a tendency to anticipate Canadian decision-making 
regarding aid projects before receiving real input from Ottawa.  The cool response he received 
from Ottawa also became typical of Reid’s relationship with officials working with the aid file in 
Ottawa, who often replied to his impassioned despatches with non-committal responses. 
A Line of Credit for India 
Beginning with the letter to A.E. Ritchie in August 1953, Reid seems to have become 
convinced of the idea of a significant line of credit for India from Canada.  The idea appealed to 
him for a number of reasons, the first simply being that the Indians wanted it.  With a line of 
credit, Reid felt that problem of Nehru’s and the GOI’s sensitivity to receiving aid could be 
easily overcome.  A loan was not a gift – it had to be repaid.  C.D. Deshmukh had told Reid in a 
                                                          
393
 LAC, RG 25, Under-Secretary of State to Office of the High Commissioner, No. 839, 6 August 1954, Volume 
6578, File 11038-1-40, part 6.2, 3. 
153 
 
December 1954 meeting that India would be “happier” to accept a loan rather than grant aid “on 
political grounds.”394  Not only was a loan more palatable, it also had the advantage, from the 
Indian point of view, of allowing much greater control over how the funds were disbursed and a 
allowed for greater potential for long-term planning. 
395
  Deshmukh made his desire known, 
albeit in measured tones, to the Canadian government publicly as well when he travelled to 
Ottawa for consultative committee meetings in 1954, saying that: 
So far as we are concerned we do not disparage any aid in the form of a grant as given at 
present, but we should not object if the assisting countries were to decide that the whole 
or part of the assistance in the future would take the part of loans, because we would 
always choose those development project which would either specifically or generally 
increase our capacity to repay foreign debts.
396
  
 
 Rather than the somewhat ad-hoc process by which Canada and India worked out aid projects 
within the confines of the Five Year Plan, a large loan would allow for planning for years into 
the future, and might allow for greater flexibility in terms of how the funds were spent.  Finally, 
a line of credit would be particularly helpful in alleviating one of the greatest problems faced by 
India in the 1950s – a lack of foreign exchange.  Deshmukh felt strongly enough about the 
potential for a line of credit that he raised the issue more than once with Reid.
397
  The high 
commissioner understood why the idea was appealing to the GOI and he agreed with the Indian 
finance minister that the idea was at least worth proposing. 
By the mid-1950s, planning for the second five-year plan was well underway by 
Mahalanobis and his zoo.  Outwardly it seemed that the problems India faced due to the 
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consequences of the Second World War were dissipating and financial conditions improving.  
India had been buoyed by conditions in 1953 and 1954, when food grain production reached 150 
per cent of the target for the final plan year in 1956.
398
  While hindsight would suggest that this 
strength derived more from good monsoons rather than from the first Five-Year Plan, which 
Hanson deemed “not so much unsuccessful as irrelevant,” the Planning Commission, not 
surprisingly, took credit for the economy’s success.399  The combination of the optimism 
surrounding the Indian economy, and the ambition inherent in the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy 
for development, prompted the planners to dream big. 
 Mahalanobis created a draft set of recommendations which the National Development 
Council adopted in 1955, and which set out several objectives, including: “to attain a rapid 
growth of the national economy by increasing the scope and importance of the public sector and 
in this way to advance to a socialistic pattern of society;” “to develop basic heavy industries for 
the manufacture of producer goods to strengthen the foundations of economic independence;” 
and, “to liquidate unemployment as quickly as possible and within a period not exceeding ten 
years.”400  These bold objectives, he believed, required an economic model that would encourage 
fast-paced economic growth.  His model for growth depended fully on the in-country production 
of capital goods, that is, goods that provided inputs for heavy industry, such as steel.
401
  The 
Second Plan, presented in 1956 to the Lok Sabha, India’s parliament, outlined ambitious 
production targets for the life of the plan, including a 191 percent increase in the production of 
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iron ore, a 231 percent rise in the production of finished steel, and a 300 percent jump in the 
production of cement machinery.
402
   
 As shown in chapter 1, India was not totally devoid of indigenous industry, but the 
manufacturing sector mostly produced consumer goods.  Further, the government was to begin 
the Plan with an expected current account shortfall of Rs 2.1 billion (US$441 million)
403
 in the 
year 1956-7 and an aggregate deficit of Rs. 11.2 billion (US$2.35 billion) over the life of the 
Plan.
404
 New Delhi noted this dilemma in its Second Five-Year Plan document, stating that “It 
has ... to be borne in mind that a country which starts on industrialisation has necessarily to 
import the required machinery and equipment from abroad in the early stages, and foreign 
exchange resources, therefore, present a problem which calls for special attention.”405  The 
government calculated that the total resources needed for the plan would be the staggering 
amount of Rs. 48 billion (US$10 billion).  Domestic revenue sources were to come from 
increased taxation, borrowings from the public in the form of small savings and loans, and 
revenues from the railways and investments.  The foreign exchange component would be funded 
by drawing down Indian reserves or foreign exchange and Rs. 8 billion (US$1.68 billion) would 
be raised externally in the form of loans and grants from “international agencies and friendly 
foreign governments.”406  This still left the government with a needed Rs. 12 billion (US$2.5 
billion) of deficit financing and a shortfall of Rs. 4 billion (US$840 million) of funding for the 
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Plan.  The Planning Commission admitted that finding the necessary foreign exchange 
represented a work in progress, writing that “the foreign exchange requirements of the second 
five year plan are large.  All possible avenues have, therefore, to be explored for securing the 
required inflow of resources.”407  Clearly, foreign exchange resources would be a continuing area 
of concern for the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy for development. 
 Even before the Second Plan was released, it was clear to observers, including Reid, that 
the Second Five-Year plan would be far more ambitious than the first.
408
  The Indian ministry of 
finance apparently also began to prepare for the demands the plan would be placing on the 
budget, and under Deshmukh’s direction, began to look at foreign aid as a source for that 
revenue.  In early 1955, Cavell and O.G. Stoner, who had been brought from his post as second 
secretary at the Canadian embassy in France to work in the Economic Division of the DEA in 
1954, visited India on a tour of the Colombo Plan countries.  In March 1955, Reid wrote a letter 
to Pearson outlining these issues, noting that during this visit, officials in the Indian ministry of 
finance had informally inquired about the possibility of a much larger loan to replace grant 
aid.
409
  Reid characteristically also pointed to the example of the United States, which according 
to Reid, had begun to move from grant aid to loans.
410
  He also highlighted his belief that India 
represented a fundamentally different case from other major countries in South Asia, since it was 
“capable of absorbing large amounts of outside economic aid in its national economic 
developmental programme.”411    
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Reid decided to plunge ahead into discussions about the potential for a loan from Canada.  
In late March and April he had a series of meetings with Indian politicians and officials, meeting 
with Deshmukh, T.T. Krishnamachari, minister of the Department of Commerce and Industry, as 
well as a Mr. Iengar who was secretary of the ministry of commerce and industry, a Mr. Patel, 
secretary of the ministry of finance, and a Mr. da Costa, editor of the Eastern Economist.  They 
spoke about the foreign assistance demands that the second Five-Year Plan period might place 
on the Indian economy.
412
  Deshmukh stressed that despite outward appearances of a 
comfortable situation, he was uneasy with the levels of foreign exchange held by the 
government.  During their talks, however, Reid probably raised false expectations: 
Mr. Krishnamachari agreed that no one could yet be certain of the amount of foreign 
exchange which India might require to implement its next Five-Year Plan.  I suggested to 
him that in these circumstances a line of credit might perhaps represent the most 
appropriate form which foreign assistance to India could take.  He agreed that this was so 
provided that the repayment of interest and capital did not being until the fourth Five-
Year Plan or roughly in 1970.
413
 
 
A Canadian official wrote in the margin beside this paragraph “Somewhat in advance of 
Canadian thinking now.”414  Reid’s enthusiasm for the loan was clear, but he did not have the 
authorization from his government to raise it as a serious possibility with Indian ministers just 
yet.   
However, since these requests were coming repeatedly not just from the high 
commissioner, but also from the Indian ministry of finance, the Canadian government did take 
the question of whether or not to grant a line of credit seriously.  As Reid began preparations for 
a visit to Canada for meetings and a vacation, the government did begin an investigation into the 
                                                          
412
 LAC, RG 25, Escott Reid, The High Commissioner for Canada in India to The Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, No. 376, 2 April 1955, Volume 7339, File 11038-1-40, part 7.2, 1. 
413
 Ibid, 16. 
414
 Ibid. The initials underneath this comment do not appear to be those of O.G. Stoner, however, it appears to be his 
handwriting.  
158 
 
issue.  It did not take long for an answer to be proposed.  On 31 May Jules Léger sent a memo 
partially drafted by O.G. Stoner outlining his perspective on the issue, which dismantled, 
wholesale, all of Reid’s arguments in favour of a line of credit.  Léger began the memo by 
rejecting Reid’s fundamental proposition that India was somehow different, and a “safer bet,” 
than other countries in the region.  He raised the possibility that giving a loan to India would 
open a metaphorical can of worms, with Canada finding itself under demands, justifiably, from 
the other countries of the region asking for the same treatment.
415
  He also rejected the premise 
that India was as financially sound as it appeared, writing, somewhat presciently, that 
“unfavourable weather conditions resulting in a bad crop could hand the whole economy and the 
development programme a serious setback.”416  In this case, India would find it impossible to 
service the loan.  Léger made the point that the grant aid program had achieved “modest success” 
but that it might lose support if its commercial benefits for Canada were lost, as they might be 
with a loan.  He did not believe that India would accept a tied loan since Canadian goods 
generally were priced higher than those on the world market.  Finally, Léger dismissed the 
argument that a loan was more palatable for proud India: “we might want to consider whether we 
really wish to reinforce the position of those who would keep the ties with the west as loose and 
stately as possible.”417   
In June, the DEA circulated a more detailed eight-page memo, drafted by Stoner,  It 
carefully considered the request but ultimately rejected it in favour of more of the same, 
cautioning that the extension of loans might open a Pandora’s box, encouraging a wholesale shift 
from grant to loan aid.  While proposing that Section 21 of the Export Credit Insurance Act could 
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be used to extend medium and short-term credit for the purchase of Canadian exports in a 
disaster scenario, such as a bad drought, the document recommended pursuing the Colombo Plan 
as it already was, albeit with more enthusiasm.  He encouraged the department to look at the 
scaling up of grant aid, donating more surplus commodities, and to actively support the 
continuation of the program past its six year expiry date.
418
  Before Reid’s plane even landed in 
Canada, the DEA shut the coffin lid on the idea of a line of credit for India. 
 In Ottawa, Reid pleaded his case, but not surprisingly did not make any headway.  As 
Greg Donaghy writes, Marcel Cadieux had just returned from meetings of the International 
Control Commission in Vietnam, and was unhappy with what he felt was a false “neutralism” 
practiced by the Indians on the subject of communism, and was not open to the idea.
419
  When 
Reid raised the issue with the Colombo Plan Group he was told by Wynne Plumptre that 
“Canada felt that loans should be largely undertaken by existing international organizations, i.e., 
The International Bank.”420  He had a slightly more sympathetic hearing when he met with J.E. 
Coyne, governor of the Bank of Canada, in September.  Coyne assured Reid that in the case of a 
crisis Canada might consider the issue again, but that in the meantime it was best not to get up 
Deshmukh’s hopes because no Canadian loan was forthcoming.421  Reid temporarily stopped 
lobbying on the issue following his visit to Canada.  However, he never stopped believing in a  
large loan for India’s development, and when a financial crisis began to in through India as his 
term neared its end in 1957, he took up the issue again. As will be shown in chapter 7, Reid was 
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ahead of his time, as Canada did eventually succumb to international pressure to extend large 
loans to India through the World Bank’s Aid-India Consortium. 
Cavell vs. Reid 
Escott Reid and Nik Cavell shared a particular rivalry during their respective times as 
high commissioner and Colombo Plan administrator.  This rivalry is worth highlighting because 
it is so representative of the yawning gap between Reid’s views on the aid program and those 
held in Ottawa.  Both began from the position that the Canadian aid should win friends in Asia 
by bringing West and East closer together and helping to fight off the threat of communism in 
the area.  However, they differed on how to achieve it.  The different positions that Cavell and 
Reid occupied, as administrator and high commissioner respectively, influenced their 
approaches.  Nik Cavell advocated for a uniquely Canadian program, which emphasized the 
bilateral nature of Colombo Plan programs and focused on achievable, concrete results.
422
  As 
already noted, Escott Reid campaigned for an approach that promoted multilateral relationships 
and drew on the expertise of other aid organizations such as the UN agencies, as well as his own 
opinions gained from being “on the ground.”  These remote positions led to a basic philosophic 
difference about whether or not the aid program should be “distinctively Canadian.”   
The organization of the Colombo Plan in government demonstrates much about the 
expectations, goals and motivations behind Canada’s ODA program in the 1950s. Brought up in 
the UK, Cavell had first-hand knowledge of the South and Southeast Asian region, where in 
younger days, he had served in the cavalry branch of the Indian army.  Prior to joining the 
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federal government, he had worked in business for decades, both in the UK and in Canada.  The 
choice of an experienced businessman, rather than say, a social scientist, to lead the program 
shows an expectation that the program would require technical and managerial skills to oversee 
the transfer of goods and services from one country to the other.  However, while the DTC 
certainly prioritized hard skills over considerations of the larger, social goals of development in 
their choice of Cavell, this is not to say that he, individually, gave no consideration to the broader 
implications of the aid program.  
While considerations of Canadian commerce were undoubtedly important to the way that 
he, and other officials in Ottawa, viewed the aid program, it was not the only consideration.  As 
his 1953 letter to John Deutsch, quoted in chapter three, underscores, Cavell felt Canadian aid 
had a higher purpose. He genuinely worried that a failure of aid in India might end in “chaos” 
and the end of the country’s democratic experiment.423  Cavell and Reid, then, shared similar 
motivations and a belief that maintaining India’s Five-Year Plans and its democracy was a 
crucial goal for the Canadian aid program.  However, their vision about how to achieve this goal 
differed strongly, and as a result, they regularly clashed over how Canadian aid should be used.  
As Cavell’s point of view usually coincided more with general opinion in Ottawa, he usually 
won these battles. 
In 1954, the problem of getting projects submitted to the Canadian government from 
India continued to challenge officials in Ottawa and New Delhi.  Even with the high commission 
so actively involved, over-worked Indian civil servants struggled to meet the demands placed on 
the aid program by fiscal deadlines.  In April, Reid proposed the idea of meeting with the finance 
minister, C.D. Deshmukh, to pressure that ministry to propose potential development projects to 
the Canadian Colombo Plan, especially for the use of counterpart funds. The DEA authorized 
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him to approach the minister, with the caveat that haste to choose projects should not “override 
considerations of care and caution in the selection of the projects themselves.”424  By June, 
Reid’s efforts had paid off, and India submitted proposals for two years of potential Colombo 
Plan projects.  In interpreting the proposals to the under-secretary’s office, Reid singled out one 
project in particular, a scheme to build hydro-electric dams in the Chambal river valley in the 
state of Rajasthan, which he urged should be “given the highest priority.”425  He noted that the 
Americans had previously helped fund construction equipment for the dams.
426
 
The Colombo Plan Group read Reid’s letter in early July, but the fruits of his labour did 
not receive a positive response.  A report came back to Reid telling of the Group’s “apparent lack 
of enthusiasm” for Canadian participation in the Chambal project.427  Cavell had not been 
impressed with the management of Chambal during his visit.  Crucially, it also was a project 
which required sharing responsibility with the United States, which the Group was not keen on 
without some assurance that Canada could take up some part of the project completely 
independently.  The Group assured Reid that they had not closed the door on Chambal, but did 
inform him that he should not expect a positive outcome.
428
  Ritchie also reported that the 
Colombo Plan Group responded negatively to the proposal of a similar dam project proposed for 
the Rihand Valley in Uttar Pradesh.  They reacted positively to a suggestion for the provision of 
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small thermal and diesel power sets which Canada manufactured and would be “Tangible proof 
of Canadian assistance.”429 It seemed that Reid’s grand plans were out.  
 Perhaps, however, those opposing the high commissioner’s recommendations had a better 
grasp on the reality of working in the subcontinent. Cavell, for example, noted to Ritchie that 
Escott is putting forward the Chambal Project and Rihand.  You may have noticed that in 
the last meeting I was distinctly chilly to both and I feel very strongly that we are not 
interested in any projects where we have day-to-day co-operation with the F.O.A. [the 
U.S. Foreign Operations Administration].
430
   
 
Cavell cited as justification for this position an apparently difficult experience that the IETCD 
had in a joint project with the FOA in a Colombo Plan project at a cement plant in Pakistan.  
Cavell believed that joint cooperation would be impossible with a large and technically advanced 
project such as a hydro-electric dam,: “This is something we should avoid at all costs and I 
would like to suggest that you will make it quite clear to Escott that we are not interested so that 
he will not be tempted to give our Indian friends any hope that such co-operation would find 
favour in sight.”431   
 This response disappointed Reid.  He conveyed this to the Canadian government, writing 
that he felt the projects were “sound” and were suitable for Canadian involvement.432  He also 
warned the Colombo Group against being overly choosy, writing that it might be unrealistic to 
assume that Canada would have an unlimited number of projects from which to choose in the 
penultimate year of the First Five Year Plan.
433
  He continued to promote the idea of supporting 
the Chambal project in a despatch dated 2 September.  Indeed, he had gone so far as to meet with 
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representatives of the US Technical Cooperation Mission in order to coordinate and discuss the 
progress of their respective programs: 
You might be interested to know that our United States colleagues here are considerably 
less skeptical about the Chambal project than their opposite numbers in the Foreign 
Operations Administration in Washington ... They feel that Chambal is one of the most 
worthwhile projects included in the Five Year Plan.  Its costs are low in proportion to the 
benefits expected, so much so that the irrigation costs per acre at Chambal are between 
one-sixth and one-tenth of the costs at the comparable Columbia Basin Project in the 
United States.
434
 
 
However, this information made little dent in Cavell’s views, who wrote to Ritchie on 30 
September in another attempt to shut down progress on the project.  Cavell said that it was 
becoming obvious that Chambal would have to be undertaken with other agencies, and “We have 
learnt by painful experience the headaches that this causes, and with this the Indians here [in 
Ottawa] entirely agree.  My personal and very strong inclination is to keep out of such 
entanglements if possible, and that means leaving both Chambal and Rihand alone.”435  By 
December, Cavell’s view had won out and Reid was left to backtrack. The high commissioner 
wrote home that while the GOI still thought it was “intrinsically a good project ... the Indians are 
now prepared to withdraw their request for Canadian participation and put forward an alternative 
project.”436  Reid then dropped the issue. 
 As these discussions were taking place, another hydro-electric project was also producing 
tensions between Reid and officials in Ottawa, and particularly with Cavell.  Throughout 1953, 
Canada had participated in negotiations regarding the construction of the Umtru dam in state of 
Assam.  In September, cabinet agreed in principle to contribute C$1.2 million to the project.  In 
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November, Cavell arranged for Denis Stairs, an engineer from the Montreal Engineering 
Company, to visit the project to assess its quality and suitability for Canadian support.  Reid 
reported that Stairs found the project in good order and that the “project as such was sound and 
the engineering was beyond reproach.”437  Stairs recommended a few changes but it was his view 
“that the scope for hydro-electric development in Assam was tremendous.”438   
 While all seemed to agree on the appropriateness of the Umtru project for Canadian aid, a 
disagreement did arise about how to manage the project.  On 15 April 1954, Reid sent a despatch 
questioning one of the judgements of Stairs’ findings in Assam based on recommendations by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) regarding hydro-electric 
projects in Pakistan.  Reid explained that according to IBRD policy, aid would not be given to 
hydro-electric projects in Pakistan unless they were supervised by outside, authorized, consulting 
engineers.  He compared this with Denis Stairs’ recommendation that Canadian engineers should 
“act on an advisory basis,” rather than supervise, the Umtru project.439  He encouraged the 
government to follow the Bank’s example and ensure that the Canadian firms working on the 
project would have sufficient control over the construction of the dam.  In May, Reid’s letter 
found its way to Cavell, who, in a note to Ritchie, rejected Reid’s assumption that the IBRD’s 
experience proved relevant to Canada.”440  Cavell worried that following the IBRD’s practices 
would undermine the uniqueness of what he felt was the Canadian approach: “I have always felt 
that in its Colombo Plan relations with South-East Asian countries Canada can best serve the 
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overall objective by putting forward a distinctively Canadian view.”441  Cavell noted that the 
Indian government appreciated Canada’s neutrality:  
I have always tried to give them the impression that we had no desire to coerce them or 
impose any particular point of view upon them, but wished only to assist them as best we 
could in our own Canadian way ... Should we then take the view that our High 
Commissioner takes and force upon Assam a contract which in our Consulting 
Engineer’s opinion they would resent and which, he thinks, is entirely unnecessary?442   
 
Ritchie agreed with Cavell that Canada had operated with a “distinctive” view and would 
continue to do so in the future.
443
  However, he did say that he believed that ignoring the IBRD’s 
work was not advisable either.  He wrote a letter to Reid that largely echoed Cavell’s concerns, 
although in a noticeably more diplomatic fashion, noting that “it is useful to draw on the 
experience of the Bank and other agencies ... On the other hand, there is much to be said for the 
maintenance of a distinctively Canadian approach in our Colombo Plan relations.”444  It was 
possible that Ritchie and Cavell were more sensitive to Indian sensibilities than was Reid in 
terms of avoiding “giving any appearance of coercion” in the allocation of aid projects and their 
administration.
 445
  Certainly, they were correct in pointing out the difficulties that might emerge 
if Canadian engineers attempted to control too closely the Assam Engineering Authority. 
Despite this, the DEA did scope out the IBRD’s policies regarding the supervision of 
hydro-electric projects.  For this, they contacted Jake Warren, who at that time was Canada’s 
alternate director at the IBRD, to explain the policy.  In a letter to Louis Rasminsky, deputy 
governor of the Bank of Canada and Canada’s executive director at the IBRD, Warren confirmed 
that the Bank’s policy in Pakistan was to have a Western engineering firm directly supervise the 
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work.  He did qualify this information with the caveat that in India there were more competent 
engineering firms than in Pakistan, and that the Bank policy varied on a case to case basis.
446
  
Predictably, Cavell reacted strongly and negatively to this with a long letter to Ritchie 
recommending that “we should cut out any further reference to the High Commissioner in India, 
to the International Bank or to Mr. Warren in connection with the manner in which we propose 
to carry out the Umtru project.”447  Cavell emphasized that Denis Stairs was among the top 
engineers in Canada, and questioned the advice of laymen against that of the expert, warning that 
it was “ridiculous” to hire the best and then not follow his advice.448  Cavell then directly 
attacked Reid’s propensity to follow the lead of other development organizations: 
Our High Commissioner in India is alarmed because we are not doing exactly what the 
International Bank does, but I suggest that the operations of the Bank are not analogous 
to our operations at all ... We do not lend money – we supply the project from Canada 
and whilst, as you know, we have always maintained the closest co-operation with the 
Bank and actually have had very amicable relations with them, we cannot slavishly 
follow their practices as Mr. Reid suggests we should.
449
   
 
O.G. Stoner of the DEA advised Ritchie in a handwritten note that Cavell’s hand-wringing was 
not really warranted.  There was no harm, in Stoner’s opinion, of making inquiries into IBRD 
policy, and Canada would continue to follow Stairs’ advice as well as maintain “a distinctively 
Canadian approach.”450  Reid took a parting shot on this issue in December, just prior to the final 
exchange of letters, writing that he had “as you know advocated from the outset that Canadian 
engineers exercise considerably closer control over construction of the project,” but that he 
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unless was directed to re-open the question, he would proceed with the final agreement.
451
  Reid 
likely knew the issue would not be revisited, but wanted to make his views known for the record. 
 Another discussion over the nature of Canadian aid took place in 1955, over the 
construction of a fertilizer plant.  Like many, Reid had been convinced virtually since his arrival 
in New Delhi that India’s villages and agricultural industry were key to solving the 
overwhelming development problems the country faced.
452
  When the opportunity arose for 
Canada to support a fertilizer plant through the Colombo Plan, Reid seized it.  On 5 January 
1955, the high commissioner sent a despatch to Ottawa highlighting India’s ongoing preparation 
for the new Five-Year Plan, the need to organize in advance so that Canadian aid could 
effectively contribute to the new Plan, and the importance of chemical fertilizers to agriculture in 
India.  As background material, Reid referenced an article that had recently appeared in Foreign 
Agriculture entitled “Soil Productivity and Fertilizer Requirements in India,” penned by the 
Chief of Asia and Middle East Analysis Branch of the Foreign Agriculture Service, a US 
government organization.  The article theorized that an increase in the amount of chemical 
fertilizers used in India would have a huge impact on yields and food productivity.
453
  Reid wrote 
that he had promoted the concept to the Indian government: “In our discussions with officials of 
the Ministry of Finance we have indicated that we would be willing to explore the feasibility of 
Canadian participation in the construction of a fertilizer plant.”454  He followed this with another, 
dated the same day, recommending that if Canada were to construct a fertilizer plant, it should be 
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wholly done by a Canadian firm and completely paid for by Canada, and turned over to the 
Indian government upon completion.  Reid believed that by taking over the costs of the entire 
project, Canada would help relieve India’s stressed administration and distract attention from the 
recent announcement of a Soviet-built steel plant.  Reid followed these despatches with another 
on 28 January that quoted The Economist about the benefits of the “whole-project” approach.  
On 26 February the secretary of state for external affair’s office replied in a non-committal 
fashion, noting that they would not make any decisions until after Cavell’s upcoming visit to 
India. 
 In March, Cavell and Stoner travelled to India, meeting with the Planning Commission 
and Indian officials in the Ministry of Finance about potential aid projects for Canada to support. 
They also toured Canadian projects underway.  Their report noted that that Cavell did not believe 
that the right equipment for a fertilizer plant would be available in Canada, and that prices for 
any equipment that could be found would be higher than that from Britain.
455
  Nevertheless, the 
report did not rule out the idea of a fertilizer plant, provided the GOI valued it highly enough.  
Reid wrote in his report of the visit that Cavell did not view the fertilizer plant favourably, 
writing that the administrator did not believe that Canada could build it at a reasonable cost. 
 As the year progressed, Canadian officials researched the feasibility of the plant and other 
suggested projects.  During Reid’s meeting with the Colombo Plan Group during his trip home in 
1955 he again proposed the idea of a Canadian-built fertilizer plant.  However, officials learned 
in the meeting that support of the plan necessarily excluded any other project ideas.  Because the 
Indian proposals included projects that ranged between C$18 million and C$25 million, Canada 
would either have to fund the fertilizer plant or one of the hydro-electric projects suggested by 
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India, including a promising dam project in southern India named Kundah.  Minutes recorded 
that the Group did not like this choice, and would have preferred a diverse list of small projects 
so that Canadian funding could be more dispersed.
456
  However, Canadian officials could only 
work with the proposals that the Indian government made, and the either/or nature of the 
decision once again pitted Reid’s views against those of Cavell. 
 In August, Cavell wrote a letter to Ritchie with the results of the IETCD’s investigations 
into the possible costs of a fertilizer plant.  They commissioned a report from Canadian Vickers 
and found that the plant could be built within the C$25 million cost considered feasible by the 
Canadian government.
 457
  However, Cavell did not warm to the idea despite this new 
information.  He ended the letter with these warnings: “Are we prepared at this stage to enter into 
such a large undertaking with the future of the Colombo Plan somewhat uncertain? [referring to 
the fact that the Plan was then four years into a six-year commitment and no provisions had yet 
been made for its extension] .... We would be dealing with a Canadian company which has never 
operated abroad.”458  On this basis Ritchie sent a letter to the high commissioner in New Delhi 
requesting more information from the Indian government about where the Indian government 
wished the plant to be constructed, the type of fertilizer needed, and estimates of local costs.  
Ritchie also stated he would ask Denis Stairs to visit Kundah to make an assessment of that 
project.
459
  He sent a request to the Canadian ambassador in Washington to get information from 
the IBRD about its experience assisting the construction of a fertilizer plant in Sindri.   
 In a confidential and revealing letter to the acting high commissioner in New Delhi, 
Bruce Williams, Reid urged the Delhi mission to do all that was needed to make the project 
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succeed.  He also made his opinions clear about the limited approach, in his view, that Cavell 
took to aid and development: 
Cavell … is determined that our assistance to India should take no other form than hydro-
electric turbines and generators.  He is fighting a last-ditch fight against the proposal that 
we give a fertilizer plant.  I think, however, that it is possible we may give such a plant 
and that it may be constructed in India by the same firm which constructed the Sindri 
plant.  The important thing is for us to get the Indian authorities to ask us to construct the 
fertilizer plant at the very best possible spot in India where there is the best possible 
assurance of cheap power and raw materials.
460
 
 
However, Reid’s assessment that Cavell’s efforts were “last-ditch” turned out to be misguided.  
By the middle of September the Canadian embassy in Washington responded to Ritchie’s 
request, meeting with two representatives of the IBRD.  It sent a telegram to Ottawa reporting 
that in one IBRD official’s opinion, fertilizer was a crucial part of India’s development plan, but 
estimated that the fertilizer plant that India needed would cost double the C$25 million of 
Vickers’ estimate.461  This would be the equivalent of two years of Canadian Colombo Plan aid 
for all of South and Southeast Asia.  Acting High Commissioner Williams sent a despatch 
notifying Ottawa that C.V. Narasimhan of the Indian Ministry of Finance “strongly” favoured 
Kundah, and that in fact the dam had been approved by the planning commission with the idea of 
Canadian assistance in mind.
462
  On 3 October, the DEA informed the high commissioner’s 
office that that Colombo Plan Group had decided in favour of funding Kundah.
463
 
 Cavell was happy about that, perhaps in part because he had so decisively triumphed over 
Reid:  
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I have been inalterably opposed to providing a Canadian fertilizer factory because (a) it 
would not be Canadian, and (b) we know virtually nothing about it and would have to get 
American advice and help all the time which would virtually make it an American 
project.  The recent reports that we have received from Vickers were prepared in the 
States, and I think still think it would be a bad project for us to undertake and one which 
we should bitterly regret before we were through with it.  Kundah, on the other hand, is 
something we can do, and do well.
464
 
 
Once again, Cavell approached this project with the criteria that Canadian aid should be 
distinctively Canadian.  Whereas Reid valued American expertise and favoured cooperation with 
American aid agencies, Cavell preferred to choose projects that could be independently managed 
in Canada and eschewed cooperation with the US or other aid organizations.  He believed 
cooperation with other agencies would introduce unnecessary complications.  Moreover, from 
Cavell’s perspective, Canadian aid should focus on Canadian expertise, even if, as Reid 
pejoratively pointed out, it meant that hydro-electric projects would form the bulk of Canadian 
Colombo Plan assistance.  Reid, on the other hand, tended to examine Canadian aid from a 
macro perspective.  He favoured the fertilizer project because agriculture was so important to 
India’s overall development.  If Canada did not necessarily have everything needed to complete 
the project, expertise could be found elsewhere. What mattered most to the high commissioner 
was finding aid projects that would bring the biggest benefits to the Indian economy. 
 In all of these examples, Cavell’s perspective won the day.  Unlike the numerous 
organizations emerging out of Washington and New York, the Canadian aid program during 
Reid’s time as high commissioner had limited resources which determined its limited objectives.  
Reid lived in the milieu of diplomacy, constantly surrounded by the enormity of problems, both 
political and economic, facing India.  He frequently met with intellectuals passing through India.  
He sought the opinions of experts from international organizations and read widely from both 
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Asian and western publications.  He corresponded and met with the highest levels of the Indian 
government. 
 By contrast, Cavell and other officials in Ottawa were faced daily with the opinions of 
cabinet, whose views they had to carefully consider before proposing any expenditure.  While 
Cavell was not simply an instrument of Trade and Commerce, there is no doubt that Canadian 
commercial concerns had to be front and centre in the Colombo Plan program by virtue of the 
IETCD’s location.  From Cavell’s position in Ottawa, it made sense to find projects that were 
both desired by the Indian government and matched well with the expertise provided by 
Canadian business.  It was not Canada’s role to decide what projects India should prioritize for 
their own economic development.  Officials in Ottawa were concerned with accountability and 
value for money.  Projects had to come in on budget and on time.  These considerations 
narrowed the perspective through which officials like Cavell viewed the aid program and drove 
the philosophic differences that Cavell had with Reid.  Keeping Canadian aid Canadian kept it 
simpler, and in his opinion, made it more effective. 
Conclusion 
If Canadian officials agreed with Reid that India was a unique case, a democratic bastion 
against the forces of communism in South and Southeast Asia that should be understood and 
supported through Canadian aid at all costs, their actions did not reflect this.  Certainly, as Greg 
Donaghy writes, “Through his letter, telegrams, and despatches, Reid forcefully compelled 
Pearson and his officials to engage India, its problems and perspectives.  For Canada, Escott 
Reid put India on the map. ”465 Despite his success in doing so, however, Reid was never able to 
make India a top foreign policy priority for Canada, nor did he realize his ambition of securing 
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larger sums of aid for the country, nor in changing the nature of the aid program to become more 
strongly multilateral, nor in integrating loan-giving into the Plan.   
Reid thought about Canadian aid from a dramatically different viewpoint than did official 
Ottawa.  Perhaps it was his first-hand and continuing exposure to Indian poverty and contact 
with Indian officials and politicians, perhaps it was his extensive reading and collaboration with 
development experts such as Barbara Ward, or perhaps it was his natural inclination, but Reid 
saw the Canadian aid program within a developmental framework.
 466
 He took seriously the 
Indian government’s views on the political implications of aid, understood Nehru’s and other’s 
discomfort, and tried to accommodate that at a time when many in the West dismissed it as 
ingratitude.  He tended to support aid programs based on his opinion about their efficacy in 
addressing the problems of Indian development before he thought about their potential impact on 
Canadian business.  His concern with gaining adequate publicity for Canada in India stemmed 
from a real belief that Canadian ODA had a role to play in upholding Indian democracy and 
defeating communist influences.  In contrast, officials in Ottawa, while perhaps believing in this 
last higher goal on an ideological level, were far more concerned with the day-to-day realities of 
the aid program.  From their viewpoint, aid needed to be distinctively Canadian, both in terms of 
its profile within India, but also on the practical and commercial matter of Canadian content.  
Accountability was also a major concern.  The problems the government faced with the 
counterpart funds issue alerted officials working on the aid program that the auditor general 
carefully monitored their work.  Reid’s enthusiasm, tenacity, and tendency to make judgements 
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on Ottawa’s behalf probably also grated on the nerves of some.  It certainly seems to have 
annoyed Cavell. 
It should be noted, however, that Reid’s failures were failures of his own personal 
ambitions.  As high commissioner, Reid strongly nurtured the India-Canada relationship and his 
strong enthusiasm for Canadian ODA in India did make an impact.  His tenacity about the issue 
of a line of credit did force the Department of External Affairs to review the aid program and to 
make a decisive choice to continue supporting the Colombo Plan past its initial six-year term, 
and to push for greater allocations for grant aid for India and the Plan in general; and as the 
following chapters will demonstrate, while Reid’s credibility in Ottawa continued to decline 
during his final two years in India, in the long-term, many of these ambitions were eventually 
realized.  
 As Reid’s time as high commissioner in India wound down, his enthusiasm for the 
country of India, and his consideration of its geo-political importance, never waned.  If anything, 
it increased in fervour.  However, his final year there was not destined to be happy, at least from 
a professional point of view.  He did not make the progress on any aid issue he hoped to 
champion during his 1955 trip to Canada.  Somewhat embarrassingly, the text of an off-the-
record speech he gave at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs was published, word for 
word, in the Christian Science Monitor, and he was forced to write Nehru to apologize.
467
  Not 
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surprisingly, Cavell quickly reported this indiscretion to Ritchie.
468
  Certainly, as has been 
described earlier, officials in the DEA and the DTC had been irritated by Reid’s behaviour 
concerning aid at times.  However, other issues outside of the aid file also led Ottawa to question 
Reid’s judgement.  For example, Reid’s description of Louis St-Laurent’s 1954 visit to India in 
exceptionally glowing terms, noting it was no less than an “immense success and a personal 
triumph” for the prime minister and “deepened the understanding and friendship between the two 
Prime Ministers” came as a surprise to Charles Ritchie, who had accompanied St-Laurent on the 
trip.
469
  Ritchie found St-Laurent “put off” by Nehru and found relations between the two 
statesmen strained.
470
   
 The fall and summer of 1956 saw Reid, according to Donaghy, “at his very worst.”471  In 
sum, Reid, who had been in ill health, and over-worked as usual, responded poorly to the 
diplomatic crises brought on by the Suez Canal dispute and the Hungarian crisis.  Convinced of 
Nehru’s even-handedness, Reid was bewildered at the statesman’s slow and apathetic response 
to the obvious and serious human rights’ violations that Soviets committed in Hungary, even as 
the prime minister railed strongly against the British and French imperialism that drove the Suez 
dispute.
472
  Reid also had the idea that because the Anglo-Indian diplomatic relationship had 
suffered so greatly because of Suez, Canada could somehow fulfill and new role as the sole 
interpreter of the West to India, passing information through the Canadian high commission to 
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the Indian government.
473
  The sprawling 44 page commentary Reid sent to Ottawa on Nehru’s 
upcoming visit was at times strange.  In addition to the sensible statistical and informational 
aspects of the commentary, and beating on familiar drums such as the value of a line of credit 
and the dangerous path before the West should India fall to communism, Reid made suggestions 
and conclusions that must have read as disturbingly out of touch in Ottawa.  At one point, while 
discussing the recent improvement in Indian-US relations under Eisenhower, Reid asks “Could 
not Mr. Eisenhower now firmly establish himself as the national President of a government of 
national unity with a cabinet and administration composed equally of Republicans and 
Democrats – and composed only of liberal Republicans and liberal Democrats.”474  Surely those 
reading this particular sentence must have questioned Reid’s judgement on political matters. 
 Recognizing that his performance during the Suez and Hungarian crises had not been 
read as level-headed in Ottawa, Reid wrote a personal appeal to Pearson.  While he admitted that 
he had been overworked and had made some mistakes in the prior six months, Reid defended 
what he knew many in Ottawa saw as his extreme emotionalism, writing that “it is not my heart 
that rules my head, but it is my heart which stimulates my head to higher levels of sustained 
intellectual effort, and that my excitement during such a crisis is not so much emotional as 
intellectual.”475  Nonetheless, his hopes for a post in Washington or London, the most prestigious 
in Canadian diplomacy, were dashed.  After leaving India, Reid became ambassador to West 
Germany, still a prominent position to be sure, but one that he undoubtedly saw as second-best.   
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 Reid’s final year in India, and his subsequent appointment to Germany, may not have 
been what he hoped for in earlier days.  However, he looked fondly on his time as high 
commissioner for the rest of his life.  In a farewell essay dated 3 May 1957 exploring India’s 
social, economic, and political situation, Reid put his ideas about where India and its leader stood 
in the worldwide geo-political hierarchy bluntly: “India is the most important country in Asia 
next to Russia and China.  Nehru is not the spokesman and symbol of India; he is the most 
important statesman in the whole of non-Communist Asia.”476  Again and again, in so many 
different ways, Reid tried to emphasize this message.  While he may not have been as successful 
as he would have liked in convincing Ottawa of his views, as his time in India drew to a close a 
financial crisis was just beginning to brew that would begin to align the Canadian government 
with some of the messages he had been giving all along. 
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Chapter 6: Atoms for Profit and Dams for Kilowatts 
 Much has already been said about the Canada-India reactor.  Robert Bothwell, Iris 
Lonergan, Brian Buckley, and Duane Bratt have each written on the subject.
477
  Lonergan wrote 
a M.A. thesis about the Canada-India negotiations for the reactor.  It is not necessary, therefore, 
to repeat what has already been said.  In addition to briefly outlining the history of the 
negotiations that took place over the reactor in 1955 and 1956, and the unintended consequences 
that resulted, this chapter will attempt to examine the nuclear reactor project specifically from 
the point of view of the history of the Canadian aid program.  It came about in a very different 
way than other Canadian-Indian aid projects during that era. Due to the political and commercial 
importance of the research reactor, the agreement between Canada and India occurred at the 
executive level, and diplomacy was a crucial factor in making the agreement work.   
In order to contrast the example of the reactor with another project that operated 
concurrently, this chapter will also examine the Mayurakshi project, or what became known as 
“The Canada Dam.”  Although Mayurakshi represented a large share of the total aid budget to 
India and was an important project for Canada’s aid relationship with India, it simply did not 
have the same level of executive oversight or interest as the reactor, especially since the majority 
of the Canadian costs were covered by counterpart funds.  The example of Mayurakshi will be 
shown as an “average” Canadian aid project.  This will be compared with the example of the 
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reactor, which was exceptional in terms of approach and method for securing an aid project in 
India. 
The Mayurakshi Project 
  In 1955, as negotiations for the NRX reactor were just beginning, the Mayurakshi dam 
project was nearing completing.  It had been three years in the making, and cost the Canadian 
government approximately C$20 million, a large part of the total Colombo Plan budget.
478
  It 
must be emphasized, however, that this high price tag was mostly covered through counterpart 
funds generated through the sale of surplus Canadian wheat, and therefore hardly represented a 
major sacrifice on the part of Canadian taxpayers.  The idea of building a dam on the Mayurakshi 
river and reservoir at Massanjore in West Bengal pre-dated the independent Indian government, 
resonating in planners’ minds as far back as 1927; actual construction of the project began in 
1948.
479
  It was a multi-purpose scheme, as the dam was designed to provide water for both 
600,000 acres of irrigation as well as 4,000 KW of power, and would also provide some control 
over the flooding that the region occasionally experienced.
480
   
It was a large project, with the dam rising 2345 ft. and the reservoir covering 24 square 
miles.
481
  For both the Canadian and Indian governments the project was an appealing one for 
joint cooperation.  It was a high priority item within the First Five Year Plan, and dam-building 
was an area where Canada had clear expertise.  It was also an easy way in which to use those 
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problematic counterpart funds, as many of the materials for building the dam could be purchased 
within India.  The project was probably seriously proposed in 1951, and by early 1952, following 
a favourable review of the project by the IBRD, A.F.W. Plumptre confirmed that Canada would 
use counterpart funds arising from the C$10 million gift of wheat in the first year’s 
appropriations for further construction of the dam project.
482
  Canadian officials were likely even 
more delighted when the GOI requested that Canada provide C$3 million worth of Canadian-
manufactured generating and transmission equipment for Mayurakshi.  However, while the 
decision to support the project may have been an easy one, enough documentation has survived 
to show that the project itself was a long and difficult process for everyone involved.   
Mayurakshi was fully managed by the state of West Bengal, and if they had any 
knowledge of the Canadian-Indian negotiations over electrical equipment, they did not support it.  
The gnarly problem of state/centre communication again reared its head when West Bengal 
refused to accept the offer of Canadian-made equipment.  Although the present author found no 
record of communication of this internal discussion in India, it is likely that West Bengal and the 
dam authorities were nonplussed at a lack of appropriate consultation.  There is also evidence 
that the state had to scrap existing tenders in order to accept the aid from the Canadian 
government, and that West Bengal preferred to get the equipment from West Germany.
483
  The 
problem was resolved when the chief engineer of the Electricity Development Department of 
West Bengal and a financial adviser travelled to Canada in March 1953 in order to approve the 
equipment and negotiate a delivery date.
484
  Cavell wrote that “the Central Government had 
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almost to beat West Bengal into taking $3 million from us for Mayurakshi electrical 
equipment.”485  Although free to the central government, the aid was not free to West Bengal, as 
they had to pay the GOI for the equipment.  It was a no-win situation from the perspective of 
West Bengal.  Therefore, state officials behaved like buyers, not like aid recipients, when it came 
to dealing with the Canadian government. 
 By July, Canada and India had drawn up a contract in order to supply the equipment, 
which included the conditions not only for the purchase of the equipment, but its installation as 
well.  Wilgress wrote Reid in New Delhi to warn him of an issue which the Canadian 
government felt might cause problems down the road.  Canada wished for one engineering firm 
to supervise the work in Canada, as well as in India.  However, West Bengal refused to be 
subservient to a Canadian engineer given that the state held final responsibility for the dam’s 
outcomes.  They compromised, and the governments decided that two engineers, one Canadian, 
and one Indian, would supervise the installation of the generating equipment.  Wilgress was not 
hopeful about this solution: “The two engineers will be expected to work in friendly cooperation.  
One can, of course, imagine that situations will arise when the Engineers will differ and this will 
obviously make the position of the Contractor difficult.  We will have to face this eventuality 
when it arises.”486  In December, the Colombo Group recommended that further counterpart 
funds be allocated to the Mayurakshi project, reasoning that the dam deserved further support 
due to the large amount Canada had already invested.
487
  It is at least partly likely that further 
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investment in the Mayurakshi project was simply easier than finding additional projects from 
overworked Ministry officials.     
 The bidding and selection process took months.  The Canadian Commercial Corporation 
issued the general requisition for tenders 10 June 1953, and closed it on it on 24 August.  The 
Canada government gave the lowest bids to the Indian high commissioner in September, and in 
October the Indian government gave its approval.  The bids then had to be approved by ministers 
of the DTC, DF and the DEA, a process which took another three weeks.  Finally, the bidders 
were notified of their success by Christmas of that year, and official purchase orders were issued 
in February 1954.
488
  The President of the CCC acknowledged that the process had been 
unacceptably slow, and in this case, the Canadian government could hardly blame the famously 
over-worked Indian civil servants for the delays.
489
  The Allis-Chalmers Company and the 
English Electric Company won tenders to supply equipment, and H.G. Acres & Company Ltd. 
from Niagara Falls became the consulting engineers on the project.   
Despite the tardy action on the part of the Canadian government, it wanted quick action 
on the part of the companies, pressuring them to advance the shipping dates by three months so 
that the equipment could arrive in India in March, 1955.  The Indian government wanted a 
March delivery date because it preceded the monsoon with enough time to allow for installation.  
If the equipment was not delivered by March, it would push the installation to November.  As 
Reid wrote to the USSEA’s office: 
A delay in the installation of the turbines until November, 1955 would mean a delay in 
the production of power until January 1956 and a consequent loss in revenue.  This would 
expose the West Bengal authorities to the criticism that they agreed to order the turbines 
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from Canada when, as it will be alleged, earlier delivery could have been obtained from 
alternative suppliers.
490
 
 
Cavell appealed to H.G. Acres & Company to speed up the work, referring to the livelihood of 
“thousands of cultivators” and small industries that depended on the power, not to mention the 
loss of face: “the day will assuredly come when everything will be ready except the Canadian 
equipment.”491  This would cause negative press for Canadian aid within India.  Despite this 
pressure, the dates could not be moved.  S.W. Andrews, the president of H.G. Acres wrote to the 
Canadian government that it was impossible to better the originally scheduled dates, and that “no 
pressure or influence from the outside can help matters in any way.”492 
 In November, Reid visited the dam site to investigate its progress.  The report he sent 
back to Ottawa remarks on one aspect of the dam which was not considered to be significant 
from his point of view, but is significant in hindsight.  This was the displacement of tribal 
Santhal villages in order to make room for the reservoir.  In the 1990s, the decision to displace 
almost 2,100 families to make way for the Sardar Sarovar dam in the Narmada Valley caused 
huge protest movements to form against the project.  Internationally famous author Arundhati 
Roy brought international attention to the issue.
493
  By contrast, Reid’s treatment of the subject in 
the description of his visit to one of the village sites that had been constructed for the relocated 
villagers is remarkably flippant.  Indian officials guiding the high commissioner did not try to 
hide the fact that the relocated Santhals were unhappy, not only with the houses that had been 
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built, but also because the village was not close enough to the water source that they had 
previously used for their crops: 
The crops of the displaced villagers had failed because of the drought.  The villagers 
could not understand why, when D.V.C. [Damodar Valley Corporation] had so much 
water in its reservoir, it did not give them water.  They also complained that whereas 
previously their lands had been low lying and they could bring water to their fields by a 
slight lift, now they had to lift it a long way.
494
 
 
Reid noted that the government had given up on building houses for the Santhals, and instead 
increased their compensation to allow the villagers to build their own.
495
  He was told that they 
would eventually be given access to irrigation from the dam, and that the wasteland they were 
being placed on was arable and in the process of being “reclaimed” by the Indian government in 
a two year process of plowing and growing green manure.
496
  This explanation put to rest any 
possible concerns he had about the villagers’ temporary lack of access to water. 
 A heavy dose of paternalism and even racism permeates Reid’s interpretation of the 
relocation.  He writes of the Santhals that they are “a charming happy-go-lucky people.  About 
their only vice is that when the men have any extra money they spend it on drink.  They have a 
thin veneer of Hinduism over their animist religion.”497  The Santhals rejected the houses, Reid 
reports, because of a belief that they contained “evil spirits.”498  The only negative aspect of the 
relocation, Reid found, was that not enough education was being done with the villagers to 
ensure that they understood the modern agricultural techniques that irrigated farmland 
required.
499
  Reid’s greatest concern about the impact of the relocation did not really concern the 
villagers, however; he worried that if the villager’s complaints were aired in the press it might 
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give Canadian aid a bad name.  Still, all in all, he felt that the way the project was handling 
rehabilitation was adequate and that there was “not much danger of the Project being given 
unfavourable publicity in India and abroad.”500   
The historical context of this relocation is important to bear in mind.  As historian Alan 
Rudolph Marcus reminds us in his book Relocating Eden: the Images and Politics of Inuit Exile 
in the Canadian Arctic, during the 1950s, the Canadian government relocated another ethnic 
group frequently described as “happy-go-lucky” to the desert of the high Arctic in abhorrent 
conditions.
501
  In comparison to that relocation, West Bengal’s attention to the needs of the 
Santhal peoples at least appears, from Reid’s reports, fairly progressive.  Unfortunately, there is 
no archival record speaking to an evaluation of the effect that the dam relocation had on the local 
population nor, it is reasonable to assume, was one undertaken.  One M.A. thesis has found that 
over time the dam has had a net positive effect on the region, including the benefits of flood 
control, land improvement, electricity availability, drinking water, and irrigation.
502
  However, it 
does not include any historical research on the impact of the relocation at the time it occurred, 
nor any assessment of the sociological impact on the people it affected.  Also, this relocation was 
only one among many that occurred over the decades in India.  According to one figure, as many 
as 16.4 million people have been displaced in India due to dam development.
503
  For both the 
GOI and the Canadian government, then, this type of relocation would not have stood out in any 
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way in the early 1950s.  Reid’s underwhelming reaction to his visit of the newly constructed 
village is not out of the ordinary, given these circumstances. 
In April, Canada shipped the turbines to India, and the generators were not yet ready but 
the manufacturers promised to deliver them by June.
504
  On 9 June 1955, the administrator of 
Mayurakshi, R. Banerjee, asked for a firm timeline for the installation of the Canadian 
equipment as work finished on the grid, power line and dam.  By late August he was still unsure 
how many Canadian engineers would be going to India.
505
  Given that Banerjee was expected to 
provide good accommodations and transportation for the engineers in a non-metropolitan area, 
this may have caused him some frustration.  On 19 September, the first engineer, Charles 
Wakeham, finally arrived in Calcutta, and another followed soon thereafter.
506
  On 7 October the 
Canadian government received a disturbing letter from H.G. Acres & Company with a report 
from Harry Boardman, the second engineer to arrive.  He alleged that there were no skilled 
labour or tools on the site and little had been done since his arrival. As well, it was impossible to 
get into the power house because of bamboo scaffolding, there was no road access to the dam, 
and the equipment that had been shipped to the dam site had been damaged or was in poor repair 
due to carelessness. This was quite a list.
507
  It all came as a bit of a shock, since there had been 
hopes that Lester Pearson would be able to visit the dam site during a visit to India in November.  
Stoner believed that although the Indian authorities had to shoulder a large part of the blame for 
these conditions, the Canadian companies should have had their engineers on site during the time 
of delivery, and not after, suggesting that the Canadian officials were not entirely satisfied with 
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the work of their consulting engineers.
508
 These issues were not unusual in the context of 
development work in India in the mid-1950s.  
Reid, concerned with the prospect of the minister’s upcoming visit, immediately 
contacted the deputy minister of external affairs in India.  Yet he might have regretted the 
decision to bring the matter to such a high level so soon, since when he finally spoke face-to-face 
with Boardman at the Mayurakshi site, he discovered that the Canadian “had never reported that 
the construction was faulty and that there was nothing in any of the reports which he had sent 
which could be an occasion for any substantial concern.”509  In the meantime, the government 
had also had “a more optimistic report” from Wakeham as well.510  As a result of the confusion, 
Reid had to then contact the Mayurakshi officials and the GOI to apologize “profusely” for the 
upset this situation had caused.
511
  He ended his despatch in this way: “I do not know what 
morals should be drawn from this incident.  I only hope that a similar one will never occur in 
connection with any Canadian project in India.”512  Stoner was offended by Reid’s tone, putting 
in a handwritten note under this sentence that Reid’s assessment of the situation was “unfair” 
since they were only passing on what they had been told by the company, and that in his opinion 
the mission had handled the situation “untactfully.”513  It is difficult to know exactly what caused 
the miscommunication.  Perhaps jumpy officials at the mission and in Ottawa, already somewhat 
nervous about the outcome of the project, misinterpreted the meaning of the engineers, who may 
not have intended to give such a dire impression of the project.  It did serve to make an already 
tense situation between all the stakeholders more fraught.  After the troublesome experience of 
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the BSTC project, those working in the aid administration may have wondered if any aid project 
could be carried off successfully in India. 
Despite this tension on all sides, Pearson did make it to the opening of the Massanjore 
dam on 1 November, as did Prime Minister Nehru, although in some ways this was a chimera, 
since none of the generating equipment was actually ready.  The Indian government announced 
that the dam would be named “The Canada Dam,” which was the first time in India that a 
structure, built with external aid, was named after the donor country.  Given Nehru’s touchy 
feelings on the subject of donor aid, this was quite an honour for Canada.  The opening of the 
dam was reported in both the French and English press in Canada, including one headline in the 
Globe and Mail that reported “Built by Prairie Wheat: Pearson Opens Bengal Canada Dam.”514  
A plaque noting Canada’s contributions to the dam continues to sit at the site to this day. 
After Pearson left, however, distrust continued to exist between the Canadian mission and 
the Mayurakshi officials as well.  In November C.E. McGaughey, a mission official, wrote to the 
high commission to give his bad opinion of Banerjee.  McGaughey pointed to the dam 
administrator’s assurance, given several times, that trees had been removed from the reservoir.  
When McGaughey made known his desire to walk along the lake and view the work in progress, 
Banerjee discouraged him because of the “extra-ordinarily belligerent bears” that roamed the 
area.  While Benerjee was away, McGaughey did walk the area and found “no sign of tree 
cutting operations, or incidentally, of bears.”515  The official also suspected that Banerjee was 
spying on the Canadian engineers’ telegraphic and written communications, and felt he had a 
poor attitude toward the Canadian engineers, likely resulting from the earlier decision to take 
                                                          
514
 LAC, MG 26 N1, Pearson Papers, Press Clipping: “Built by Prairie Wheat: Pearson Opens Bengal Canada Dam,” 
2 November 1955, Vol. 70, File “Visit to USSR, Asia, Egypt – Clippings Files 4-5.”  
515
 LAC, RG 25, The High Commissioner for Canada to The Secretary of State for External Affairs, No. 1540, and 
attachment, Memorandum for the High Commissioner, 16 November 1955, Vol. 6579, File 11038-1-2A-40, part 
2.2, 2. 
190 
 
Canadian, rather than German, equipment.
516
  The Canadian engineers also encountered 
frustrations, such as a lack of transportation, help and proper tools, although a representative 
from H.G. Acres & Company that visited the project felt that the “Indians are trying their best” 
and that the inadequacy of support was largely due to the lack of availability of expertise and 
equipment in the area and that the dam itself was “a job well done.”517  They also had 
disagreements with the Indian supervising engineer who, according to Acres personnel, looked to 
the Canadians to supply equipment that had not been on the original list, or that could be 
acquired locally.
518
  In September 1956, company officials were poised to give a clear certificate 
to the entire project, but in October they were forced to withdraw that when one of the generators 
did not test to specifications.  Finally, on 14 December 1956, an official from the Canadian high 
commission in New Delhi came to Massanjore to attend the official opening of the now-
complete project.
519
 
Old wounds lingered, not only between West Bengal and Canada, but also between the 
Canadian government and the companies involved. On 9 January 1957, Nik Cavell reported on 
meetings with members of the West Bengal government.  He found them “very bitter about the 
delay in putting the Mayurakshi machine right.”520  Cavell blamed the Canadian subsidiary of 
English Electric and the consulting engineers in particular, finding them lax and unconcerned 
about politically crucial matters.  Cavell lost his temper: “I have now blown them all up and told 
them what I thought of their organization.  It so happens that Sir George Nelson [Chairman of 
English Electric] is an old friend of mind and I have threatened them with reporting the whole 
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thing to him when I pass through London.”521  It is uncertain whether or not he actually carried 
out this threat.  Nonetheless, H.G. Acres & Company continued to blame the Indian engineers 
for any potential faults and insisted that West Bengal was not listening to Canadian advice.  They 
made it plain in their final report that should any future problems occur with the dam, they would 
not bear any responsibility.
522
  Although H.G. Acres felt that overall project was “a successful 
project well carried out,” and Prime Minister Nehru called it “a visible and enduring link of 
friendship between Canada and India,” under the surface, the Mayurakshi dam project was a very 
challenging and difficult project for all sides.
523
   
However, for all the bumps and difficulties, Mayurakshi does represent a “typical” 
Canadian-Indian aid project of the 1950s. Canadian and Indian officials identified an area where 
Canada could supply desired goods, in this case, both through the contribution of rupees for local 
costs via counterpart funds, and through the provision of Canadian-manufactured goods.  The 
project had already been identified by the GOI as an economic priority for the country, which 
was also important for Canadian officials.  It had positive commercial benefits for Canada, since 
the country accepted, even with some hesitation on the part of local officials, goods 
manufactured within Canada and the expertise of a Canadian engineering firm.  It managed a few 
positive headlines in both the Canadian and Indian press.  As the following section will 
demonstrate, in comparison, the NRX project followed a process that was anything but “typical.” 
The Canada-India Reactor 
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 Although Canada’s involvement in nuclear energy was borne out of war-time necessities, 
the Canadian government decided to continue to research the development of nuclear power for 
peacetime use, despite its prohibitive costs.
524
  The powerful “minister of everything,” C.D. 
Howe was highly involved in this, and all decisions regarding Canada’s early nuclear power 
industry.
525
  By 1945, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), the Canadian Crown 
corporation in charge of Canada’s nuclear program, in cooperation with the British government, 
built ZEEP, the first successful reactor constructed outside of the United States.
526
  By 1947, the 
NRX (National Research X-perimental) research reactor came online.  Initially projected to cost 
C$1.2 million in 1944, the final amount eventually soared to approximately C$10 million.
527
  
However, this did not dissuade AECL from pursuing further research in order to build a 
marketable reactor for the purposes of generating electricity.  Upon finishing NRX, the 
corporation was already planning for the newest reactor, the NRU (National Research 
Universal).  Although still a research reactor, the NRU represented a significant technological 
leap forward, both in terms of bringing Canada closer to making a functional reactor for 
electricity, and also for generating medical isotopes, and it went active on 3 November 1957.
528
 
 By the mid 1950s, then, Canada had invested a lot in its nuclear power industry.  It was 
an expensive and potentially dangerous business, as AECL found out during three separate and 
serious accidents in 1947, 1950, and 1952.  The accident in 1950 killed one man and injured four 
others, while the one in 1952 required an expensive salvage effort to save the NRX.
529
  Canada 
focused on creating an independent nuclear reactor design for a number of reasons.  It had a large 
                                                          
524
 Robert Bothwell covers this history very comprehensively in his book Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of 
Canada Limited, 3-105. 
525
 Ibid. 
526
 Ibid, 62-69. 
527
 Ibid, 101. 
528
 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, “NRU: What Does it Do?” 
http://www.nrucanada.ca/en/home/insidenru/nruwhatdoesitdo.aspx, (accessed September 19, 2013). 
529
 Bothwell, Nucleus, 123, 155, Bratt, Politics of CANDU, 6. 
193 
 
supply of uranium, and if it could sell a reactor that used unenriched uranium, it could secure 
exports for that fuel and avoid the need to use expensive American enrichment facilities.
530
  
Producing an independent design would also help Canada stand alone in what was becoming a 
competitive industry.  As political scientists Duane Bratt asserts, the Canadian government had 
no interest in the business becoming a “branch plant” of the American nuclear industry.531  
Getting Canadian technology out in the world in order to develop an export industry was an 
important consideration for the government.  It needed to begin recouping on the large 
investment it had made in the Canadian nuclear industry. 
Using the Canadian aid program in order to achieve this result initially appeared to be an 
obvious solution.  According to Bothwell, early in 1955 Nik Cavell proposed the idea in order to 
add “flair” to the otherwise apparently dull business of supplying commodities and facilitating 
hydro generation in India.  A research reactor might capture the public imagination in both 
Canada and India in a way that previous projects, such as Mayurakshi, had not.
532
  During a 
lunch with William Bennett, AECL’s president, Cavell asked if the corporation could supply a 
nuclear research reactor to India.
533
  Although Bennett was initially cautious, the idea soon 
gained momentum.  If AECL supplied a simple copy of the NRX reactor, it would be a low-cost 
endeavour with few security concerns since the design had already been declassified, or so they 
theorized.  India had already set up an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1948, and had the 
technical capability to receive a reactor, largely due to the expertise and leadership of its most 
eminent Cambridge-educated physicist, Homi Bhabha.
534
  Bhabha, who was personally 
supported by Nehru, also had a Canadian connection, since he studied at Cambridge with the 
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Vice-President of AECL, Wilfred Bennett Lewis.
535
  Discussions with the department and with 
Bennett led Jules Léger to officially propose the idea to Pearson in a lengthy memorandum on 21 
March 1955.   
Léger made sure to defend the idea in terms of Cold War politics, citing rumours that the 
Soviet Union had been helping China to develop atomic energy.
536
  He also suggested that by 
helping an Asian country to develop a peaceful nuclear program, Canada could stem negative 
publicity about the evils of western nuclear weapons within the region.
537
  India would be more 
likely, and less embarrassed, to accept the sensitive technology from Canada, the USSEA 
believed.  However, Léger largely sold the idea in terms of Canadian commerce.  Canada could 
not afford to delay the development of an export market waiting on a theoretical international 
nuclear control organization.
538
  Canadian companies were vying for the opportunity to get 
involved in nuclear power, and such a project would build expertise among those wanting to 
enter the market: “it is evident that before very long the development of atomic energy is going 
to become—if it has not already—very keenly competitive.  Our technical people and our firms 
are anxious to gain some experience in order that they may be able to meet such competition in 
Canada and probably also in foreign countries.”539  In a hand-written note below the text of the 
memorandum, Léger wrote that the project could “politically ... do more to strengthen our 
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relations with India than anything I could think of” and asked for a special appropriation in 
addition to regular Colombo Plan funding for the reactor.
540
   
 Compared to other aid projects, this idea progressed quickly to the executive level.  That 
the executive became so closely involved at all was certainly a different facet of this particular 
project.  Perfunctory memoranda that sought approval for Colombo expenditure regularly went 
before cabinet, but this project had a different level of urgency and seriousness attached to it.  
The government made decisions quickly, particularly since Reid was planning to leave the 
country on 8 April for his trip to North America.
541
  By the end of March, Pearson had presented 
the idea to cabinet and Escott Reid had already been given the green light to engage in 
exploratory conversations with ministers in the union council.
542
  On 1 April, Reid gave an 
informal letter to the Secretary General of the MEA, N.R. Pillai, informing Nehru of the plan.
543
  
Pillai responded positively to the offer, and confirmed earlier impressions that it would, 
politically speaking, be easier for India to accept nuclear technology from Canada than from the 
UK or the United States.
544
  Meanwhile, Lewis wrote a personal letter to Bhabha with the 
suggestion that Canada might be able to “help” with a heavy water research reactor, somewhat 
disingenuously suggesting that the idea had come from his reading of “the newspapers” about the 
AEC’s plans.545   
Despite early signals that the reactor would be acceptable, acting high commissioner 
Bruce Williams reported on 19 April that the Indian government could not fully embrace the idea 
until Bhabha had come to inspect NRX personally, as there was some question that the reactor 
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might be out of date.  Pillai, speaking off the record, indicated that the decision would be easy if 
the reactor were an outright gift.  If, however, the reactor was to be paid for out of normal 
Colombo funds at the expense of other projects, it would be a more difficult decision for the 
government.  Officials within the GOI also questioned the idea of bringing other Colombo Plan 
country scientists to train at the facility, as Canada suggested.  The Indian government already 
had discussions with the UK about sharing research and the confidentiality of sensitive 
information might be compromised should other scientists be allowed access to the facilities.
546
  
India had begun to bargain.  In the months to come, Bhabha proved to be a savvy negotiator.   
The Canadian government was ready to proceed, but India continued to hesitate.  When 
Bhabha spoke to Pillai about the possibility of a visit, the physicist was non-committal.  To 
Lewis, Bhabha wrote that he had been investigating the possibility of getting the most up-to-date 
reactor being developed in the UK and was not that keen on the older NRX model.
547
  
Meanwhile, the Canadians continued to do what they could to make the offer appealing, without 
wishing to give the impression that they were forcing damaged, or older, goods on the Indians.
548
  
On 13 June, Léger again wrote in a memo to Pearson that there were “very strong political and 
commercial reasons for making a more definite and liberal offer to the Indian Government” 
before Nehru returned from a trip abroad and the upcoming Geneva summit in July.
549
  As a 
result, Pearson sent a letter to Howe and Walter Harris, the finance minister, to see if they might 
be open to allotting an additional sum toward the reactor, above and beyond the regular Colombo 
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Plan contribution.
550
  Not surprisingly, Howe concurred with this idea for reasons of commercial 
competitiveness: “I agree with you that it is greatly in the interest of Canada’s trade position in 
the Middle East that Canada provide an atomic reactor under the terms offered to India rather 
than allow the United States or United Kingdom to do so.”551  Although Harris had initially only 
agreed to support the reactor if the money was taken from existing Colombo Plan appropriations, 
he also cautiously accepted the “broad outline” of the proposal, with certain caveats based on the 
need for more information about exact costs.
552
  Pearson again took the idea to cabinet, and on 
11 July, it approved three proposals: that Canada make an official offer to Nehru; that scientists 
from other countries should use be allowed to use the facilities if built; and that the project be 
taken into account in the decision to extend the Colombo Plan beyond its six-year lifespan.
553
 
On 18 July, Bruce Williams took a personal message from St Laurent to Nehru 
containing the official offer.  An upcoming conference in Geneva about the possibility of 
establishing an international atomic energy agency leant further urgency to the decision.  An 
announcement prior to or during the summit could lend it symbolic importance.
554
  This led to 
the tricky question of when to inform their diplomatic allies but nuclear competitors, the UK and 
the US.  Léger suspected that the UK government was already aware of the idea because of 
India’s atomic cooperation with that country.555  While the Washington embassy communicated 
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it was unconcerned about the reaction of the U.S. government, the Canadian high commission in 
the UK worried about diplomatic consequences in London.  Apparently the decision to ship 
Canadian steam locomotives under the Colombo Plan into a traditional British export market in 
India remained a sore spot in the UK government, and Canada’s acting high commissioner in 
London felt that the announcement of a Canadian atomic reactor in India would not be greeted 
with “unreserved enthusiasm.”  He recommended telling the UK about their plans as soon as it 
was confirmed.
556
  The care with which Canada tended its diplomatic relationships again singled 
out the uniqueness of the atomic reactor project. 
Once again, however, the Indian government was not on the same timeline as the 
Canadian.  They did not receive an official reply from Nehru until 31 July, days after the summit 
ended.
557
  Moreover, while Nehru “warmly welcomed” the proposal, he also stated that he had 
been advised – the adviser most certainly being Bhabha – to convey that they preferred the newer 
NRU model that Canada recently developed.
558
  The justification for this preference was a 
technical one; Bombay did not have the fresh, cold waters of northern Ontario with which to cool 
the reactor.  The solution to this problem was a heat exchanger that used heavy water, and this, 
the letter reasoned, would be akin to the NRU process rather than the NRX.
559
  Nehru also 
offered to pay the extra costs of the NRU reactor.  When Canadian officials met with Bhabha in 
Geneva in August, they found him more open to the NRX reactor provided this cooling problem 
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could be addressed, but also learned that in addition to the UK’s reactor, Bhabha was also 
looking into acquiring an American swimming pool type reactor.
560
  The pressure mounted. 
By late August another problem emerged.  The NRX reactor produced a by-product, 
plutonium, which could be used in the development of nuclear weapons.  The hurry with which 
Canada pursued this project began to show a rather significant error in judgement.  In their haste 
to get an agreement with the Indian government, officials had ignored a literally potentially 
explosive situation.  As of yet, no international control organization existed that spelled out 
regulations for plutonium.  That meant that Canada and India had to find a solution between 
themselves, and Canadian officials apparently had no inkling of the political minefield that this 
problem would create.  On 16 September, they issued a press release which announced that 
“Canada had offered an NRX atomic reactor to India under the Colombo Plan and that this offer 
had been accepted by India.”561  The government was forced into issuing the press release 
prematurely due to leaks in the press about the reactor.
562
 
 For the next several months, however, the Indians showed the strength of their hand by 
bargaining as much as possible, all revolving around maintaining the sovereignty they felt due.  
Bhabha was determined that the gift aspect of the project would not impose on India’s national 
sovereignty or on his own scientific freedom.  The imposition of the reactor’s use as a scientific 
training ground for other countries’ scientists irked the Indians, who wanted greater control over 
which countries they did and did not let in to the site.
563
  However, it was the issue of fuel by-
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products which proved to be the biggest hindrance in concluding a final detailed agreement with 
the Indians.  The full consequences of this problem did not make an impact until after the public 
announcement.  Having been the suitors, and still thinking of the potential commercial benefits, 
it would be almost impossible for Canada to back out of the negotiations, despite the obvious 
problems that the spent fuel might present in the future.  The Indians continued to drive a hard 
bargain.     
Bhabha asked Canada to supply the fuel rods and replacements, as part of the Colombo 
Plan gift, a request which Plumptre felt was “not only looking a gift horse in the mouth but 
insisting that we supply a complete set of gold-filled teeth for the beast as well – together with 
replacements as the teeth wore out!”564  Canada wished to maintain control over the fuel rods, 
and wanted a guarantee that India would purchase the fuel from Canada.
565
  For political reasons, 
Bhabha continued to strongly reject the idea that Canada could continue to control the fuel, and 
its by-products, once it came into India.
566
  Canada proposed a solution that saw a lease of the 
fuel rods to India, with a return of the fuel elements to Canada after they were spent.
567
  While 
trying to take a tougher position with the Indians, the real views of Canada came out in 
discussions with the U.S. government about the reactor project:  “We have … made it clear that 
in the Canadian view the larger considerations tend to outweigh any risk involved.  We admitted 
the difficulty of such a precedent but suggested that this might be overcome satisfactorily by a 
provision emphasizing the interim character of the arrangement pending agreement upon a new 
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international regime.”568  Canada simply was not that worried, or at least, the risk/benefit ratio 
was balanced favourably enough for the DEA to proceed with negotiations.  Yet the idea that the 
problem could be resolved given the “interim” nature of an agreement – that is, until an 
international atomic energy agency could be set up – went awry when India began to signal its 
hesitation to join such a agency in November.   
During his visit to India in November, Pearson hoped to press forward on the fuel issue 
for what had become known as the Canada-India Reactor (CIR), without success.  As the high 
commissioner admitted in a despatch to Ottawa, Pearson and Reid were “[out] of our depth in a 
discussion of this nature.”569  In addition to this failure, Bhabha sent out a memo on 9 November 
which spelled out the two provisions for India’s acceptance of an international regulatory 
agency.  He requested that no nation or group of nations have a privileged position in the agency, 
and that the sovereignty of all nations be respected equally.
570
  As Heeney, then ambassador in 
Washington, pointed out to the DEA, it was “totally unrealistic” to expect that the US, the USSR, 
and the UK, being the only atomic powers in the world, would accept the same controls and 
conditions on their atomic programs as other non-nuclear countries.
571
  The idea that Canada 
could expect the fuel issue to go away once the atomic energy agency was up and running was 
threatened by the possibility that India would not join the agency. 
 On 21 November, Léger sent a confidential memorandum to Pearson addressing these 
issues.  What comes through most clearly in this memo was that the CIR could not fail without 
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risking “grave political consequences.”572  Not only would this be highly embarrassing and 
damaging to the Canada-India relationship, it might have the effect of making India even more 
intractable regarding the international atomic agency.
573
  Léger suggested a compromise, adding 
that Canada should set down some guidelines going forward.  He suggested that the most 
important guideline should be the first refusal rights for the supply of fuel, again highlighting the 
importance that the government attached to this possible future export market.
574
  He also 
suggested that Canada should make it clear that Canada would only supply fuel under the terms 
of any future international agency.
575
 
 After much back and forth, in which India barely budged from its original position, they 
reached a final agreement in March.  The critical article regarding fuel read in this way: 
It is the intention of both Governments that the fuel elements for the initial fuel charge 
and for the continuing requirements of the reactor will be supplied from Canada save to 
the extent that India provides them from sources within India [this sentence was added to 
allow for the case that India might find and develop their own uranium sources].  
Arrangements for the provision of the fuel elements to India from Canada will be agreed 
upon by the two Governments before the reactor is ready to operate; if an international 
agency acceptable to both Governments has come into being or is in prospect at that time, 
the terms of such agreement will be in keeping with the principles of that agency.
576
 
 
Most of the accommodation had been done in favour of Bhabha’s demands; there was no 
mention of the fuel by-products at all.  In this agreement India was not bound to the provisions of 
a future agency at all, nor was there any agreement as to what to do should India not accept the 
terms of the future agency.  India had bargained, and won. 
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Some have portrayed this series of events as massively irresponsible.  Ryan Touhey has 
described the belief that a minister of external affairs, informed by those in his department, could 
competently negotiate this matter as “stunningly naïve.”577 Certainly in hindsight, it is hard to 
disagree with this assessment.  However, it is also important to bear in mind the historical 
context.  Nehru, unlike Gandhi, was not a pacifist, and as the war with Pakistan showed, would 
resort to force if he felt it was necessary.
578
  However, despite this, he was strongly supportive of 
peace and very strongly opposed to nuclear weapons.  He consistently made the case for nuclear 
disarmament to the international community.  Bound together for Nehru were concepts of anti-
colonialism, non-alignment, and world peace, expressed in the policy of Panch Sheel, the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence.
579
 Being both the minister of external affairs and the prime 
minister, Nehru’s beliefs were strongly associated with Indian foreign policy as a whole.  Eager 
to complete the project for commercial reasons and embrace positive “propaganda value” in the 
words of the Graham McInnes, head of the Commonwealth division, those working on behalf of 
the project in both the DTC and the DEA did not fully appreciate the potential risks that a future, 
and changed, political situation in India presented to the CIR project.
580
   
Conclusion 
Originally the Colombo Plan had been conceived on a six-year timeline.  In 1956, just as 
the program was supposed to be ending, Canada had finished one major hydro project with India, 
and had agreed to the establishment of another large nuclear energy project.  The Colombo Plan 
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Group met on 16 October to talk about the future of the Plan, and came to an easy consensus: “It 
was emphasized that the value of the Plan could not now be questioned.  In fact, there appeared 
new and more cogent reasons for participating than the reasons given in support of the 
programme six years ago.”581  Although they did not spell out what these reasons were, the CIR 
reactor in particular must have weighed heavily in their minds.   
The two projects came about in totally different ways.  Mayurakshi was a “typical” 
project, although somewhat larger than had been achieved previously.  The CIR, on the other 
hand, was a complete anomaly, for never before had the Canadian government, at the executive 
level, so forcefully lobbied the Indian government to give it aid. Ottawa agreed that it would lend 
its support to the extension of the Colombo program, and it is easy to see why.  The Mayurakshi 
project, though beset by difficulties, had provided good publicity in Canada and work for 
Canadian companies.  While the Canada-India Reactor would eventually lead to serious 
problems, for the time being it had achieved the result of developing a potential export market 
for an emerging Canadian nuclear industry.  Viewed from a distance, both projects were win-
win.  They helped India’s goal of industrialization, and Canada’s commercial competitiveness.   
However, if the end of the Colombo Plan might have prompted some deeper inquiry into 
its nature, it did not.  Officials, in deciding to carry on with the Plan, considered the role of 
counterpart funds, how much Canada should be involved in the management of projects, the 
problem of competitiveness of Canadian goods on the international market, and their approach to 
commodities within the Plan.
582
  The closest they came to considering their motives for the Plan 
is contained in this one sentence from the minutes of a Colombo Plan Group meeting: “In 
general it could be said that the principal objectives of the Government in contributing to the 
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Plan were endorsed.  Our main motive in extending aid, within our means, was to help Asian 
members of the Plan develop along the lines which we ourselves had, without attaching to our 
assistance any considerations of an ideological nature.”583  The blandness of this statement is 
interesting.  That Colombo Plan officials stated that they “had no considerations of an 
ideological nature” is in some ways surprising, as clearly the prevention of communism was an 
underlying motive behind the Plan, once again revealing the paradoxical nature of the Cold War 
context in which it operated.  Nobody from the Indian government, or any of the other Colombo 
Plan countries, was in attendance at this meeting, and the minutes were marked “confidential,” 
so there was no need to hide this objective from anyone.  Was it that officials working on the 
Colombo Plan had begun to take the Indian point of view on political matters into consideration, 
and perhaps, even adopt them?  Or did they, even in private, wish to distinguish their assistance 
from that of the US, evidence, perhaps, of Cavell’s influence in the Colombo Plan Group?   
Government officials considered that Canada’s economic success was the model of 
growth and development.  It was such an obvious point that this is the only clear statement in 
government documents of that belief.  Mayurakshi was an inherently Indian project, planned and 
executed by the GOI, and so it was perhaps understandable that Canadian officials did not think 
too deeply upon how it contributed to India’s developmental goals.  That was the role of the 
Indian government.  However, the CIR was a Canadian-initiated project, the first of its kind.  
Again, the context is critical.  Nuclear technology, and its possible role in the electricity 
generation system, was cutting edge technology, thought to be the future for any advanced, 
industrialized nation.  Helping India to achieve nuclear power capability was helping it to 
“develop along the lines that we ourselves had.” 
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The Liberal government had guided these initial priorities, and made Canadian aid policy 
in concert with the work of officials in the DEA, the DF and the DTC.  However, what it did not 
realize in 1955 and 1956, as it worked to make the CIR a reality, was that its days were soon 
numbered, and that a new government would soon be setting its own priorities for the aid 
program. 
  
207 
 
Chapter 7: “An Enormous Surplus of Wheat” – Diefenbaker and a New Era of 
Bilateralism and Multilateralism 
For students of Canadian political history, the year 1957 represents the end of an era.  On 
10 June 1957, John Diefenbaker, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, won a minority 
government and ended the 22 year reign of the Liberals in federal politics.  The following year, 
Diefenbaker solidified his position with an astounding win of 208 out of 265 seats in parliament.  
For this, and others reasons, 1957 also represents the end of an era for students of the Canadian 
foreign aid relationship with India.  Reid departed as high commissioner in the spring of 1957, 
and was replaced by Chester Ronning, a man whose history with the Asian continent dated back 
to his own childhood in China.
584
  The trend of change continued in the following year, as Nik 
Cavell departed for Ceylon to become Canada’s high commissioner in that country, and Dr. O.E. 
Ault, an official already working within the DTC, became the Colombo Plan’s administrator.   
Neither made as large an impact on the Colombo Plan as had their predecessors: Cavell 
had nurtured the Plan from its infancy, whereas Ault walked into an already functioning 
program; and Ronning was a level-headed man, not given to the same flights of emotionalism as 
Reid.  He also came into his role as a Colombo Plan skeptic, only growing to appreciate it over 
time.
585
  Finally, 1957 also signalled the end of the GOI’s hopes for the Second Five Year Plan, 
and with it, the end of hope for a self-sufficient India, at least for the foreseeable future.  As the 
year went on, it became more and more clear that India was headed toward a very serious 
                                                          
584
 Brian L. Evans. The Remarkable Chester Ronning: Proud Son of China (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
2013), 1-25. 
585
 In minutes of a meeting Ronning held in Ottawa in June of 1959 it was recorded that “At the time he arrived in 
India Mr. Ronning stated that he had very deep misgivings about the effect the Colombo Plan was having and would 
have on India’s economic development, and whether it could do the job it had set out to achieve” but had come see 
to the value of such capital projects as the Kundah dam project first-hand.  LAC, RG 25, “Minutes of the 7th Meeting 
of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Aid Policy,” 18 June 1959, Volume 4297, File 11038-6-C-40, part 
1, 2. 
208 
 
economic crisis which would seriously affect the ability of the government to implement the 
ambitious industrialization scheme it had hoped to achieve.   
Major transitions occurred in the aid program occurred during the Diefenbaker era.  The 
newly-elected prime minister had little understanding of the problems of international economic 
development or the parameters of the Canadian aid program, although he did appreciate its 
importance to the Commonwealth and had been a supporter of the Colombo Plan throughout the 
1950s.  The program underwent a total reorganization, which will be explored in the next 
chapter, almost entirely without input from the Diefenbaker cabinet.  However, some significant 
changes did occur, directly or more often, indirectly, as a result of the prime minister’s 
leadership.   
Diefenbaker and his ministers were intensely interested in aid as it pertained to a single 
issue – wheat – and as a result of this, and the effects of the Indian financial crisis, the Canadian 
government negotiated a loan to India so that the country could buy Canadian wheat, the first 
such deal in the post-war era with a developing country.
586
  The prime minister’s agitation for a 
NATO World Food Bank did not achieve the results he had initially envisioned.  However, his 
public calls for a multilateral food program, particularly at the UN in 1959, did support other 
initiatives being championed in the United States which eventually led to the creation of the 
World Food Programme.  Also, his invitation to the Commonwealth to hold a Trade and 
Economic conference in Canada in 1958 prompted the Canadian government to come up with 
some innovations on the aid file, which resulted in a new scholarship program, a larger financial 
commitment to the Colombo Plan as well as a multi-year commitment to the program, and the 
extension of the Colombo Plan into new areas in Africa and the Caribbean.  Finally, due to the 
                                                          
586
 By the later 1950s, Diefenbaker represented the riding of Prince Albert, home to many wheat growers. As well, 
wheat remained king in Western Canada, an area that held special resonance for the prime minister. 
209 
 
relationship that Canada had with India, Canada was drawn into participating in the Aid-India 
Consortium in 1958, a World Bank/US-led initiative that represented Canada’s first major 
financial commitment to a multilateral aid program outside of the Bretton Woods organizations.   
Diefenbaker Becomes Prime Minister 
 Diefenbaker’s election as prime minister on 10 June 1957, ended 22 years of Liberal rule 
in Canada.  The story of Diefenbaker’s unease with a bureaucracy so accustomed to Liberal 
government, particularly in the case of the DEA and his dread of the so-called “Pearsonalities” 
he felt occupied that department, is well told in Canadian historiography.
587
  According to 
historians John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Diefenbaker’s inexperience with teamwork and his 
position as an outsider even within his own party meant that he was never able to fully 
collaborate with the civil service and the DEA in particular.
588
  Eventually, Diefenbaker settled 
into a routine on the foreign affairs portfolio that saw him personally engage in issues that 
interested him, with Basil Robinson at his disposal in his own office to work on those issues.
589
  
Meanwhile Robinson and the clerk of the privy council and secretary to the cabinet, Robert 
Bryce, acted as the go-between for Diefenbaker and the long-suffering, chain-smoking 
undersecretary of state for external affairs, Norman Robertson.
590
  At first, Diefenbaker became 
SSEA, until the heavy travel demands of that position finally provoked him into choosing Sidney 
Smith, a Tory and president of the University of Toronto, to take over that position in September 
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of 1957.
591
  However, Smith’s inexperience with matters of foreign affairs meant that he never 
fully took ownership of the role.
592
  His sudden death in March of 1959 ended any possibility 
that he would grow into the position over time.  Until Howard Green took over and settled into 
his role as SSEA following Smith’s death, this meant there were two somewhat separate bodies 
acting within the Diefenbaker administration on behalf of the aid file: Diefenbaker himself and 
the DEA under Robertson in collaboration with the DTC and the DF.  The formerly fairly 
straightforward chain of command that existed through Pearson’s close collaboration with 
officials in the DEA, and the former SSEA’s advocacy for Colombo Plan matters in cabinet and 
to the prime minister, was no more.   
 However, this did not put the Colombo Plan in jeopardy.  On the contrary, there were two 
factors that made it appealing for Diefenbaker: the first was his feeling for the oppressed, which 
he easily transposed from the sometimes parochial matters of his Saskatchewan law office to the 
weightier matters of foreign affairs; the second was his affection for the Commonwealth as an 
expression of what he saw as the common bond of superior British values and British law 
throughout the world.  As Canada stood outside the sterling relationship that economically 
bounded the other members together, the Colombo Plan was the only large and concrete link that 
the country had with its sister nations.  Not surprisingly, Diefenbaker supported the Plan whole-
heartedly, and looked for ways to strengthen it.  However, this support for the Plan did not mean 
that he really understood it. 
 Diefenbaker had only been prime minister for two weeks when he attended his first 
Commonwealth prime minister’s conference in London, an opportunity he greatly relished.593  It 
gave him a chance to realise his election promises for closer collaboration with the 
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Commonwealth.  The previous year, the United Kingdom had begun to inquire about the 
possibilities of setting up a Commonwealth development agency and Commonwealth 
development fund or bank.
594
  The briefing documents that Diefenbaker received from the DEA, 
prepared prior to the election and quite probably with a different audience in mind, made its 
position on this idea fairly clear; a Commonwealth fund or bank would simply duplicate the 
work of the IBRD, only on a smaller and probably less effective scale.
595
  However, with the 
election of the assertively pro-Commonwealth Diefenbaker, all ideas were back on the table.  
This was especially true after he proposed that Canada host a Commonwealth trade conference in 
addition to the finance minister’s meeting already planned for that September in Mont 
Tremblant, a move designed to harken back to the British Empire Economic Conference of 
1932.
596
  When Diefenbaker capped off the trip with an ill-fated, off-the-cuff announcement at an 
impromptu press conference held on the tarmac at Uplands Airport in Ottawa that Canada would 
attempt to divert 15 percent of its trade away from the US in favour of the United Kingdom, his 
government’s intentions for closer economic collaboration with the leading member of the 
Commonwealth could not have been made more transparent.
597
   
 In economic matters, the Diefenbaker administration preoccupied itself with closer 
cooperation with the Commonwealth, and concerns about the “bogeyman” of the US and its 
dominant presence in the Canadian economy.  On the aid file, one problem in particular 
dominated the cabinet.  This was the ever-more burdensome issue of wheat, or rather, the excess 
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of wheat as it piled up, unsold, in elevators across the prairies. During the Second World War, 
wheat had become more than a mere food commodity.  A world-wide shortage of grain at the 
end of the war rated as a security concern for the US government.
598
  Wheat, and its finished 
product in the 1950s, commercially-produced white bread, were even imbued with cultural 
meanings that celebrated its healthfulness and importance in North American Cold War 
society.
599
  Advancements in agricultural technology made large surpluses possible, and instead 
of practicing production controls as they had done before the Second World War, the United 
States allowed massive wheat surpluses to accumulate as a buffer against a potential hot war.
600
  
These economic, cultural and technological shifts affected Canada as well, and during the 1950s 
and 1960s, the US and Canada controlled between 60 and 70 percent of the world’s wheat 
exports.
601
  
 As already noted above, the Canadian government dealt with some of these surpluses 
through the Colombo Plan.  Indeed, in the early 1950s, India was happy to receive wheat 
imports, and although the counterpart funds generated from the sale of Canadian wheat sales 
went toward economic development projects, using the Colombo Plan to dispose of Canadian 
wheat was a grey area that drew the ire of the auditor general.  However, the sums that Canada 
exported through the Plan appeared quite meagre in comparison to the United States.  The 
Agricultural Trade and Development and Assistance Act of 1954, better known as Public Law 
(PL) 480 gave the US a method of disposing of massive quantities of wheat via aid by accepting 
local, soft currencies for sales of wheat, a policy that no other country could feasibly manage at 
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that time.
602
  It also allowed for credit sales at concession rates and lengthy repayment periods, 
barter for payment, and even financed the shipping costs.
603
  By 1958, the US was shipping 
about half of its total wheat exports under PL 480, an amount almost as large as Canada’s total 
wheat exports.
604
  Not surprisingly, these policies aggravated the Canadian government and the 
prairie farmers, whose export opportunities were being limited by the US.  As a result, Canada 
lobbied both the US directly and the Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO) of the United 
Nations to cease this practice.  In 1954, the FAO created a set of Principles of Surplus Disposal 
Recommended by F.A.O. and Guiding Lines in order to set some parameters around commodity 
disposal.  However, this made little impact on American PL 480 behaviour.
605
 
 As Diefenbaker owed his election win in large part to the massive support he earned 
across the prairies, he and his cabinet paid keen attention to these problems.  The Liberals had 
underestimated the extent to which discontent among western farmers could translate into 
election defeat, and Diefenbaker had capitalized on this.
606
  Once in office, helping the prairie 
farmer had to be an important political objective for the new prime minister, and the aid program 
was an obvious place to begin.  While Canada could never hope to match the type of activity on 
this front that the US managed under PL 480, it was one area where Canada could relieve the 
burden of costly wheat surpluses, and Diefenbaker set out to tackle this problem.  Sometimes 
another’s misfortune can be a blessing, and while no one in the Diefenbaker government 
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celebrated the financial catastrophe that beset India in 1957, and which lasted into 1958, it did 
give the new administration an opportunity to show, in a very concrete way, its concern for 
western farmers.   
The Indian Financial Crisis of 1957 
As outlined in chapter 5, the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy for development, expressed in 
the Second Five Year Plan, left India with a US$840 million foreign exchange shortfall.  Despite 
this expectation, resistance to the acquisition of foreign aid to cover that shortfall also continued.  
When T.T. Krishnamachari took over as finance minister from C.D. Deshmukh in 1956, he did 
so having the year before already publicly stated his personal opposition to “asking for foreign 
aid.”607  Not only did the Plan have an uncovered gap of foreign exchange, it did not fully fund 
domestic expenditures either, and tentative plans within the Planning Commission to increase 
taxation were rejected by the Finance Ministry and the states.
608
  The voices of optimism 
overwhelmed those who, with clearer eyes, saw the immense shortcomings of the Plan.  Only a 
few members of the Planning Commission, such as K.C. Neogy and B.R. Shenoy, came to the 
conclusion that the Plan was unsustainable, but they received no support from the National 
Development Council.
609
   
The few critics of the Plan had legitimate concerns.  The extreme focus on the 
development of heavy industry might have made sense for politicians and economists inspired by 
the Soviet example of rapid industrialization.  However, as later critics have noted, the 
Mahalanobis model treated planning as an accounting scheme, and assumed the type of tightly 
controlled inputs and outputs that characterized a command economy.  But India was not a 
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command economy, and although the state clearly staked out a strong role for itself, India still 
had a vast private sector which responded to market forces.
610
  Although the Plan addressed a 
large array of social and economic fields, including education, health, and rural development, the 
numbers spoke for themselves.  In a country where nearly the entire population lived in a rural 
setting, the Second Five Year Plan prepared for an investment of Rs. 338 crores into agricultural 
and community development, in comparison with a Rs. 670 crores investment into large and 
medium-sized industries and mining.
611
  Although it promised a “larger emphasis on basic 
education,” its planned investment in elementary education actually decreased by Rs. 4 crores 
whereas planned investment in university education went up by Rs. 42 crores and investment in 
technical and vocational education went up Rs. 25 crores.
612
  This all added up to an imbalanced 
focus on a small, mostly urban and educated percentage of the population.   
It did not take long for the accounting-book perfection of the Second Five Year Plan to 
come face to face with reality.  The First Five Year Plan had been buoyed by better than average 
crops.  This luck did not carry over to the Second Plan and by 1957, the country suffered from 
both a poor monsoon and flooding, resulting in bad harvests and consequent rapid inflation, 
forcing the GOI to draw heavily on its foreign exchange reserves.
613
  In addition to the bad food 
situation, the Second Plan’s failure to account for the private sector’s role in the economy also 
made an impact.  In order to spur heavy industry, the GOI had taken a liberal approach to the 
granting of import licenses, but these got ahead of the economy’s ability to fund these imports. 
How exactly this came about is not entirely clear, although in a letter from C.D. Deshmukh to 
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Nehru early in 1958, the former distanced himself from responsibility for the licenses and 
blamed the new finance minister and former minister of commerce and industry, 
Krishnamachari, as well as B.K. Nehru for not informing the former minister of the extent of the 
licensing problem.
614
   
The third factor in precipitating the crisis was defense.  Another gaping hole in the 
Second Five Year Plan was its failure to account for the large, and ever-growing, defense budget.  
As Cold War realities manifested themselves, the military lobbied for greater funding and the 
proportion of the budget that India spent on defence grew.  Despite warnings to the prime 
minister from President Rajendra Prasad in 1955 and Deshmukh in 1956 that the government 
could not afford a large increase in defence expenditure, the military’s perspective increasingly 
won out.
615
  India and Pakistan had already fought a war over Kashmir in 1947, and throughout 
the 1950s further conflict over this area remained a real possibility for both countries.  The US 
government supported Pakistan through the Mutual Aid agreement signed by Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles in February of 1954, which provided US$80 million a year of defense support 
to the Pakistani government.
616
 The Plan blithely ignored all of these realities.  Later, the finance 
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minister concluded that “no allowance was made for Defence on the ground that Defence was 
outside the Plan,” succinctly revealing the Commission’s flawed and circular logic.617   
Krishnamachari blamed the Second Plan for the financial problems: “The foreign 
exchange crisis is a result of the Plan itself.  The estimates of deficit as calculated by the 
Planning Commission were underestimated from the beginning because the foreign exchange 
costs of the projects sought to be executed were not fully worked out.”618  The Planning 
Commission itself came to a similar conclusion, admitting to Nehru that in addition to the burden 
of crop failures and the needs of the defense budget, the “rise in imports and the consequent 
drain on the foreign exchange resources is chiefly attributable to the attempt to carry out the 
Second Five Year Plan.”619  This could not be but a dramatic disappointment although one, in 
hindsight, that is difficult to reconcile given that those in the Planning Commission knew the 
facts of the Indian economy.  
The reality of the situation was not lost on Nehru, who reluctantly reconsidered his 
position on aid.  In 1957, his correspondence began to reflect an understanding that the crisis was 
of a dramatic enough nature that India would not be able to see it through without a substantial 
influx of aid, especially from the US.
620
  He wrote to Vijaya Pandit, India’s high commissioner 
in the UK: 
The United States is the only country, apart perhaps from Western Germany, which can 
help us substantially.  We have now to think in terms of hundreds of crores.  Because of 
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this foreign exchange difficulty we have been cutting our plans and projects down to the 
bone, and sometimes a bit of the bone is taken off too.
621
   
 
As a result, the Indian government, and T.T. Krishnamachari in particular, changed their 
positions radically, and began to actively pursue new aid flows in order to pull the country out of 
the crisis.  In August, Norman Robertson, then the Canadian ambassador to the US, reported that 
the State Department believed that India needed more assistance, including wheat, than even the 
US could provide.
622
  In October, he indicated the extent to which the Indians had changed their 
tactics when he wrote that the “USA is concerned and somewhat embarrassed by the scale and 
seriousness of the Indian requests for economic assistance.”623   
 Politically, this was excellent timing for the new Diefenbaker government.  While the 
Liberal government had been measured and restrained in its use of wheat through the aid 
program for reasons outlined earlier, even when pushed to do so by the Indian government, the 
new administration had no such compunctions.  It prepared a memorandum for the 
Commonwealth finance ministers that stated it was “prepared to use some of its present wheat 
surplus to enlarge substantially the scale of assistance now being made available to 
Commonwealth countries under the Colombo Plan.”624  The circumstances around why a deal 
was made in the form of a loan rather than under regular Colombo Plan allotments will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  By November, when Douglas Harkness, the minister of 
agriculture, visited Rome for an FAO meeting, he went with authorization from the Canadian 
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government to tell his Indian counterpart, Panjabrao Deshmukh, that Canada would consider a 
five year loan to India for the purchase of wheat. 
Some within the relevant departments expressed concern about the advisability of such 
a loan.  On 25 November, Mitchell Sharp wrote a memo to J.M. Macdonnell, then acting 
minister of Trade and Commerce, to outline the pros and cons of such a loan.  On the positive 
side, Sharp wrote, the loan would relieve distress for a “worthy” cause, would strengthen the 
Commonwealth, and would not bring Canada into conflict with either the US or Australia in 
terms of stepping on any trade-related toes.
625
  On the negative side, he questioned or not India 
was a good risk for such a loan, and more significantly, he questioned whether or not this action 
would “establish a dangerous precedent.”626  Undoubtedly, Sharp concluded, lending to India 
would send a signal to other countries that Canada was able to provide loans to Colombo Plan 
countries, something the Liberal government had resisted.  Indeed, Wynne Plumptre was one 
important skeptic who strongly opposed a wheat loan.
627
   
However, the Diefenbaker administration did not fear such a precedent, and the DEA 
notified the high commission in New Delhi that the Canadian government was “anxious” to 
finish the sale, and would even offer a greater than five-year term on the loan in order to get the 
deal done.
628
  In December, the Canadian government began negotiations with representatives 
from the GOI.  New Delhi asked for 215,000 tons of Number 4 Northern on a seven year term, 
and Canada offered a rate of interest at approximately 4 ½ percent.  The Canadian government 
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found the requested quantity “disappointing” and asked the officials from the GOI to enlarge the 
request since the terms were very favourable, which they promised to do.
629
  By the end of 1958, 
Canada loaned India C$24.18 million for wheat sales, in addition to their wheat grant worth C$8 
million, and again in 1959, Canada concluded a loan worth C$8.82 million in addition to a C$10 
million wheat grant.
630
  In the end, worries about India as a bad risk proved justified, and during 
India’s next major financial crisis in the mid-1960s, Canada decided to forgive these loans to 
help the ailing country.
631
  The decision to offer a loan was a political rather than an economic 
one. 
However convenient the financial crisis turned out to be as an incentive to find additional 
reasons to send wheat to India, it was a short-term solution to Canada’s wheat problem.  
Diefenbaker searched for more permanent solutions.  In 1958, during his world tour, Diefenbaker 
visited India.  In addition to meetings with Nehru and being bestowed with an honourary degree 
from Delhi University, he also visited the Supreme Court, gave a speech in the Indian Lok 
Sabha, and participated in a rather questionable tiger hunt.  Diefenbaker also met with the 
Planning Commission.
632
 He had been warned about Indian sensitivities by the DEA, and asked, 
when making his speeches, not to emphasize the British connection in discussing the 
Commonwealth, nor to launch any attacks against communism, and finally, to refer to Canadian 
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Colombo Plan aid only “briefly and in modest terms” and to focus on praising India’s own 
development efforts.
633
  The records of Diefenbaker’s speeches and meetings show that he was 
largely listened to the DEA’s advice, although Nehru became somewhat defensive when 
Diefenbaker asked him about the size of India’s defense budget.634  The DEA and the Canadian 
high commission likely would have advised against Diefenbaker touching on this topic, since 
Nehru was particularly sensitive to the feeling that India should not make changes to its internal 
policies and decision-making based on donor attitudes.  The DEA might also have questioned the 
propriety of Diefenbaker’s direct lobbying of the Planning Commission on behalf of Canadian 
wheat.  According to the meeting minutes: 
Explaining the background, the Prime Minister said that he had been very much in favour 
of the Colombo Plan since its inception in 1950 … There was, however a major problem 
which he wished to bring to the attention of the Planning Commission.  Canada had an 
enormous surplus of wheat which could cost as much as $30 to 40 million in storage.  
Unlike the United States which exported only 19% of its wheat production, Canada had 
to export as much as 80%.  Public opinion in Canada felt that the increased assistance 
given under the Colombo Plan should especially take the form of wheat and that 
countries within the Commonwealth should appreciate the problems with which Canada 
was faced in connection with its wheat surplus.  The United States had made extensive 
bilateral arrangements for disposing of its surplus and was in a position to offer facilities 
and concessions which were beyond the means of Canada.  In this connection, the Prime  
Minister also referred to the budgetary deficit, the foreign exchange gap and 
unemployment in Canada.
635
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It is difficult to know how members of the Planning Commission felt about this appeal.  
One might guess that the prime minister of one of the wealthiest countries in the world with a 
population of a mere 18 million, complaining about unemployment and a foreign exchange gap 
to the members of the group responsible for raising over half of its approximately 433 million 
persons out of poverty during a severe financial crisis may have appeared somewhat farcical, if 
not offensive.  This was a dramatic example of Diefenbaker’s failure to grasp not only the 
nuances of the Nehru administration’s approach, but also the problem of economic development 
in general.  However, regardless of the advisability of this approach, the message was loud and 
clear.  Canada had lots of wheat and it was happy to find ways to get rid of it. 
Another approach that Diefenbaker took to the problem of surplus wheat was his idea for 
a World Food Bank (WFB), although it did not specifically implicate India.  In his memoirs, 
Diefenbaker credits the inspiration for the idea of the WFB to his father, who felt that Christian 
theology, and the lessons of the biblical story of Joseph who encouraged the Pharaoh to set aside 
seven years of surplus for an oncoming drought, could be applied to international affairs.
636
  This 
may very well have been the case personally for the prime minister, but ideas for the 
improvement of food aid policy were very much in the air in the late 1950s.  According to 
political scientist Mark W. Charlton, the idea for a WFB was presented to Diefenbaker by the 
Canadian Federation of Agriculture.
637
  Within the US government, Senator Hubert Humphrey 
and a group of like-minded colleagues had been working since 1954 to transform the PL 480 
provisions from a dumping ground to a developmentally-minded program, which could be used 
as an aid resource.
638
  In 1956, he was commissioned by the Senate to study PL 480, and he 
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released a report, “Food and Fiber as a Force for Freedom” in 1958 which advocated for the 
extension of the program and the creation of a “Peace Food Administrator” in the White 
House.
639
  In 1959, he introduced “A Bill to promote the foreign policy of the United States and 
help essential world conditions of peace by the more effective use of United States agricultural 
commodities for the relief of human hunger, and for promoting economic and social 
development in less developed countries.”640  During this time, the State Department also 
conducted a review of American food aid policies.
641
   
However, Diefenbaker does deserve credit for first bringing the idea of multilateral 
cooperation in food aid to the world stage.  He did so in his first year in office at the NATO 
heads of government meeting in December 1957, pitching the WFB as both a strategic policy to 
build up food reserves in the event of a Third World War, and also as a developmental initiative 
to build up developing economies as a bulwark against communism.  Using India as an example, 
Diefenbaker argued that a secure food supply was an important contributor to political 
stability.
642
  The idea stalled at NATO, but in 1959, following the State Department review of aid 
policies and Humphrey’s bill in the Senate, the Eisenhower administration began to reconsider 
multilateral approaches to its food aid program.
643
  During his special farm message to Congress 
in January 1959, Eisenhower, at the urging of an adviser, recommended the extension of PL 480 
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programs.
644
 In February of 1959, the US embassy contacted the DTC to notify the Canadian 
government that plans were in the works in Washington to hold a “Food for Peace conference,” a 
three-day meeting in order to consider these issues.
645
   
In considering whether or not to participate in the conference, Merril W. Menzies, an 
adviser to the prime minister’s office, warned that despite their best intentions, “surplus disposal 
remains the basic purpose of their proposal.”646  The DF came to a similar conclusion, worrying 
that the program might lead to the perpetuation, rather than the removal, of surplus production in 
North America.
647
  Despite these concerns, the government concluded that it was better to be at 
the table defending Canada’s interests than not, and so agreed to participate in the May 
meetings.
648
   
In preparation for the meeting, Canadian officials were forced to think through the 
abstract idea that Diefenbaker had earlier proposed at NATO.  Roy Faibish, the private sectary 
and special assistant to the minister of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources sent a letter to 
Menzies suggesting Canada propose that all surplus disposal should be handled through an 
international agency like the FAO, although he did worry that the US might reject a plan which 
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took control out of American hands.
649
  Like the proposals that US Senator Hubert Humphrey 
developed in Washington, a memorandum prepared for the meetings characterized the WFB as 
not just a means of surplus disposal but as a way of “developing the economies, health and 
welfare of peoples in underdeveloped countries” and that the program should be aimed toward 
creating new consumption rather than just replacing exports.
650
  The author devised a variety of 
ways in which the proposed program might operate.  In addition to ordinary uses, such as the 
provision of food in cases of emergency, the author also came up with some more novel ideas, 
including the use of food aid to pay for labour on economic development projects, and the use of 
food as a scholarship program and/or a salary for teachers.
651
  These suggestions represented the 
attempt to mould what was at its heart surplus disposal into an economic development program, 
a formidable challenge for bureaucrats sitting at their desks in snowy Ottawa. 
 Despite its interest in the idea, the Eisenhower administration was in its waning days and 
little came of the meetings in the short term.  They did strike a “Wheat Utilization Committee” 
and held meetings the following month and again in November which at least kept the lines of 
communication open between the US and Canada on the issue.
652
  However, in 1960, two factors 
came into play.  One was the active interest in food aid policy from Senator John F. Kennedy, 
who was running for Eisenhower’s job.  While traditional agricultural issues bored Kennedy, he 
was excited by the possibilities of the use of agricultural surpluses for international economic 
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development.
653
  The second factor was Diefenbaker’s decision to bring the WFB idea away 
from NATO and to the United Nations during his speech at the fifteenth session of the General 
Assembly in September of that year.  Eisenhower made a similar address, asking that “a 
workable scheme should be devised for providing food aid through the UN system.”654  On 27 
October, Canada, the United States, and four other countries sponsored Resolution 1496 XV, 
“Provision of food surpluses to food deficient peoples through the United Nations system.” The 
resolution called on the FAO to “undertake a study of the feasibility and acceptability of 
additional arrangements, including multilateral arrangements under the auspices of the Food and 
Agricultural organization, having as their objective the mobilization of available surplus 
foodstuffs and their distribution in areas of greatest need, particularly in economically less 
developed countries.”655 
Simultaneously, Senator George McGovern worked on a similar idea for a multilateral 
world food agency for the Kennedy campaign.  In October, McGovern issued a press release, 
using the “Food for Peace” terminology, and called for a conference to create this type of 
organization.  The press release also suggested a food-for-work scheme as a part of the 
proposal.
656
  Kennedy’s presidential win the previous fall only increased the likelihood that the 
UN resolution might turn into something concrete, and once installed in the White House as the 
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director of the US Food for Peace Programme, McGovern pushed the idea into fruition.  In 
response to the resolution, the Director General of the FAO did convene a panel to study the 
issue, and submitted a draft report in April, 1961.
657
 In the late autumn of 1961, the World Food 
Programme was brought into being by parallel resolutions in the UN General Assembly and 
FAO on a three-year experimental basis.
658
 
Diefenbaker’s role in the process that led up to the formation of the FAO was, in the end, 
fairly marginal.  The real work was done in Washington; it happened in Congress and in the 
State Department, in the United Nations, and following Kennedy’s win, George McGovern led 
the charge.  While Diefenbaker had an idea for some kind of a multilateral agency to handle 
grain surpluses, the present author has not found any evidence in either his personal papers, DTC 
or DEA documents that Diefenbaker ever articulated, clearly and specifically, what he 
envisioned or meant by the proposal.
659
  The work done in the DTC to try and thresh out what he 
may have desired possibly made some impact on US officials through the Wheat Committee or 
through their representations in Rome at the FAO, but it seems that their ideas were largely in 
step with contemporary thinking in Washington anyway.  However, Diefenbaker does deserve 
credit for first bringing the issue to the international stage. 
At the time, Diefenbaker might have happily accepted credit for his role in the formation 
of the WFP, as would anyone.  Not only did Canada participate in the World Food Programme, it 
also continued to give food bilaterally.  The Canadian food aid program grew dramatically 
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during the 1960s, ballooning to over C$100 million in the 1966/67 fiscal year.
660
  However, the 
uncomplicated view that both the donor and recipient governments had about food aid during 
this era has largely been discredited.  Simple assumptions based on a model that saw all calories 
as equal, and neglected local cultural and socio-economic factors in recipient countries have 
simply not worked.  Since the 1950s, scholarship on and thinking about food aid has evolved 
significantly.  Recent scholarship has pointed to the numerous problems related to the use, or 
misuse, of food aid, even when it is provided during a humanitarian crisis.  Scholars have 
extensively criticized the food aid as being primarily oriented toward the needs of the donor 
rather than the recipient, a criticism one can very easily make of the Diefenbaker 
administration’s approach.661  Poor management of food aid distribution is criticized for failing 
to meet the real nutritional needs of the populations it targets, interfering with local markets and 
indigenous eating habits, and often ending up in the hands of those who do not need it.  
Moreover, although Canada justified the use of food aid as a way to promote exports, research 
shows that it has been an inefficient means of doing so.
662
  The Canadian government and the 
European Union has made a significant shift away from the type of surplus food exports that 
originally characterized food aid from the 1950s to the 1980s, and has shifted towards an 
approach that addresses humanitarian and development issues based on the needs of the 
recipient.
663
  The World Food Programme itself has made significant changes during the 1990s, 
                                                          
660
 Mark W. Charlton, The Making of Canadian Food Aid Policy (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1982. 
661
 Christopher B. Barrett and Daniel G. Maxwell, Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its Role (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 19.  See also Hans Wolfgang Singer, John B. Wood and Tony Jennings, Food Aid: The Challenge 
and the Opportunity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Edward Clay and Olav Stokke, eds., Food Aid Reconsidered: 
Assessing the Impact on Third World Countries (London: Frank Cass  & Co., Ltd., 1991); Edward Clay and Olav 
Stokke, eds., Food Aid and Human Security (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000); Jennifer Clapp,  Hunger in 
the Balance:  The New Politics of International Food Aid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012);  
662
 Ibid, 176-191. 
663
 Barrett and Maxwell, Food Aid, 52-54. 
229 
 
moving substantially away from a surplus food distribution agency to one that is more dedicated 
to humanitarian crises.
664
   
Obviously, Canadian aid policy during the Diefenbaker era was targeted more at donor 
concerns than the needs of recipients, since it was so closely tied to the Progressive Conservative 
party’s political ambitions.  It was yet another example of the embedded assumptions in the aid 
program that assumed a well-intentioned gift would result in a positive outcome for the recipient.  
Diefenbaker’s simplistic thinking about food aid – if there are hungry people, and we have 
surplus wheat, it is our duty to share – was widespread at the time both among governments and 
among the public, and to a large extent still is.  However, Diefenbaker wrote in his memoirs that 
he did not get the support he anticipated for the World Food Bank idea from the DEA:  
The idea was one of the many I put forward which encountered negative responses from 
the officials in the Department of External Affairs.  In December 1957, they advised me 
not to touch the issue.  Their general attitude was that the only course worth following 
internationally had already been established.  Most of the personalities in External Affairs 
fit Churchill’s description: “There but for the grace of God goes God.”665 
 
However, there was much more to the resistance that Diefenbaker encountered in the DEA to the 
World Food Bank, and his ideas on food aid generally, than the simple arrogance he attributes to 
officials in the department.  This will be explored in the next chapter.
666
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The Montreal Conference 
 Most of changes to the aid file in the first years of the Diefenbaker era were prompted by 
the decision to host the Commonwealth Trade and Economic conference in Montreal.  The 
government wanted to be seen as proactive and aid was one area where the publicity to cost ratio 
was quite favourable from the government’s point of view.  While more thorny issues such as 
increasing Commonwealth trade continued to elude the Diefenbaker administration, aid 
presented an area where concrete proposals could be fairly easily achieved. Although the idea for 
a Commonwealth Fund failed, one long-standing program that emerged from the Commonwealth 
relationship on the aid file was the Commonwealth Scholarship program.  Also, Diefenbaker’s 
government made a multi-year funding commitment to the Commonwealth, the first time that 
any Canadian government had done so.  Not only did this help formally transition the program 
from a temporary to a permanent part of Canadian government expenditures, it also was an idea 
that responded to donor concerns, including those voiced from India.  As well, it extended the 
Colombo Plan out of South and Southeast Asia for the first time. 
 The government held the Commonwealth Trade and Economic conference from 15-26 
September 1958 in Montreal.  Others have examined the failure of the Diefenbaker 
administration to grow closer economic ties with the Commonwealth which had originally been 
envisioned when the Canadian government first set out the invitation at the prime minister’s 
meeting the previous year.
667
  The idea to strengthen economic ties through a Commonwealth 
fund or bank, alongside a new development agency, did not survive the Montreal meeting either.  
Key to its demise was the decision by the UK government, the original proponent, not to support 
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the idea of a Commonwealth fund prior to conference, even though the Diefenbaker cabinet still 
liked the idea.  According to a DEA memorandum prepared prior to the conference, a 
Commonwealth development bank did not find favour in the Canadian government as officials 
felt that a bank would needlessly replicate the work of the IBRD, and might prove problematic in 
the long-run for the borrowing countries due to the burden the loans might place on their balance 
of payments.
668
  However, loans lent out from a Commonwealth fund, as the Canadians 
envisioned it, would be repayable in local currencies, and therefore would provide something 
novel that the IBRD was not already doing.
669
  However, the UK’s position did not change.   
On 6 August 1958 at the cabinet committee tasked with planning the upcoming 
conference, Fleming and Claude Isbister, assistant deputy minister for the DTC, both speculated 
whether or not Canada could encourage the UK government to reconsider the proposal.
670
  The 
UK suggested that the organization could look at strengthening the Commonwealth 
Development Finance Company, the UK government-owned business development organization.  
Fleming felt this would be a “poor substitute” for the idea of a Commonwealth fund.671  
However, Plumptre advised the committee that the UK had “decisively rejected” the idea a 
Commonwealth fund.
672
  Louis Rasminsky, a deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, explained 
that three elements had made the UK reconsider the proposal, namely the implications for their 
balance of payments, the effect on the UK budget, and their opposition to giving soft loans “on 
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easy terms.”673  It makes one wonder what the UK government could have possibly had in mind 
when it originally proposed the initiative.  However, without their support, the idea for a 
Commonwealth bank or fund was dead.
674
 
 However, this failure did not prevent the Canadian government from moving forward in 
other directions.  In the extensive preparations made for the meeting, the departments worked on 
proposals and announcements the government could make during the meeting on economic 
development matters.  The Diefenbaker administration gave the green light to three important 
proposals.  The first was for a scholarship program within the Commonwealth.  This was a 
Canadian proposal, although the UK delegation came to the conference armed with a similar idea 
to increase student training in technical and scientific fields.
675
  The Canadian government had 
developed the idea much more extensively than the UK, however.  It suggested a “broad and 
reciprocal plan of Commonwealth scholarships.”676  Also, instead of limiting the scholarship 
program to just the training of scientists and technicians, the Canadian proposal cast a wider net 
on what types of educational opportunities it could offer, recognizing that there was a need for 
“administrators, political leaders, teachers and administrators who can participate in the 
formulation and management of more effective and dynamic programmes and thereby ensure 
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productive employment of the growing reservoir of technically skilled personnel and other 
resources.”677  The approach is what might today be termed “capacity building” in development 
circles.  During the meetings leading up to the conference, other countries, including India, 
voiced their support for the UK and Canadian proposals, ensuring their success during the 
conference.
678
  Although the details of the plan were not finalized until after the conference, the 
“broad and reciprocal” nature of the Canadian proposal survived the negotiations, and the 
Commonwealth Scholarship program became one of the defining features of the Commonwealth 
organization in the years to come.
679
 
 Another announcement that the Canadian government made during the Montreal 
conference was the first major raise in Colombo Plan funding since the program began, outside 
of the unique circumstances of the atomic reactor project.  The government announced that not 
only would funding for the Colombo Plan be raised by C$15 million, from C$35 to C$50 
million, it also would put that funding in place annually for a three-year period.  One of the 
major arguments that Reid had made for a large line of credit, as shown above, was the difficulty 
the Indian government faced in making long-term economic development plans when donor 
funding came in yearly allotments.  Discussions in the DEA regarding the extension of Canada’s 
Colombo Plan grant aid over a longer than one-year term went as far back as 1955 as a result of 
Reid’s prodding on the line of credit idea.  As a memo by O.G. Stoner from 23 June 1955 read: 
“[i]t may be felt ... that for purpose [sic] of the Indian planners, there might be some merit in 
having Canada’s grant aid established over a fixed period of more than one year, e.g., five years 
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or the life of the Second Plan.”680  While movement in this direction did not happen under the 
Liberal government, at Reid’s insistence the DEA recognized the utility, at least for the Indian 
government which thought in terms of Five Year Plans, of multi-year grants. 
 The idea to substantially increase the level of grants under the Colombo Plan also 
emerged from this period.  As shown in chapters 4 and 5, although the former high commissioner 
had substantially larger numbers in mind than a C$15 million increase, his activism for increased 
aid for India made an impression on the DEA, and probably the DTC and DF as well.  An 
increase in aid for India, if not the entire Colombo Plan, was already lodged in the minds of 
officials in Ottawa well before the 1957 election.  Diefenbaker’s vocal support for the Colombo 
Plan, and the need to “make a splash” at the Montreal conference, combined to turn this already-
formed idea into action.  Not surprisingly, however, the first proposal for an increase in Colombo 
Plan aid came in the form of agitation for an increase in Canadian wheat supplied under the 
program.  The idea first came about in the Diefenbaker government as officials prepared for the 
Mont Tremblant meeting.  The DTC originally made a proposal that the 1957-58 allocation be 
raised from C$35 to C$50 million with the increase directed specifically at wheat.  In the three 
months leading up to the meeting, the proposal was considered at the official and ministerial 
level, but in the end it was decided the announcement should be held back for the 
Commonwealth trade conference.
681
  On 30August, just prior to the conference, Diefenbaker 
specifically mentioned the Canadian aid program during a statement on agriculture, saying that 
“The Government proposes, subject to approval by parliament at the next session, to continue the 
fund to assist in the export of surplus wheat stocks to non-commercial markets under the 
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Colombo Plan so as to assure the continuance of the full scale sales promotion and market 
development programme” and used the C$15 million figure as a “supplementary estimate.”682  
Importantly, however, during the announcement in Montreal, no specific mention of wheat was 
attached to the additional C$15 million figure.  This was as a result of recommendations coming 
from the DEA which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 Another important announcement that came out of the Montreal conference was the 
decision to extend Canadian Colombo Plan aid outside of Southeast Asia for the first time.  Prior 
to the conference, arrangements had already been made for a special programme of grant aid to 
the Federation of the West Indies which amounted to C$10 million over five years and would be 
targeted at shipping and technical assistance.
683
  The government also announced its first 
program in Africa, allocating an initial C$500,000 to Commonwealth members.
684
 The exclusion 
of former French territories would cause some soul-searching, but only once the Liberals had 
regained government following the April 1963 federal election.  Eventually, this excursion out of 
Southeast Asia would represent a dramatic shift for the aid program, particularly after the 
establishment of CIDA in September 1968.  However, this initial venture outside of traditional 
Colombo Plan areas remained modest until the mid-1960s. 
The Aid-India Consortium 
A decision which was to have lasting consequences for the Canadian aid program was the 
choice to join the Aid-India Consortium, technically a World Bank, US-led initiative, to help bail 
India out of its financial crisis.  In addition to becoming a member of the World Food 
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Programme and joining other multilateral initiatives that sprang up during this era, this was an 
important step out of an aid program that had been, with a few exceptions, focused on bilateral 
programming.  Cavell’s vision for a strongly individualized Canadian aid program receded, 
albeit slowly, as Canada became more and more involved in multilateral organizations.  The 
particular decision to join the Aid-India Consortium is notable not simply because of the large 
amount of money involved, but also because it was a marker of a more general trend away from 
bilateralism which continued through the 1960s and urged Canada into the “First Development 
Decade.” 
 As outlined above, a major financial crisis in India began in 1957, carried on through to 
1958 and forced the GOI to reconsider its position on aid.  Initially, India attempted to address 
the problem by severely cutting back on its Second Five Year Plan programming; however, this 
was not enough to stall the outflow of foreign exchange that reached dangerously low levels.  
What it needed was a bailout – a large inflow of foreign currency to prevent financial collapse.685  
The only country with deep enough pockets to provide some relief was the US, the country 
Nehru most distrusted.  In January 1958, after consultations with Krishnamachari, Eisenhower’s 
government agreed to immediately lend US$225 million to the GOI.
686
  The topic of aid to India 
had become what historian Dennis Merrill describes as a “cause célѐbre” in the United States at 
this time, partially as a result of Max Millikan and W.W. Rostow’s publication of A Proposal: 
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Key to Effective Foreign Policy in 1957 out of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology which 
called for large injections of foreign aid into India.
687
   
By June, the GOI had formulated an idea for a “rescue operation” that would include the 
US, UK, Germany and Japan.  Most of the large import orders that were draining India of its 
foreign currency had been placed within these four countries.  However, during a meeting of 
officials held in London to prepare for the upcoming Montreal conference, B.K. Nehru 
approached Wynne Plumptre to pitch the idea that Canada might be included in the group.  
Plumptre demurred, explaining that Canada’s economy was “not in the same league, 
economically or financially” with creditor countries such as West Germany and the United 
States, and expressed the opinion that Canada simply would not be able to make any contribution 
of value.  However, Nehru persisted, praising the “grace” of Canadian aid and its responsiveness 
to Indian needs, and urged Canada to consider the request.
688
  Nehru subsequently visited 
Washington and Bonn to continue his campaign for the rescue operation.
689
 
Fleming was a cautious financial administrator, but he was also sensitive to international 
diplomacy and concerned about the impact of a possible default by the GOI. He did not dismiss 
the idea of Canadian participation in the IBRD operation when Plumptre informed him of the 
idea on 2 July.  Rather, he suggested that Nehru consult with Robertson and Alan Hockin, the 
Canadian Treasury representative and the Alternate Director on the IMF and IBRD, during the 
Indian official’s subsequent visit to Washington.690  That month, the IBRD responded to India’s 
proposal and the President, Eugene Black, invited the named countries, including Canada, to a 
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meeting to be held in August to confer on the proposal.  B.K. Nehru continued his direct 
lobbying, writing Plumptre on 19 July to pressure Canadian participation, once again flattering 
the Canadians by suggesting that India relied on Canada to “instill realism into discussion at 
these meetings.”691  He also lobbied indirectly through his old contact Escott Reid in Bonn, 
where he must have known he would find a receptive ear.  Reid wrote directly to Sidney Smith 
to outline the problems and suggest the necessity of Canadian participation.
692
  As always, Reid 
could be relied upon to inject a heavy dose of alarmism into the debate, writing that: 
If India does receive insufficient economic assistance I am afraid that it would be started 
on a slippery slope which would end in a defeat for Western interests as great as the 
defeat which we suffered ten years ago when the Nationalist regime collapsed in China 
and the Communists took over.  As India goes so goes the whole of Asia and ultimately 
of Africa.
693
  
 
 Again, however, Canadian officials hesitated.  Rasminsky told Black that his participation in 
such a meeting might lead to “confusion” since, as Plumptre had earlier insinuated, he felt that 
Canada could simply not be of much help.
694
  Plumptre supported him on this, and believed that 
not only could Canada not afford to be a part of such an operation, it should not involve itself in 
any more loans to developing countries in general.
695
 
What happened next was quite interesting for an historian of Canadian political history.  
As outlined earlier, much has been made of Smith’s ineffectiveness as a minister for the DEA, 
which is in general an accurate assessment.  However, this is one area where it appears that 
Smith did make an impact, in all likelihood with the support of his department who were 
naturally inclined toward multilateralism and the maintenance of good diplomacy with both the 
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US and India.  Despite the exhortations of both Rasminsky and Plumptre, Fleming left the door 
open to Canadian participation in the meeting on 1 August when he met for a final time with 
India’s outgoing high commissioner to Canada, Dr. Rauf. 696  Naturally, Rauf had encouraged 
Fleming to reconsider their position on the IBRD meeting.
  
As Fleming wrote to Smith following 
the meeting, “I realize we cannot adopt a point blank refusal in such discussions with India.”697  
On 7 August, Smith wrote two letters: one to Escott Reid, which personally thanked the 
ambassador for his “initiative,” and one to Fleming, a long letter which outlined why Smith felt 
that Canada should participate in the meeting.  The specific nature of Smith’s reply to Reid 
suggests that it was more than a pro forma response, and that Smith had indeed read and digested 
the contents of the ambassador’s letter.  Not only this, Smith’s letter to Fleming clearly draws 
upon Reid’s analysis when he writes that “the free world’s stake in the success of the second 
Indian Five-Year Plan is such as to justify some form of concerted action on the part of those 
countries able to do so to help India over her present difficulties.”698  Smith no doubt drew upon 
the expertise of his department in the drafting of this letter, however, it is difficult to imagine the 
level heads of the DEA either taking Reid’s letter so seriously or drawing upon this sort of 
dramatic language to make its argument, suggesting that Smith personally took the lead in this 
correspondence.  He also included a copy of Reid’s letter to Fleming.699  Fleming had already 
been amenable to the idea of Canadian participation, and it seems that Smith’s letter made an 
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impact.  He agreed that Smith, Gordon Churchill and himself should bring the matter to the 
prime minister.    
By 15 August, Canada had agreed to participate, although its representative was not 
permitted to make any commitments during the meeting.
700
  Once Canada agreed to participate 
in the first meeting, however, it was all but decided that Canada would participate financially, 
which is why Rasminsky and Plumptre had advised against it in the first place.  As historian 
Bruce Muirhead writes, the Aid-India Consortium, as the group became known, was “not ... a 
coalition of the willing” and that it hung together mostly as a result of the huge financial input of 
the United States and that government’s “cajoling” of the other partners.701  However, it was 
only through the openness of Fleming and the active willingness of Smith, as well as a lot of 
diplomatic pressure from India and other sources, that Canada joined the group in the first place.   
This was only one area in which Canada extended itself multilaterally under the 
Diefenbaker administration.  For example, on 28 August, Diefenbaker cemented his support of 
multilateralism through the Bretton Woods organizations when he announced that, in preparation 
for the Montreal conference, he welcomed proposals from the US to increase funding for the 
IMF and IBRD.
702
  In the following years, Canada joined other new multilateral organizations 
such as the International Development Association in 1960 and the Development Assistance 
Committee in 1961.
703
  It may be that a government of any political stripe would have followed 
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the international trend toward multilateralism on these issues, yet in Canada the pivotal moment 
in accepting this trend dates from the Diefenbaker government’s decision to join the Aid-India 
Consortium.  
Conclusion 
 Few associate the Diefenbaker government’s time in office with any great advances in 
the foreign aid portfolio, and in some ways this analysis is correct.  Diefenbaker and his 
ministers knew little about the subject, and tended to see aid solely in terms of how it could be 
used to shift surplus wheat overseas in a convenient and cost-effective way.  Few of the 
accomplishments of his government on the aid file could be directly attributed to his leadership, 
although he did play a marginal role in the establishment of the FAO.  Nonetheless, indirectly, 
his leadership did make a difference.  First and foremost, his whole-hearted support for the 
program meant that the Colombo Plan not only survived a change in government, it actually 
thrived, and his administration’s quest to prove its fealty to the Commonwealth benefitted the 
foreign aid program.  This firmly and permanently integrated aid into Canadian foreign policy.  
Secondly, although helped by the financial crisis in India, the Diefenbaker administration’s quest 
to support prairie farmers broke new ground when it extended credit to India to buy wheat.  This 
was the first loan that Canada made to a developing country in the post-war context.  Finally, his 
invitation to host a Trade and Economic Conference brought an impulse for activity on the file.  
While other commitments by his government to the Commonwealth proved harder to implement, 
smaller and more concrete initiatives on the foreign aid program were easier to achieve.  This 
resulted in a new scholarship program, an increase in Colombo Plan aid as well as a multi-year 
commitment to the grant program, and the extension of Canadian foreign aid outside of 
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Southeast Asia to the Caribbean and Africa.  Finally, his government, under the leadership of 
Smith and Fleming, made the important decision to participate in the Aid-India Consortium.  
Again, this was prompted by the strong aid relationship that Canada had with India, and the 
Indian government lobbied hard to make sure that Canada was at the meeting.  However, with 
hindsight, the significance of Canada’s decision to take part went beyond its relationship with 
India, and signalled that the government was open to multilateralism for economic development 
in a new way.  Its consideration of the Commonwealth Fund idea was another such signal.   
 It might easily be argued that had any other government been in charge during this era, 
this broader shift toward multilateral engagement might have occurred anyway.  After all, this 
was a trend that emanated out of the highly influential US government, with its authority over 
the Bretton Woods and UN organizations.  As this chapter has shown, even only briefly and 
partially, certain US senators, representatives and even future presidents were active on foreign 
aid initiatives, and they were supported by many of the public intellectuals of the day.  It was 
perhaps inevitable that these ideas would influence the direction of the Canadian government no 
matter who was in charge.  This is likely true.  Nonetheless, it was Diefenbaker’s government 
that was in power, and certain changes are directly attributable to his own personal commitment 
to the Commonwealth, and his ministers’ openness to multilateral engagement on this particular 
issue.   
There is another side to this story, based on what was happening behind the scenes in the 
DEA, where Diefenbaker did not care to go.  One of the most significant changes that happened 
during his administration was not led by the Diefenbaker administration.  This was the total 
reorganization of the bureaucracy behind the aid program into the External Aid Office in an 
attempt to professionalize a now-permanent aid program.  However, indirectly, Diefenbaker’s 
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political influence may have had a significant impact on this reorganization, as the DEA strove to 
protect what it felt was being damaged by unthinking politicians.  The next chapter will examine 
the Diefenbaker years from this perspective. 
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Chapter 8: The Department of External Affairs Takes Charge 
The Diefenbaker government’s relationship to the aid program was somewhat 
paradoxical.  One the one hand, as the previous chapter has outlined, many important changes on 
the aid file can be attributed to his administration.  However, the most significant change to the 
machinery of the aid program occurred with almost no interest or input from the prime minister’s 
office, and very little from the cabinet in general.  Sidney Smith’s weak performance as minister 
of the DEA, and Howard Green’s newness to the position during the latter part of 1959 and the 
beginning of 1960, allowed the interested departments, but particularly the DEA, to undertake a 
large-scale reorganization of the aid program with very little prime ministerial involvement.  
During this time, the DEA asserted its sovereignty over matters relating to the Colombo Plan and 
other aid programs, as the government abolished Economic and Technical Assistance Branch 
(ETAB) and created a new External Aid Office (EAO) housed within the DEA. Diefenbaker 
seems to have been largely disinterested in these issues, despite their importance to the 
administration of aid programs. 
Also, the changes that the Diefenbaker government sought, particularly in relation to the 
use of the aid program for the promotion of wheat, might have been far more significant if not 
for the push back that the government received from aid officials in all the relevant departments, 
but particularly in the DEA. The new administration was ignorant of the balance of interests that 
Canada had tried to maintain in the aid program until that point.  Whereas the Progressive 
Conservatives were new to the role of government, many of the officials working on the aid 
program in the DTC, the DF and the DEA had been present on the aid file since the beginning.  
Their experiences, and particularly their involvement with aid to India where Canada had 
invested the most, had taught them a lot about what policies and programs should be promoted 
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and what should be avoided.  Diefenbaker supported India’s role as a new country in the 
Commonwealth, but he distrusted their non-alignment policy, did not understand Nehru, and 
favoured Pakistan in his foreign policy approach.
704
  Matters stood somewhat differently within 
the bureaucracy where, at least among those directly involved with the aid program, India was 
held in higher esteem than it had been earlier in the decade, and officials began to recognize that 
perhaps changes needed to be made on the Canadian side if better results were to be achieved.  
Whereas earlier in the decade the default response to problems in the program had been to blame 
inefficiencies on the Indian government, officials in Ottawa started to reflect on what they could 
do better. As well, officials began to advocate for India when they saw that government policy, 
particularly around wheat disposal, was not in the best interest of that country.  Finally, officials 
in the aid program began to reflect more seriously on the purpose of aid, what it could and could 
not accomplish, and how to make it work better, although their concerns still focused mainly on 
the process rather than the results. In short, the establishment of the EAO was a part of the 
continuing maturation of the Canadian aid effort, where it could, dimly, be seen as a possible 
career and not a dead-end job. 
An Uneasy Relationship 
As the previous chapter showed, the Diefenbaker administration began its time in 
government intent on using the Colombo Program as a vehicle for surplus wheat disposal.  Due 
to the Indian financial crisis and bad weather, the government was able to make some progress 
on this front by making wheat loans to the Indian government in 1957 and 1958.  The previous 
chapter also noted that the government, and particularly the DTC, initially wanted to use the 
additional C$15 million increase in Colombo Plan funding specifically for wheat. Wheat was not 
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mentioned specifically in the final announcement.  This was because officials working on aid, 
particularly in the DEA and the DF, did not approve of the use of the Colombo Plan, or Canadian 
foreign aid in general, as simply a mechanism to transfer commodities from Canada to other 
countries.  By now, officials had begun to think about the purpose and direction of the Canadian 
foreign aid program, and were interested in what they felt could be done to achieve long-term 
economic development.  They also listened to what officials in the Indian government, and the 
Canadian high commissioner, now Chester Ronning, had to say about what was actually needed 
in India.  As a result, they pushed back against the Progressive Conservative government’s wheat 
obsession, and tried to find a middle ground that would suit both Indian and Canadian needs. 
As has been shown in earlier chapters, the Colombo Plan had been used to provide 
Canadian commodities to Colombo Plan countries.  However, there was always uneasiness about 
the use of the program for this purpose; the auditor general had repeatedly expressed his concern 
about this function, and it only was made a legal Colombo Plan expenditure through the use of 
counterpart funds.  The Indian government put pressure on Canada earlier in the decade to 
dedicate the entire program to funding wheat imports. India’s rationale being that any foreign 
commodities brought into the country could raise rupees for development projects, while 
relieving some strain on precious foreign exchange resources.  Partly due to the criticism from 
the auditor general’s office, and partly because of the intervention of C.D. Howe, the Canadian 
government had resisted this pressure and tried to balance the requests for wheat against the 
provision of capital goods and technical assistance.  However, by 1957, the situation had 
completely reversed.  Now, the Canadian government was doing its best to use the Colombo 
Plan for wheat disposal, and the Indian government resisted.  Officials in Ottawa were once 
again left to try to find a compromise between the two sides. 
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A discussion between Nik Cavell and officials in the relevant departments in June 1957, 
just after the election of the Diefenbaker government, was typical of the overall approach.  L.E. 
Couillard, the new head of the Economic Division in the DEA, wrote to Cavell to discuss various 
aid matters, and raised the possibility that the Indian financial crisis might affect the requests 
coming from India to the Canadian program.  Couillard noted that funds Canada had provided to 
India to buy Canadian aluminum would soon be running low, and that India might renew the 
request given that they considered the commodity an “essential dollar import.”705  However, 
Couillard also worried that because of the crisis and near-famine conditions in Bihar state, the 
Indians might request the bulk of the next year’s program only in wheat.  To avert this, Couillard 
suggested that the government consider giving part of the current year’s program in wheat 
“rather than have an undue proportion of our aid next year in terms of this commodity.”706   
As noted, the Diefenbaker administration saw matters very differently, and began 
working on whittling away the Western Canadian wheat surplus via the Colombo Plan almost 
immediately.  The difference partly originated from a misunderstanding by the Diefenbaker 
government about how the Colombo Plan could be used.  They could hardly be faulted for this – 
Canada had regularly shipped wheat as part of the Colombo Plan since 1950, and in pure dollar 
terms, wheat made up by far the largest share of Canadian aid.  Initially there seemed to be little 
comprehension on the part of the new cabinet that there was tension around the use of the 
Colombo Plan for wheat disposal, and that in Ottawa the rule of thumb had been to keep wheat 
flows to moderate levels.  Wheat also inevitably generated counterpart funds and their 
expenditure, as has been seen, required a great deal of negotiation and planning.   
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However, the new minister of the DTC, Gordon Churchill, saw it as his duty to use his 
position to move Canadian wheat, and the Colombo Plan technically fell within his purview.  As 
noted in the previous chapter, a proposal to increase funding to the Colombo Plan prior to the 
Commonwealth finance ministers meeting in September emerged from his department.  In a 
memorandum to cabinet, just prior to the Commonwealth finance ministers’ conference, a memo 
signed by Churchill confidently stated that “the Canadian Government is prepared to give 
consideration to the use of a portion of its present wheat surplus to enlarge the scale of assistance 
now being made to Commonwealth countries under the Colombo Plan.”707  He also mentioned 
that it was “desirable” for part of the aid to be given in the form of flour because of the milling 
industry’s difficult export position.  Although the memo considered how the US and Australia 
might react to the proposal, no consideration was given to whether or not the recipients might 
want wheat, although perhaps it was thought that since India and Pakistan had made requests for 
wheat from the US that they would also want Canadian wheat.  There is also no mention of 
counterpart funds in this proposal.  It is not clear if Cavell, who worked within the DTC, was 
consulted on these plans.  If so, he likely would not have encouraged them. 
India had very different ideas about why it wanted Colombo Plan funding, and what it 
would be used for, during the emerging crisis.  As it turned out, Couillard was correct in his 
assessment that the Indian government would want to use the Colombo Plan to import essential 
dollar commodities such as metals, but incorrect in his assessment that India would be looking to 
make the following year’s program focus on wheat.  While some officials thought that the export 
of industrial commodities would be no better than shipping wheat, Cavell agreed with the Indian 
government’s point of view. The GOI felt that industrial metals were important for their 
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economy since without these, some factories in India would have to shut down, stalling its 
modernization programs.
708
  The high commission in New Delhi wrote to the DEA to say that 
the GOI had instituted a “rigid set of priorities” in order to keep as much of the core of the Five 
Year Plan operating as possible.  As a result, they prioritized the import of metals over that of 
food. B.K. Nehru explained that his government had taken a rather harsh approach to the issue, 
and determined that there were “unfortunately priorities higher than the full satisfaction of 
demands for food” if they were to keep their economic plans moving.709  The knowledge of the 
extensive availability of PL 480 imports set the background for these discussions. 
Further lobbying by the Indian government continued.  Krishnamachari met with Cavell 
while he was in Ottawa during the finance minister’s meeting to explain in person what the high 
commission in New Delhi had already communicated.  Krishnamachari told Cavell that he had 
been at the receiving end of a lobby effort by Canadian officials who wanted the GOI to take 
more wheat.  The Indian finance minister was not against taking Canadian wheat, just not at the 
expense of the commodities they needed to keep their industries running.  Cavell communicated 
the Indian point of view to Mitchell Sharp, the deputy minister of the DTC.  When 
Krishnamachari met with Diefenbaker, he also argued the same point.
710
  
It is likely that this is why the idea of a wheat loan emerged in the first place.  The loan 
was a compromise.  It allowed Canada to fulfill the objectives it set out for itself in terms of 
wheat disposal and it allowed the GOI to keep receiving the commodities it actually wanted 
under the Colombo Plan.  From the point of view of the aid officials, it kept wheat distribution 
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through regular Plan allotments at a more reasonable level.  Additionally, cabinet decided to ship 
C$5 million worth of wheat as part of the following year’s normal Colombo Plan expenditure for 
wheat in advance.
711
  How much this actually addressed the humanitarian nature of the famine is 
unclear.  On one hand, B.K. Nehru’s discussions with the high commission indicated that there 
might be a food shortfall; on the other hand, Krishnamachari told Cavell that the US was 
providing sufficient wheat such that the finance minister did not feel additional wheat was 
required from the Canadian government, at least not at the expense of metals.  It is more 
noteworthy that neither government seemed particularly concerned about the actual nature of the 
famine, and how much food was required to stop it, when it came to these negotiations.  The 
amount of wheat eventually given by Canada seems to have had more to do with how much it 
had at its disposal than any other consideration. 
However, the struggle over Canadian wheat did not end that fall.  Almost identical 
conversations were held a year later.  The position in the DEA was the same as a year earlier, 
and a memo to the minister of External Affairs “strongly” recommended that the Colombo Plan 
funds should only be used for the “regular” Colombo Plan programme, that is, technical 
assistance, development projects, and commodities that the recipient country had asked to 
receive: “The recipient countries have made it clear that they do not want wheat as a part of the 
Colombo plan programmes; they attach higher priorities to industrial metals for their factories 
and to basic development projects.”712  The memo also warned that the goodwill Canada had 
built up over the past decade would be lost if the government of Canada forced wheat on the 
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recipients.
713
  Nonetheless, the message did not make an impact on the cabinet.  On 9 September, 
when it met to discuss the 1958-9 year’s allocations, of which it was decided India would receive 
C$17 million, the subject of the pressing nature of Canada’s wheat surplus once again came to 
the fore.  After a general discussion of the numbers and different types of projects that had been 
delayed, such as a highway survey team in Burma and a fish dryer for Cambodia, it was 
concluded that it seemed “unrealistic to provide aid of the above nature when the basic problem 
facing Canada was to  dispose of surplus agricultural products.”714   
The cabinet approved the SSEA’s recommendations for allocations, but on the condition 
that “full consideration would be given to the possibility of providing aid in a form that would 
reduce the surplus of Canada’s agricultural products.”715 However, it was also suggested that this 
be targeted more toward non-Commonwealth countries.  Perhaps this reflected some awareness 
that the Commonwealth countries were already doing their share in taking Canadian wheat.  
Following the cabinet meeting, Plumptre wrote to the finance minister to inform him that once 
again, India did not want any wheat as a part of the C$17 million allocation.  However, after 
conversations with B.K. Nehru, the Indian officials suggested, “[w]ithout any pressure on my 
part,” that India would once again take a wheat loan, partly because the terms of a wheat grant 
that the United States had made to India included a requirement that India purchase some wheat 
on the commercial market.
716
   
India’s decision to take another wheat loan apparently did not take the pressure off from 
Churchill to make a substantial part of the regular program in the form of wheat.  By January, a 
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cabinet decision on the 1958-59 program was at a standstill because of the disagreement.  On 10 
January the prime minister deferred a decision on the Indian program because “the whole matter 
of aid under the Colombo Plan had to be reviewed,” which was almost certainly an oblique 
reference to the disagreement about how much wheat India should take under the program.
717
 On 
27 January, the matter came up in cabinet once again, but now both Smith and Fleming argued in 
favour of the Indian program as it stood, which provided for commodity expenditures on 
industrial metals.  Fleming took Plumptre’s recommendations to heart, stating bluntly that the 
GOI had only taken the wheat loan the previous fall “reluctantly” and that “India did not want to 
use the Colombo Plan aid for wheat.”718  Churchill was unmoved, and said that he could only 
recommend approval of the Indian program if additional funds could be granted for wheat, 
warning that otherwise it would be impossible to maintain exports for the next crop year.
719
   
Following this meeting, a strongly worded memorandum from the USSEA, probably 
drafted by LePan, came to the minister, encouraging him to not give in to his cabinet colleague.  
It outlined all the reasons that India should not be expected to take any additional wheat as part 
of the 1958-59 program.  Robertson noted that in the past eighteen months India had taken a 
whopping C$48 million of Canadian wheat, was paying interest on the loans, and that C$5 
million had already been taken from the 1958-59 program for wheat anyway.
720
 He wrote that he 
strongly favoured meeting additional requests from India for more industrial commodities, and 
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that the Indian program should be decided independently of Churchill’s proposals to increase the 
amount of wheat in the Colombo Plan programme: 
It has been the consistent view of this Department (which you conveyed to Mr. Churchill 
in your letter of September 15) that it would be against our interests to ask the Indians, at a time 
when they were in severe balance of payments difficulties and in need of industrial commodities 
vital to their development programme, to use for purchase of wheat any of the $17 million which 
Cabinet had allocated to them under the Colombo Plan in the current fiscal year.
721
   
Additionally, 
The proposals put to Cabinet by Mr. Churchill raise a number of substantive issues of 
which Cabinet will wish to be aware before reaching a final decision.  I am, of course, 
primarily concerned about the proposal that $25 million, or fully one-half of the Colombo 
Plan appropriation available in the next fiscal year, should be set aside for gifts in the 
form of wheat.  A decision in this sense would, in my view, affect the basic premise on 
which Canada’s Colombo Plan operations have been conducted.722 
 
He concluded that those in the DF shared his views on the matter and had briefed their 
minister in the same manner.  That day, cabinet met again.  Once again, Churchill suggested that 
part of that year’s allotment to India be set aside for wheat, but this time the arguments against 
him from Fleming and Smith succeeded in pushing a decision forward.  The cabinet finally 
approved the India program, which set aside C$10.5 million for industrial metals.
723
 
It was only three months later that the issue arose once again, this time in preparation for 
the 1959-60 allotment.  The DEA notified the high commission in New Delhi that the department 
was recommending to the prime minister that the Indian allocation be set at C$25 million, or half 
of the annual C$50 million figure, for three years.  They also advised the high commission that 
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the department would be recommending that one-quarter of the total C$50 million should take 
the form of wheat and flour.  The memo has an apologetic tone, admitting that while it knew 
there were problems with this suggestion, it felt that it could not leave out a substantial 
recommendation for wheat given Diefenbaker’s conversations with the Planning Commission 
and other Colombo Plan country governments which explicitly promoted wheat, and referred to a 
3 February cabinet directive that pointed out that “efforts be made to ensure that the recipients 
take as much wheat and flour as possible.”724  Given the circumstances, the DEA felt it had no 
choice but to make more substantial recommendations for wheat than they might otherwise have 
done. 
In May, Ronning visited Canada.  He used the opportunity to once again express the 
Indian point of view, as well as his own high commission, on the matter of wheat.  In a meeting 
of the Interdepartmental Committee on External Aid Policy (ICEAP), formerly known as the 
Colombo Plan Group, he stated that the Indians were aware of Canada’s “wheat disposal 
problem” – Diefenbaker’s visit the previous fall had certainly brought the issue forward – and 
were willing to help Canada out with it in the context of the Colombo Plan.
725
  However, in his 
view and in the view of the GOI, increasing the provision of wheat beyond the C$7 million that 
the DEA recommended for the 1959-60 program would be, “a contradiction of the basic 
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principle of the Colombo Plan.”726  In the end, the DEA had its way and by May, cabinet had 
accepted the C$25 million figure for India’s allotment and by September cabinet officially 
approved the C$7 million figure for wheat.   
As the famine in Bihar and the financial crisis in India subsided, it was harder to justify 
wheat sales or grants to a reluctant recipient, and while Churchill continued to pressure the 
Indian government to buy more wheat from Canada commercially, and managed to influence 
Colombo Plan expenditures quite significantly, he did not succeed in turning the Colombo Plan 
into the wheat disposal program that he and Diefenbaker had initially envisioned.
727
  This was 
due not only to the efforts of the Indian government, but also to the strong efforts of officials in 
the DEA and the DF who gave credence to the Indian position with their ministers, and lobbied 
hard for that perspective to be taken into account.  It was perhaps fortuitous from the point of 
view of officials working in their departments that neither Smith nor Fleming were as dependent 
on the Canadian wheat lobby for their political future as Churchill or Diefenbaker; otherwise the 
situation may have turned out differently.  For officials such as Plumptre who had been working 
on the aid file for years, Churchill’s plans for the Colombo Plan made no sense given the 
mandate and the history of the program.  Officials like Plumptre or LePan who had known the 
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program in the 1950s still held to the principles that been developed in its early years.  They 
sought to find the areas where Canadian expertise and goods matched with Indian needs.  If one 
of those elements was missing, the program, in their view, was not effective. 
The Canadian Attitude toward India  
One of the noteworthy results of the wheat battle that occurred between 1957 and 1960 
was the lengths to which Canadian officials went to defend the Indian position and articulate the 
Indian point of view.  Reid had tried to do this extensively, albeit with fewer results, as in his 
campaign for a line of credit.  It helped that Canadian officials did not want the headache of the 
policy problems that could result, especially from the auditor general’s office, if the Colombo 
Plan became a wheat surplus disposal program in contradiction to its original mandate. This 
provided Canadian officials with good reasons to support the Indian position.  However, this is 
not a total explanation of their support for India’s position, since a similar argument could have 
been made about the extent to which India was using the Colombo Plan for industrial metals.
728
  
Indeed, as the financial crisis subsided, Canadian officials began to get aid for capital projects 
back on track.  It was not just that Canadian officials were against wheat disposal; it was that 
they believed that the GOI had a right to define for itself what type of aid was most needed, 
especially during an economic crisis.   
This was not the only example of a favourable attitude toward India and its economic 
development programs on the part of aid officials in this era.  Tensions continued between India 
and Canada on the individual project level, although even there, as will be shown below, Canada 
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was also open to taking more responsibility for failure than it had previously.  However, at the 
macro level, one gets the sense that Canadian officials felt that India was not only their largest 
aid partner, it was also one that they respected, and a place they felt that Canadian aid made an 
impact.  While the Diefenbaker government may have grown to distrust Indian foreign policy, 
when it came to matters of aid, officials were more cooperative and sensitive to each other than 
ever before.  
Some of this might be simply flattery, as when B.K. Nehru praised Canada’s “grace” and 
the sympathy and “commonsense attitude” that he found from the Canadians when he was trying 
to convince the government to join the Aid-India Consortium.
729
  In the 1961 External 
Assistance, an annual report published by the government which details the previous year’s aid 
programs, it noted that Canadian aid was “particularly valuable” because, with the exception of 
the wheat loans, it came entirely in the form of grants.
730
  A similar approach can be found on the 
part of Canadian officials.  They knew that the Indian government heartily disliked any 
connection between aid and anti-communist efforts and avoided any mention of the subject, and 
they knew that it was sensitive to being a recipient.
731
  Graham McInnes, representing the high 
commission in New Delhi, knew exactly how to pitch Canadian ideas for the Commonwealth 
scholarship program when he told the Indian minister of education that reciprocity was central to 
the scheme and that Canada “did not view it simply as an arrangement whereby the more 
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developed countries of the Commonwealth could assist the less developed countries.”732  Indeed, 
by the end of the decade each partner had come to know the other’s vanities, and knew how to 
exploit them.   
That was the window-dressing of diplomacy, but there was substance there as well.  
Concrete actions resulted from the positive view that Canadian aid officials had toward India.  
When discussions were underway about how to spend the increased Colombo Plan funding, 
officials in the Colombo Plan group were unanimous that it would be “desirable,” in the words of 
Plumptre, “to increase substantially the amount of aid to be provided to India.”733  In this 
particular meeting, the only justification given for the increase was that it would compare 
favourably with India’s other partners, such as West Germany, at the Aid-India consortium.734  
There was more to it than that, however.   
One reason, of course, was simply the country’s enormous size.  LePan wrote to the 
deputy ministers of the relevant departments in February 1959 that even though India’s share of 
the Colombo Plan had ranged between 45 percent and 60 percent in the program’s history, those 
high figures did not “adequately reflect either India’s size or her population in relation to that of 
other recipient countries or, indeed, her capacity to absorb foreign economic assistance in the 
context of her long-term development programme.”735  Another was the consideration of India’s 
geopolitical importance.  Cavell and Reid would have been pleased by LePan’s analysis that 
“India’s success or failure in realising at least minimum economic objectives embodied in her 
current Five-Year Plan will have a determining influence on the pattern of political 
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developments in Free Asia.”736  Finally, there was a sense that India not only needed aid, and 
could absorb aid, but that it was uniquely qualified to manage aid.  A paper on Canadian aid 
procedure drawn up in the Department of Finance the following year sums this attitude up 
nicely: “India is perhaps the outstanding example of a country whose development plans are 
thoughtful and realistically prepared.”737  It helped that the largest project in India that Canada 
had undertaken, the Kundah dam which Canada had agreed to finance in 1956, had “proceeded 
exceptionally smoothly” and the Indian partners at the Madras Electricity Board had been found 
to be “reliable, competent, and cooperative.”738  Even after all the problems encountered during 
the Second Five Year Plan, Canadian officials still considered India to be a good bet for its aid 
dollars.   
Canadian Culpability: Aid at Work 
This is not to say that matters always proceeded perfectly smoothly at the micro or 
project level, where despite Kundah’s success, frustration about delays and problems continued 
apace on other projects.  Typical were the results of a Calcutta dairy initiative, a project that 
Cavell did not support but had been “dragged into” by UNICEF and the FAO.739  The high 
commission in New Delhi suggested in December 1956 that an uncomplicated Canadian 
contribution to the milk scheme would be coal-fired boilers to sanitize the milk coming into the 
                                                          
736
 Ibid.  A similar analysis was made by Ronning much later in 1961 when he wrote in a dispatch that “The far-
reaching political significance of either the success or failure of India needs no underlining, and has, I believe, been 
accepted as axiomatic by all Western governments.”  LAC, RG 19, A.F.W. Plumptre to A.E. Ritchie, 1 March 1960, 
Volume 4334, File 8342/I39, part 3, 1; LAC, RG 19, Chester Ronning, The High Commissioner for Canada, New 
Delhi, India to The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, no. 221, 15 March 1961, Volume 4334, File 
8342/I39-1, part 3, 1. 
737
 LAC, RG 25, A.F.W. Plumptre to A.E. Ritchie and attachment, “Canadian Aid Procedures,” 1 March 1960, 
Volume 4297, File 11038-6-C-40, part 2, 1. 
738
 LAC, RG 25, H.C. Green, “Memorandum to the Cabinet, 1960-61 Colombo Plan Capital Assistance Programme 
for India,” 4 November 1960, Volume 5411, File 11038-1-40, part 13, 22. 
739
 LAC, RG 19, Nik Cavell to L.E. Couillard, 18 June 1957, Volume 4334, File 8342/I39-1, part 2, 1.  It is 
interesting that while Cavell had been successful in staving off multilateral cooperation on the Delhi milk scheme in 
1954, he was not successful in preventing this type of cooperation in 1957.   
260 
 
dairy.
740
  Remarkably, by the time the project had been organized sufficiently to place orders in 
1959, Canada had actually stopped making coal-fired boilers.
741
  After a great deal of back and 
forth discussion about whether Canada could supply a more modern alternative, the government 
finally placed the order in May 1960.
742
  This was not entirely due to the disorganization on the 
ground in India, however.  It took a long time for officials in Canada to obtain quotes and make 
decisions, typical of aid projects as earlier chapters have demonstrated.  The high commission 
had to send two urgent telegrams in 1960 requesting blueprints for the boilers warning that if 
they did not receive them the project would “be held up on our account.”743   
Another slow-moving plan was the idea to bring innovative Canadian technology in the 
form of cobalt beam therapy units to India for cancer treatments.  The original idea dated back to 
1953.  Somehow in March 1956, the Indian government had come to believe that Canada had 
made a firm offer of therapy units, even though the DEA could not find any record of the offer.  
Neither the high commission nor the Canadian government was entirely sure how this 
impression had been made on Indian officials.
744
  Nonetheless, discussions emerged from this 
confusion but it took until December 1957 for cabinet to approve expenditure for three units to 
be sent to Indian hospitals.
745
 
Perhaps the most complicated program underway at this time was the atomic reactor.  In 
1958, the project ran into several difficulties.  In February, the AECL was forced to fire the 
project manager, F. J. Bleakley, who was in the employ of the lead engineer for the project, 
Shawinigan Engineering. The issue was competence, or rather the lack of it.  Bhabha had 
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initially tried to prevent Bleakley’s firing, but admitted later that it had been the right decision.746  
When Ronning visited the project in April 1958, he was told by D.J. Wallace, an employee of 
AECL, that the Canadian agency had not properly investigated Bleakley’s qualifications prior to 
allowing him to lead the project for Shawinigan.
747
 The high commissioner found the project 
improved by Bleakley’s removal but still in turmoil, partly as a result of the lingering problems 
caused by his lack of expertise and partly the result of a series of conflicts on the project. The 
words used to describe these issues in official documents bring to light how Canadian officials 
conceived of them, relating to both the Canadian and the Indian sides; pedantic, overly cautious, 
and lacking judgement and maturity.
748
  In addition, Canadian contractors grumbled over the 
effect of the low wages paid by the Indian Department of Atomic Energy with the resultant 
adverse effect that they had on hiring skilled tradesmen.
749
  As a result, the project fell behind 
schedule and went over budget.  However, by the following year, the situation had improved 
significantly, although the budget had to be increased to pay for rising costs. 
A further impediment took the form of the nagging but undeniably crucial problem of 
fuel controls.  It took most of 1959 for Bhabha and the Canadian government to work out the 
fuel issue.  This was complicated by the fact that since the initial agreements had been signed, 
India had started to develop its own uranium industry and wanted to use its own fuel in the 
Canadian reactor.  Naturally, this worried Canadian officials for a variety of reasons.  It 
undermined the basic commercial impulse that had initially appealed to the Canadian 
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government.  Even more aggravating was a request from the Indian government in April to 
provide equipment for uranium prospecting and mining under the aid program.
750
  Although 
India finally agreed to join the International Atomic Energy Agency, and had actually assisted in 
the creation of the organization by devising a governance formula, it still resisted fuel safeguards 
and introduced a phrase that weakened the agency’s safeguards in its founding articles on the 
issue.
751
  In the end, partly because India would not have good-quality fuel ready in time to start 
the reactor, Bhabha agreed that India lease the initial fuel requirements for the reactor from 
Canada, that any plutonium produced by the fuel would only be used for “peaceful purposes,” 
and that Canada have the right to audit the records and facilities at any time.
752
  Although the 
agreement did not totally ease Canadian concerns, Robertson concluded in a memorandum to his 
minister that it did represent a “considerable advance on any previous Indian position” and that 
given their objection to safeguards as a whole “it is unlikely that any more rigid control would be 
acceptable.”753  This was not a failure for the Canadians, but it could not exactly be called a 
success either.
754
 
On the ground, work continued.  Euan Smith, a representative from the DTC visited the 
reactor in Bombay late in 1959.  Although he was able to report that the project was about to be 
completed and, in the end, “turned out well, in a physical sense,” he did not have a lot of positive 
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news to report about the construction.
755
  In his talks with the Canadians working on the project, 
the complaints were numerous: the Indian technicians were “incompetent”; the Indian engineers 
refused to be realistic and seemed to care more about the aesthetic aspects of the reactor than its 
functionality; and, the Indian administration was slow.
756
  Smith concluded that the entire project 
would have functioned better if more rigorous planning had been done in the first place, 
something that Smith, who had only recently joined the aid administration, gathered was not the 
usual process in the Canada-India aid partnership.
 757
  He referred to the success of the Kundah 
project as an example where good planning was responsible for the project’s success.758  
Ault asked Frank Pratt, an old hand in the aid administration of the DTC, to comment on 
Smith’s findings.  Pratt had little time for Smith’s report, which he criticized as faulty since 
Smith had not taken the time to get the Indian perspective on the issues, which had been the case.  
In fact, while there were certainly problems on the Indian side, Pratt argued that Canada had a lot 
to answer for in terms of its own work on the project.  Not only did the main problems stem from 
Bleakley in the first place, they also had to withdraw an AECL senior engineer and had “to insist 
upon a change in personnel in the Foundation Company staff.” At one point the government had 
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to threaten to cancel the Foundation Company’s contract in order to get changes made.759  As for 
the idea that the program should have been planned more carefully, Pratt bitterly dismissed this 
suggestion as a “nice bit of hindsight.”  The only reason the Kundah project agreement worked 
so well, he claimed, was that “nobody ever looks at it,” an interesting insight into the practical 
nature of how Canadian-Indian aid projects functioned on the ground.
760
 Pratt’s critique was 
balanced and thoughtful, and unencumbered by sentiment.  
While not exactly a stirring defense of the Indian government’s actions, Pratt’s 
experience and empathy also showed. For him, it was not enough to once again blame the 
Indians for all the failures; the Canadians also had to accept responsibility where it was due.  It is 
telling that after working for almost a decade on the Canadian aid program, Pratt looked to 
cooperate with the GOI as much as possible in Canadian aid projects.  A letter that the Indian 
high commission sent to New Delhi in 1959 of an account that one of its officials had with Pratt 
notes that the latter thought “[t]he most suitable projects for which Canada should give aid would 
be the power projects, like the Kundah Hydro-Electric project.  It is in this type of projects that 
the effort is truly joint.”761  Obviously, commercial considerations were a high priority for Pratt, 
as he also mentioned the competitiveness of Canadian equipment in world market prices.
762
  It 
was also important that Canadian aid projects be “truly joint,” that is, they reflect the combined 
efforts of both countries.  He did not look for projects that were completely controlled by 
Canada, as someone fed up with perceived GOI incompetence might have done. 
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Both Reid and Cavell had tried to argue that Canada needed to take responsibility for its 
own shortcomings at various times, but in Ottawa this rarely made an impression.  By the late 
1950s, however, it seems that those experienced on the aid file in the department were not only 
willing to defend India’s interests on the policy level, there was also an openness to 
understanding the Indian perspective on the project level as well.  This change was borne less out 
of a feeling that the Indian government more competently managed aid projects than it did in the 
past, for problems did continue.  Yet there is a sense that of their aid partners, India did the most 
to link Canadian aid investment with an overall economic strategy, and a recognition that the 
problems associated with aid projects did not all fall on the back of the GOI, but that Canadians 
were sometimes equally, if not more, culpable.  Perhaps it was simply brought about by a 
recognition that both Indians and Canadians struggled along together in more or less the same 
direction in the face of truly daunting social and economic problems.   
The Need for Change 
The analysis that Pratt gave of Kundah’s success – that it was so precisely because 
nobody examined the project agreement in detail – is indicative of a larger sense in the relevant 
departments that the time had come for an appraisal of how the aid program operated.  Indeed, a 
feeling had developed that it bumped along, somewhat aimlessly, reacting to events rather than 
proactively creating change.  Some changes were made in 1958, such as the creation of the 
Economic II division, as well as the transition and elevation of the IETCD to the ETAB within 
the DTC that same year.
763
  Questions that earlier in the decade nobody thought to ask about 
what Canadian aid was for and how it should be best used, finally began to emerge.  While a 
strong feeling about the dangers of communism and the importance of India and the Southeast 
Asian region drove Cavell personally, he did not, at least in government records, reflect very 
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deeply on how the specific aid projects that Canada funded actually addressed those issues.  Reid 
thought more about the goals of aid and how Canada could contribute to India’s economic 
development, but these ideas were not taken seriously at the time.  By the late 1950s, these 
questions had become more prominent in Ottawa. 
The battle over wheat supplies under the Colombo Plan may also have helped along a 
process already underway. It is possible that Churchill’s incursion on the Colombo Plan may 
have prompted aid officials working in the relevant departments to question whether or not the 
placement of its administration within the DTC was a good idea.  Technically, Cavell had 
worked out of that department, but in actual fact he was more closely tied with economic 
officials in the DEA, the USSEA and the Commonwealth division of that department, Plumptre 
in the DF, as well as the high commission in India in formulating aid policy.  His connection to 
the rest of the DTC matrix seems to have been tenuous.  Hosting the aid program in the DTC 
made sense to those thinking in the post-World War II context, when aid was thought about in 
terms of Canadian exports more so than economic development or foreign relations; however, 
thinking about the Plan had evolved.  As the atomic reactor project showed, Colombo Plan 
matters had serious implications for foreign relations, and by 1958, those officials working on 
aid tried to make decisions based on their consultations with the Indian government in reference 
to the Five Year Plan, albeit with Canadian commercial interests in mind.  It was an interchange 
of those factors that led to decisions about what the Indian program would look like, and one can 
assume that similar thinking led decision-making for the other Colombo Plan countries as well. 
Churchill’s strenuous incursions into Colombo Plan matters probably came as a surprise to those 
working on aid, even within the DTC, and may have prompted those in the DEA to reconsider 
the program’s position in government.  Whether or not the wheat issue did contribute toward a 
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period of reflection or not, or whether it was simply a natural outcome of time and experience, 
such a period did occur in the late 1950s, and ended with the total reorganization of the 
program’s administration. 
In any event, a change in attitude within the bureaucracy toward the aid program 
definitely manifested itself following the Liberal defeat.  Part of this change must have been 
motivated by what was happening outside of government.  Development had become a hotter 
topic in the academy and secular international development organizations were finding their feet 
in North America.
764
  In universities, research on the “Third World” was gaining currency, with 
economists and other social scientists beginning to publish landmark books on the subject. 
Millikan and Rostow was only one such example.
765
  On 20 February 1959, the ICEAP invited 
Dr. Nathan Keyfitz, a University of Toronto demographer who went on to write a report about 
the Colombo Plan on its ten-year anniversary, to speak about population problems in South and 
Southeast Asia.  This was among the first times that the bureaucracy invited an outside “expert” 
to speak about problems associated with development and aid.  Other than reports about 
Mahalanobis’ “zoo” from Reid earlier in the decade, Keyfitz’s reference to Gunnar Myrdal 
during his talk is the first mention of a development economist or any kind of academic in any 
Canadian government documents related to aid.  Keyfitz tried to encourage the ICEAP to 
consider the issue of his own expertise, population growth, and chastised “well meaning but 
wrong policies” that failed to take into account specific circumstances on the ground.  He 
encouraged Canadian aid policy not to blindly give food aid, but rather to focus on policy that 
increased food production in country and improved networks that brought food from the rural 
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areas to the city.
766
  The program had always given Indian planners and government officials the 
chief responsibility for thinking through the specifics of how Canadian aid funding connected 
into a larger plan for the country’s economic development.  The Keyfitz approach called for 
Canadian officials to think more deeply on these issues for themselves. 
Perhaps the more reflective attitude came about due to increased executive oversight by 
the Diefenbaker administration.  On 31 March 1959, Keith Goldschlag, who was then in the 
Economic II Division, sent a letter to Arthur Menzies, at that time the high commissioner in 
Malaya.  Menzies had earlier sent a letter to Goldschlag airing concerns about the wheat 
program, and how tightly it seemed to now be controlled by Ottawa. The Malayans were feeling 
oppressed. By way of explanation, Goldschlag noted that “the content and coverage of the 
Colombo Plan have come under ministerial scrutiny” with ministerial predelictions: while there 
were large wheat surpluses, every effort had to be made to move wheat on concessional terms to 
countries that lacked food; that aid should be concentrated in the Commonwealth, and that 
Canadian content should be “as near as 100% as possible.”  Goldschlag also noted that these 
policy positions were not based on any particular assessment of the needs in Colombo Plan 
countries, but rather should be understood “against the background of recent economic trends in 
Canada.”767 Canadian ministers were put off by perceived Indian political influence. However, 
resistance within the DF and the DEA to ministerial pressure is an indication that officials were 
thinking about what Colombo Plan countries truly needed for their economic development, and 
their defense of India’s development strategy is another indication of this. 
By early 1960, a full-blown re-examination of the Colombo Plan was underway.  Keith 
Spicer wrote about this period in his 1962 dissertation and subsequent book published in 1966, 
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and the archival documents bear out his contemporary analysis of this time as one of ferment 
within the DEA.
768
  The public messaging did not change much, emphasizing the same old issues 
of Canadian content and the graphic nature of poverty. Notes prepared for a speech in the 
Economic II Division in January 1960 suggested that aid was not a “giveaway program” and 
focused on how most of the money voted for the program was spent within Canada, and was 
targeted at the “hundreds of millions in Asia” living in poverty.769  However, internal documents 
were far more probing.  Sidney Pollock, the director of international programs and contributions 
in the department of finance, wrote an internal document entitled “Analysis of Colombo Plan 
Objectives and Procedures following a tour of South East Asia” in February 1960.  His summary 
of how people lived in the area began darkly, and demonstrated the depth of the challenge facing 
Western donors in India: “My main and abiding impression during a tour of Colombo Plan 
countries was one of large, growing and destitute populations living in complex and unrewarding 
environments with inadequate resources either of finance or trained personnel to provide the 
initiatives and continuing momentum for a move forward to a better life.”770  In Pollock’s view, 
Canada had to recognize its “limited size and resources” and create “clear and well-defined 
objectives and effective, dynamic procedures” if the government was not to waste what little it 
had through “dispersal.”  India had a share of the blame in this as well, as instead of 
“comprehensive, balanced and integrated programmes” the Canadian officials received “small, 
unrelated requests.”  The high commission was of little help because it did not have “specialists” 
trained who could help guide policies.   
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Possibly his most damning critique, however, was one that harkened back to Douglas 
Abbott’s original question about the program in 1950.  Canada had to face facts about what the 
relatively tiny program could do: “[t]he tendency which is all too prevalent of seeing the 
Colombo Plan as a comprehensive solution of all the problems of the Far East is an invitation to 
failure.”771  The idea that the Colombo Plan could help hundreds of millions of Asians referred to 
in speech material above was a long-standing trope, but it could not be taken seriously when one 
considered the actual nature of the programs that Canada funded.  It was an idea that seemed to 
need explicit refutation, despite its obvious nature.  Ronning had shared a similar perspective the 
previous May when he had visited Ottawa and stressed that the Colombo Plan did not, and could 
not, provide “all of the resources” needed to create development in India.772  Although nobody 
would have admitted that C$50 million spread over all of South East Asia could solve the 
problems of Asian poverty, even when combined with the programs of other countries, it was an 
idea implicitly expressed in the speeches given about the Plan, and the urgency that figures like 
Reid and Cavell attached to decisions about the program. The concentrated focus on public 
relations issues, and the ongoing concern about how Canadian programs appeared in comparison 
with Soviet projects, also seemed to attach importance to the political and economic impact of 
Canadian aid.  Pollock urged more realism, more specificity, and an end to the underlying, but 
rarely expressed, assumptions that had so long characterized decision-making about aid.  In his 
opinion, it needed a more serious theoretical and practical basis from which to operate: “[i]t must 
be recognized that the urgency, gravity, and complexity of the problems of development are 
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increasing, necessitating revitalization and possible improvement of the machinery to deal with 
them.”773 
Pollock also identified a personnel problem in overseas missions – a problem, it should 
be noted, that Reid had highlighted many years before. However, there was also a personnel 
problem in Ottawa.  Spicer wrote the aid administration had attracted “transients and misfits” 
and was considered a career dead-end for those seeking jobs in the bureaucracy.
774
  G.F. Bruce 
expressed a similar sentiment to Ritchie in a letter dated 19 January. After 2 ½ years of 
experience working in the field of Canadian aid, he had come to the conclusion that “we lack 
sufficient well-qualified personnel to carry out effectively our responsibilities for conducting this 
Department’s economic aid operations, both in Ottawa and at our missions.”775 An April 1960 
DEA document put it more succinctly: “Competent people are apparently not attracted to 
ETAB.”776  It might be, the document concluded, that the job is considered a dead end, but it 
may also be that they simply are not paid enough.  According to this analysis, even the director 
of the ETAB was paid a sub-standard salary of C$14,000, when a salary of C$20,000 or 
C$25,000 would be needed to attract a “first-class” administrator.777  Perhaps the government got 
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what it paid for in terms of competent employees, although it is also true that many signed on in 
order to, as they might have put it, help. 
The salary levels that had been previously set, and the positions that had been created, 
reflected an administration that the post-war government considered to be fairly straightforward, 
one based on the procurement and transfer of goods and services overseas.  However, not only 
had the programs always been more complex than this model anticipated, which contributed to 
the many delays and problems that projects had experienced over the years, but aid 
administration was also growing more complex all the time.  Consider this summary of Canadian 
programs, which emphasized the ever-expanding multilateral commitments the country made in 
addition to its bilateral program: 
In 1959 Canada’s annual contribution to the Colombo Plan was increased to $50 million 
and there were other increases as well in the past year.  We began a five-year programme 
of assistance to the West Indies on which we expect to spend $10 million.  $1 million has 
been appropriated for the new Commonwealth scholarship Scheme.  In addition to the $2 
million we have contributed in each of the past three years to the United Nations 
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, we made an initial contribution of $2 
million in 1959 to the new United Nations Special Fund.  Finally, in the past year the 
Canadian subscription to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was 
raised from $325 million to $750 million and our quota in the International Monetary 
Fund went up from $300 million to $500 million.
778
 
 
This description of the growth in aid programming only reflects economic development 
programs, and did not include what was considered humanitarian, such as aid for refugees and 
natural disasters, nor did it include Canada’s participation in the Aid-India Consortium or other 
multilateral initiatives like the International Development Association or the World Food 
Programme.  While the ETAB was not directly implicated in all of these programs, the number 
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of items included in what could be considered Canadian aid grew rapidly in the last few years of 
the 1950s.   
That the ETAB was not a part of what was considered to be in the realm Canadian aid 
programming also caused problems.  The small and limited machinery set up for the branch 
reflected a restricted conceptualization of what aid and the Colombo Plan was for, despite the 
lofty goals that many articulated for the program.  This created an internal tension, as did the 
inter-departmental nature of the aid program.  As stated earlier, each relevant department 
theoretically had a role to play on the aid file, but the reality was much messier.  A document 
prepared in the Economic II division in January 1960 entitled “The Role of the Department of 
External Affairs in Economic and Technical Assistance Matters” clearly addresses this problem: 
In theory the split [between the DEA and the DTC on aid programs] is between policy 
matters (including advice on political questions) and administration with External Affairs 
assuming responsibility for policy and Trade and Commerce (ETAB) for the 
administration of the programmes.  This should mean that this Department [the DEA] is 
responsible for guiding each economic aid programme to the point where Cabinet 
approves the funds required and that Trade and Commerce is responsible for 
administering the funds.  This is the theory, but, as you certainly have suspected, it does 
not quite work out that way, because of the difficulty (in many instances the 
impossibility) of drawing a clear line between policy and administration.  In fact, we no 
longer attempt to draw the line; we meet the problem through a process of constant 
consultation at the working or desk level between External Affairs, Trade and Commerce 
and Finance.
779
 
 
This explains why the DEA seemed to handle so much of the day-to-day work of the Plan 
that was supposed to be the purview of the DTC.  It may well also be that the DEA was also 
making up for the lack of competent personnel in the ETAB, or trying to do so.  Since the DEA 
was also the main point of contact between the high commissions and the Canadian government, 
it made sense that this constant consultation occurred between the high commissions and the 
DEA, the DEA and the DTC, both Departments and the DF, not to mention informing the 
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various ministers and cabinet when the need arose.  It took a complicated array of 
communication networks across departments and oceans to consult on what sometimes were 
important, but often also small, matters.   
This messiness was reflected not only in the operation of the programs but also in the 
facts and figures collected on aid programs.  The preparation of program statistics was a shared 
responsibility between the DTC and the DF, but the statements they prepared were “frequently ... 
incomplete and inaccurate.”780  In an April letter to A.E. Ritchie, D.R. Taylor wrote that “[i]t is 
impossible to know where to start in describing the difficulties which have arisen in attempting 
to obtain a clear accounting of the funds which have been voted by Parliament for the Colombo 
Plan Programme.”781  He noted that in a recent statistical report submitted by the ETAB to the 
standing committee on external affairs, there were “18 or 20 mistakes.”782  Another example 
arose out of that C$5 million that had been set aside from the 1958-59 program for wheat to 
India in 1957.  Astonishingly, the ETAB forgot that the C$5 million had been spent, and 
proceeded with the year’s program as though India would receive its entire vote.  The only 
reason that the government was able to make up C$5 million to complete the program once the 
mistake had been realized was because of a large amount of unexpended funds from various 
Colombo Plan projects in Southeast Asia as a whole.  Taylor sums up these mistakes in this way: 
“[i]n a sense, I think it may be argued that the error of forgetting this $5 million allocation was 
counter-balanced by sloppy administration which had allowed such a substantial amount of funds 
to accumulate.”783  That in this case two wrongs had made a right clearly was of no comfort to 
anyone.  Taylor further noted that nearly a third of the C$330 million allocated over eleven years 
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to the Colombo Plan remained unspent.  This, he wrote, “can only indicate that we are 
considerably behind in our planning and programming.”784  At this point, nobody could seriously 
argue that the problems with Colombo Plan spending originated only in the countries like India, 
where it was spent.   
A.S. McGill, an official in Economic II, prepared a draft paper entitled “Administration 
of Canadian Aid Programmes” which tried to resolve one of the central challenges in the 
program – the division between the ETAB and the DEA.  It stated plainly that the “present 
arrangements for carrying out Canada’s bilateral assistance programmes are unsatisfactory,” and 
suggested that improvement was needed in three areas; a “clearer and more logical assignment of 
responsibility for policy decisions and for the administration and programmes,” recruitment of 
more competent personnel, and an overhaul of machinery and procedures. At a minimum, a 
clearer division needed to be made between the ETAB and the DEA.  Once the policy had been 
set, McGill suggested, it was not necessary for the DEA to be involved in the detailed operation 
of the programmes.  Inversely, the ETAB needed to get out of the habit of “trying to initiate 
projects or programmes or anticipating policy decisions as they now tend to do.”  However, the 
ETAB also needed more autonomy in carrying out programs, without interference from the DEA 
or the DF.
785
  Yet, as the January 1960 document quoted above had already pointed out, it was 
nearly impossible to draw a line between policy and administration.  This line of inquiry was a 
dead end. 
D.R. Taylor expressed this sentiment on 13 April.  In another letter to Ritchie he 
articulated what he believed was the “basic” weakness in the operation and administration of 
Canadian aid programmes.  This was the division between the DEA and the DTC for the 
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responsibility of policy and administration: “Theoretically this system promised certain 
advantages but I am convinced that they are not being realized.”  The solution, suggested Taylor 
was to set up within the Department of External Affairs a “top-flight civil servant” who would 
look after both the policy and administration of aid programs, reporting to the SSEA.  Although 
this idea may have been floating around the department, this is the first time it was expressed in 
writing. 
Officials in the Indian high commission in Ottawa even noticed the movement toward 
change in the administration of the program when they suggested in the 1960 annual report to 
New Delhi that while Canada had been in the past “happy enough to allocate a lump sum amount 
under the Colombo Plan aid and to leave the recipient country to decide on what form the aid 
should take,” that now the government was “getting round to the view” that Canadian aid should 
take a “tangible and visible” form in the host country instead of transferring metals and other 
commodities.
786
  This was an incorrect reading of the situation.  There had always been a wish 
within the Canadian government to fund “tangible” projects, and the extensive use of Canadian 
aid for commodities such as wheat and metals particularly after 1957 occurred as a result of the 
Indian financial crisis and internal domestic politics.  However, that the high commission noted 
there was a desire for changes in the Canadian aid program is itself noteworthy. 
The Re-organization 
Even before 1960, there had been some changes, Ault’s fresh presence as director of the 
new reorganized IETCD, which became the ETAB under his watch, seems to have been the 
initial reason for the transformation.  Soon after becoming director he led the branch in a “study 
of the method of operation” of the aid program in order to find a way to make a “single, 
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coordinated” programme and simplify the bureaucratic machinery.787  In December 1958, the 
Colombo Plan Policy Group decided to change its name to the Interdepartmental Committee on 
External Aid Policy.  The decision was made largely to reflect the extension of the aid program 
into the West Indies and Africa, although the group itself operated in largely the same manner as 
the former Colombo Plan Group.
788
  The name change reflected what had already happened, as 
the former Colombo Plan Group had been responsible for looking after those changes anyway.   
That December the IECAP also struck a sub-committee to look into the idea of creating a 
“non-lapsing fund into which various appropriations could be placed.”789  The Group worried 
that although Colombo Plan funds did not lapse at the end of the year as a result of the special 
arrangement devised in 1952, the other programs’ funds did lapse.  The sub-committee found 
that two improvements should be made to provide a clearer accounting of foreign aid funds: 
there needed to be a better and more comprehensive account of those funds for parliament and 
the public and there needed to be “greater consistency” in the way the funds were voted by 
parliament.  The first problem had come out of some critical reports published in the media about 
aid, which the sub-committee found had been partly caused by the difficulty that reporters had in 
tracking down how much had been spent.  Aid estimates and expenditures were “scattered” and 
there was no single document that published accounts and activities.  However, despite the 
recognition of these problems, the sub-committee recommended against a suggestion to change 
the way aid programs were funded.  It worried that it might “focus undue Parliamentary and 
public attention” on the aid programs, which might provoke the wrong response during a “time 
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of financial stringency”.  Ministers might decide to cut the programs instead of making aid 
expenditure more efficient.
790
  Some changes did manage to take place that spring, however.  
Ault decided to re-organize the ETAB into four divisions: programme and planning, capital 
assistance, technical cooperation, and finance and administration.  The different branches reflect 
an attempt not only to organize the programs more efficiently, but also presumably through the 
programme and planning branch, to better prepare for and coordinate Canadian aid.
791
   
The idea to change the way aid was dispersed did not die with the sub-committee’s 
negative approach, partly because the DF decided it too needed changes in the way aid flowed.  
In September, the UN Division in the DEA informed Economic II that it wanted not only the UN 
programs, but “all proposals for Canadian aid” to be considered at one time, rather than voted on 
throughout the year as had been practice up until then.
792
  This proposal suggested that cabinet 
would consider not only the Colombo Plan and technical assistance program vote, but also all the 
“humanitarian” programs such as the funds for refugees and the UN Children’s Fund all at one 
time.  The ICEAP decided to prepare a report for the relevant ministers that not only 
recommended that all of these votes be presented to cabinet under one heading, but also that an 
annual report should be submitted to parliament on the operations of the aid program and that the 
newer assistance programs be put into a non-lapsing fund.
793
   
It appears that for officials in the DEA, these administrative changes did not solve the 
larger issues that they identified.  Ault’s reorganization of the ETAB did not, for the DEA, 
change the crucial fact that administration and policy were not two separate entities and should 
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not be handled separately.  In May, A.E. Ritchie, J.A. Roberts, the deputy minister for the DTC, 
and Ken Taylor, the deputy minister of finance met.  While Ritchie referred to it as their “little 
meeting,” a significant policy document emerged from it “in accordance with the suggestion 
made” at the meeting, which outlined a “possible proposal for modifying the administration of 
our aid programmes.”794  What it described was the set-up of a new “External Aid Office” 
(EAO).  The rationale for this change was described in this way: 
A basic consideration of any approach to the administration of aid programmes is that 
they are an integral part of a nation’s foreign policy.  These programmes reflect, and, to 
an important degree, are moulded by the nature of the relationship between donor and 
recipient countries.  It is important, therefore, that the conduct of aid programmes should 
be especially closely related to the Department primarily concerned with Canada’s 
external relations.
795
 
 
The placement of the aid program within the DTC had always been artificial in this 
reckoning.  Aid programs were, in Ritchie’s view, an extension of foreign policy and should be 
treated in that way. He recommended the EAO be set up “within the Civil Service but separate 
from any existing department,” responsible to the secretary of state for external affairs, and 
headed by some “capable experienced man” holding a rank similar to a deputy or assistant 
deputy minister.  He also recommended the creation of a new Board, similar to the previous 
Colombo Plan Group/IECAP to provide the bridge between the new EAO and cabinet.  The 
Board, as Ritchie envisioned it, would be “smaller and more effective” than the previous Group, 
comprising at its core the deputy ministers of the relevant departments.  The new office could 
second officers from those departments who had worked on aid programs previously to start up 
the new office.
796
  He also noted that he already discussed the matter with Green and that the 
minister was “agreeable” to an arrangement such as he had described.  He sent the paper to 
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Rasminsky and Plumptre, although nobody else.
797
  Ritchie’s paper became the blueprint for the 
new office. 
It did not take long for planning to get underway and by July, Robertson wrote in a 
memorandum to Green that he had discussions with “senior officials of interested government 
departments” including the Bank of Canada and that “all are agreed that there would be 
advantages to the government in the scheme.”798  They had even decided that the person they 
would ask to lead the organization would be Herbert O. Moran, who had just ended his mission 
as the Canadian high commissioner in Pakistan.
799
 Although the decision had at this point 
already effectively been made, they still had not yet informed O.E. Ault, the administrator of the 
Colombo Plan, about the idea, and so Robertson asked that Green keep the information in 
confidence.
800
  This was a remarkable statement.  It could only mean that no senior official, not 
even in the DTC, had consulted with anyone in the ETAB about the changes. Clearly, they held 
the administration in very little regard, and one can only imagine that Ault must have been 
shocked when he learned the news.
801
  In some ways, even though there had been consultation 
with the DTC and the DF, this resembled a coup by the DEA.  By August, the organization of 
personnel had been hammered out and Moran had accepted the position, albeit at first 
reluctantly.
802
  The Office itself, under his direction, was officially established on 9 November 
1960.   
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The External Aid Board met for the first time on 9 January 1961.  As Ritchie had 
envisioned it, only six members attended that first session, including Moran, Roberts, 
Rasminsky, Plumptre, Ritchie, and a secretary, R.S. MacLean, from the new EAO.
803
  Three of 
the six had been involved in aid policy for years, and in this way the establishment of the EAO 
could hardly be called a changing of the guard; nor could any radical change be expected from 
its formation. Whereas Group meetings regularly had eleven or twelve people in attendance with 
heavy representation from lower level officers in the ETAB and its former incarnation, the 
IETCD, this new Board had only high-level officials in attendance, and they all knew the 
programs and issues very well.  The extent to which the Board was designed to protect what they 
felt they had learned about aid in the years before its establishment was illustrated in the first 
meeting.  The relative newcomer, Roberts, suggested that technical assistance was more 
important than capital projects, since they helped “the economically underdeveloped nations to 
help themselves.”804  In succession, Ritchie, Moran and Plumptre all politely shut down this idea, 
forcing Roberts into a corner, admitting he “did not intend to assume an inflexible position on 
this question.”805  New ideas, at least those that did not easily mesh with the orthodoxy, were not 
welcome. 
Conclusion 
There is no documentary evidence that the wheat issue provoked a feeling among 
officials that aid programs needed to be protected from political incursion.  Certainly, important 
considerations of competence and policy incoherence had been identified as the main, and quite 
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legitimate, reasons for the creation of the EAO and the position of the aid program in the DEA.  
However, one cannot help but mark the timing of this change.  It is also significant that 
Diefenbaker, perhaps a result of the frustration he felt in moving his own aid agenda forward, 
soured somewhat on aid as his term in office progressed.
806
  Plumptre and Ritchie and other 
officials working on the aid program had spent 1957 and 1958 at odds with Churchill and by 
extension, Diefenbaker, about the extent to which the Colombo Plan should be used as a wheat 
surplus disposal program.  They struggled to keep the programs that had been developed in 
collaboration with officials in Colombo Plan countries against the pressure by cabinet to change.  
The use of the Indian financial crisis as an excuse to push wheat on the Indian government had 
been a particularly thorny issue, even though their own ministers had supported them.  Although 
there is no direct documentary evidence to support this contention, it seems likely that this had 
an effect on officials working with aid in the DEA and DF, and was at least one important factor 
in prompting a review of the program and the eventual creation of the EAO. 
Two separate, although related, stories can be told about the impact of the Diefenbaker 
government on the Canadian aid program.  Although the Canadian aid program has traditionally 
been closely associated with the Liberal Party, many salutary changes did occur as the result of 
the Diefenbaker’s election, which were detailed in the previous chapter.  The second story is one 
that occurred in addition to, and perhaps indirectly as a result of, the election of the Progressive 
Conservatives into power.  The pressures that Diefenbaker and Churchill put on the aid program 
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to turn the Colombo Plan into a wheat disposal mechanism may have influenced, or pressured, 
those within the DEA to reconsider its position within the DTC.  Certainly, years of 
mismanagement, and sometimes outright incompetence, did not recommend the continuation of 
the aid administration as it had been managed during the 1950s.  It is a mistake, however, to see 
the EAO as it was in 1960 as a direct predecessor to Canadian International Development 
Agency, established in September 1968.  While the move to the EAO did rationalize, and to 
some degree professionalize, the aid program, it did not necessarily signal an openness to new 
approaches.  If anything, it showed a desire, particularly within the DEA, to keep the aid 
program firmly within its purview. 
While the creation of the EAO is not necessarily one of innovation, a few broader trends 
can be read in these changes.  The Diefenbaker administration, in concert with world events and 
political changes in the United States, had pushed Canada into engaging multilaterally to a 
greater extent than ever before.  Also, the pressure to rationalize the Canadian aid administration, 
alongside political pressures from the Diefenbaker cabinet, prompted an internal soul-searching 
about the uses and potential misuses of aid.  It forced officials to think more carefully about what 
aid did, and what it could and should accomplish.  The transition to the developmental mindset 
advocated by Reid had begun, although nobody yet thought very carefully about those who were 
supposedly helped by the aid program.  The first development decade, the 1960s, was about to 
begin, however, and Canada would once again be pushed to expand its horizons in the field of 
international development. 
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Conclusion: What Was Old is New Again 
On 19 May 1960, Chester Ronning wrote a memorandum to the SSEA, outlining his 
views on the Canada-India relationship as he felt it stood.  After nearly two years in country, 
Ronning apparently felt that it was time to take down the semi-artificial edifice of closeness that 
Reid had constructed during his time there, and to make a realistic appraisal of the diplomatic 
bond.  He did not dispute that relations between the two countries were “cordial,” but given that 
“Canada is about as far away from India as it is possible to be on the earth,” little could be 
expected in the way of a common feeling among the publics of both countries.
807
  Added to that, 
there were three diplomatic tiffs between the two nations, including the refusal by Canada to 
allow the Laos commission to reconvene despite Nehru’s direct approach to Diefenbaker, the 
refusal by Canada to India’s proposal to reduce their commercial wheat quota in order to receive 
more PL 480 wheat,
808
 and the refusal by India to support the Canada-US proposal on the Law of 
the Sea.
809
  These differences did not, for Ronning, represent a “set-back,” but simply showed 
that neither country ever had much influence over the other.  In contradiction to the message 
Reid tried to publicize during his time in New Delhi, Ronning surmised, “it now seems to me 
that relations between the two countries have always been basically thin and superficial.”810  
There was no special relationship, nor had there ever been.
811
  While Canadian-Indian diplomacy 
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had been less robust since Diefenbaker took office, the memo marked an end to Reid’s earlier 
hopes for ever-closer foreign relations between the two countries. 
This memo, along with the establishment of the External Aid Office later that year, marks 
the end of a certain era of the Canada-India aid relationship as well.  It is not that anything in 
particular had dramatically changed with the establishment of the EAO.  As stated in the 
previous chapter, the EAO represented more of a closing in than a turning outward in Canadian 
aid policy.  Canada continued to give substantial aid to India until the creation of CIDA, but 
there were only a few fresh developments in the Canada-India aid relationship throughout the 
1960s.
812
  For example, due to yet another foreign exchange crisis in the mid-1960s, Canada 
decided to forgive its wheat loans with India.
813
  Still, it was exactly this lack of change that did 
mark the end of an era.  While Canada developed new aid partnerships in the Caribbean and 
Africa, and built new multilateral relationships through its membership in the Development 
Assistance Committee, a part of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the Canada-India relationship continued on much as it had before.  Canada helped to 
build another large dam project, the Idukki dam in Kerala state.
814
  It gave more wheat.  It 
continued to be a member of the Aid-India Consortium.  As the decade came to a close, and the 
External Aid Board became the Canadian International Development Assistance agency, the 
government took a large step away from the Colombo Plan as the mainstay of the Canadian 
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foreign aid program, although it had been moving in that direction throughout the decade, and 
would continue this trend throughout the 1970s.  Whereas during the 1950s, India had acted as 
the bellwether of Canadian aid policy, in the 1960s, the aid relationship was on autopilot. 
Then, in 1974, a literal and figurative bomb went off when the Indian government tested 
a nuclear device on 18 May.  The decision to rush into the Canada-India reactor project without a 
firm agreement on fuel safeguards, and the increasing unease that Canadian policymakers felt 
about that situation, had finally materialized into a diplomatic catastrophe.  In 1976, the 
government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau decided to cut off nuclear cooperation with 
India, resulting in a large reduction in Canadian aid to India.
815
  Although the diplomatic 
relationship eventually became cordial again, even becoming a “priority” for the Conservative 
government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper after 2006, in 2003 the Indian government, 
under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), announced it would no longer be 
accepting aid from 22 countries, including Canada.  They called these countries “small donors.” 
The BJP wanted to establish greater financial autonomy and to make a statement about the 
success of India’s rapid economic growth since its decision to undertake major financial reforms 
in 1991.  At that time, Canada was giving India about C$30 million bilaterally, and C$10-12 
million through non-governmental organizations. Ottawa responded by announcing that it would 
withdraw bilateral assistance by 2006.  As of 2010, Canada had just three people working at the 
Canadian high commission in New Delhi for CIDA, with a total in-country staff of 30 persons 
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working with CIDA’s NGO programming in India.816  However, the Canada-India aid 
relationship had effectively come to an end. 
Given the current conditions, it is no wonder that many people, even well-informed 
observers of Canadian aid policy, are surprised when told of the extensive aid relationship that 
once existed between Canada and India.  However, during the 1950s, Canada built its aid 
program with the cooperation of India.  Although there were sizeable projects in Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, the Canada-India aid relationship was unique, at least from the Canadian perspective.  
For India, Canada was not exactly unimportant – after all, it was only through India’s diplomatic 
cajoling that Canada agreed to join the Aid-India Consortium in 1958.  For a country hoping to 
rapidly industrialize, Canada provided useful commodities and expertise, particularly in the field 
of hydro-electric development.  Canadian officials, especially at the high commission in New 
Delhi but also to some extent in Canada, were sensitive to Nehru’s dislike of the Cold War 
bombast that characterized American rhetoric around aid.  While the lingering threat of 
communism provided a justification for aid expenditures for audiences at home in Canada, in 
general, the subject was taboo for Canadian officials and politicians in India, or among 
representatives of the GOI.  While foreign relations between Canada and India may have been, 
as Ronning stated, “thin and superficial,” what closeness and understanding that did exist 
between the two countries to a large extent came from the contact and cooperation that resulted 
from the aid program.  Canadian officials working on aid came to understand the nuances of 
India’s non-aligned status, even if they did not agree with it. 
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This relationship, such as it was, developed quite rapidly.  With the exception of some aid 
that Canada gave to India’s colonial government during the Second World War, little contact 
existed between the two governments prior to 1950.  However, while outside international events 
in the form of the war, the decline of the British Empire, and the new Cold War combined to 
propel the two countries together in 1950, internal events in each country led them to their 
respective places as recipient and donor.  While development scholars usually point to the early 
1950s as the beginning of the modern practice of development, India’s history teaches useful 
lessons about the origins of this modern practice in the North and the Global South.  Fifty years 
of Indian colonial history produced a newly independent country with a government, led by 
Nehru, hungry for a form of economic development that hinged on rapid industrialization.  While 
the INC chastised the British imperial government for stalling India’s domestic industry, starving 
the Indian economy, and neglecting the welfare of the Indian people, their definitions of 
economic success and failure drew on a complex exchange of ideas between nationalists, 
industrialists, the imperial and colonial governments, and new ideas from abroad.  While 
Gandhi’s “self-help” movement inspired a fierce political independence among Indian 
politicians, the planning movement in England, modernization programs in the USSR, colonial 
development policies, and the influence of indigenous businesspeople and industrialists all came 
together in 1947 to inspire an ideal of economic development through industrialization and 
modernization that placed heavy expectations on the national budget.  The weight of these 
expectations, combined with India’s difficult economic position following the war, overcame the 
goal of total independence when ODA became a factor in international relations.   
While India suffered economically following the war, Canada boomed.  With the Great 
Depression still firmly in the rear-view mirror, however, the Canadian government felt it had to 
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do everything possible to continue this prosperity.  As a result, it had a strong interest in 
rebuilding European prosperity to provide a market for post-war Canadian goods.  From both an 
economic and a humanitarian standpoint, then, Canada felt compelled to participate in initiatives 
such as UNRRA and to make reconstruction loans in Europe to help it recover from the 
economic trauma of war.  While Canadian aid following the Second World War initially focused 
on Europe, the ethics, ideas and practices surrounding war and post-war aid fed into the 
Canadian international development program in the 1950s.   
Without the Commonwealth, however, it probably would have been some time before 
Canada and India came together in an aid relationship, and some time before Canada became a 
major bilateral donor to countries in the Global South at all.  It was the Commonwealth foreign 
ministers meeting in Colombo that prompted the new idea of a Commonwealth economic 
development organization, an idea the Canadian DEA had previously firmly rejected, into 
reality.  While the Cold War provided a strong impetus for the creation of the Colombo Plan, 
especially following the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, initially Canada felt 
pressured into joining the aid scheme by the UK, which supported the idea for the Plan as one 
possible way to bring US currency into the sterling area.  For the DEA, the Colombo Plan 
offered an opportunity to help the UK, without becoming even more deeply involved in that 
country’s financial problems.  Although at the time Canadian officials viewed the Colombo Plan 
as a temporary initiative, it actually became Canada’s first point of entry into the practice of 
giving aid to the developing world.   
While the machinery of the Colombo Plan had been set up to accommodate the type of 
war and post-war aid Canada gave to Europe, it did not take long for Canadian officials to learn 
that giving aid to India represented  a new, and problematic, set of challenges.  The program had 
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a rocky start in its first year.  Communication, whether it be within Canada, within India, or 
between the two countries, proved a constant challenge, creating many delays.  Added to this 
already formidable problem were differing priorities for the aid, both between the Canadian and 
Indian governments and between the Indian government and its state governments, internal 
politics in India, and a lack of experience, both in Canada and India, with aid-giving and 
receiving.  Canadian and Indian officials made up procedures as they went, occasionally 
inventing new policies in order to avoid drawing too much attention to the program, as the 
Canadian government did when it gave India’s unspent aid to the Canadian Commercial 
Corporation rather than face a revote in parliament.  However, officials rarely took the time to 
consider the intent of aid, or question its intrinsic value, even if they were dissatisfied with how 
the program functioned. 
  The program improved, albeit unevenly, over the years.  Credit for this advancement 
can be partially attributed to the appointment of Escott Reid as high commissioner late in 1952.  
Influenced by the style and philosophy of American Ambassador Chester Bowles, as well as the 
American aid program and aid agencies in India’s capital city, Reid quickly developed firm 
opinions about India’s geo-strategic importance and the possibilities for Canadian aid in South 
Asia.  He increasingly viewed the Indian aid program from an Indian, rather than a Canadian, 
perspective.  In a striking departure from official thinking in Ottawa, the high commissioner 
thought more and more in terms of a developmental framework that prioritized India’s economic 
“progress,” rather than in terms of what Canadian goods and services could be delivered to the 
country. While Reid improved the aid program by developing relationships with political and 
bureaucratic members in the GOI, and even used direct political pressure to improve 
communication between Ottawa and New Delhi, his ideas began to meet opposition in Ottawa.  
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Canadian priorities surrounding aid from the perspective of the relevant departments were fairly 
straightforward.  Officials demanded efficiency, accountability, and fiscal responsibility from the 
aid program.  Despite high-minded talk about the poor in Asia and their vulnerability to 
communism by Canadian politicians, matters looked far more mundane at the administrative 
level.  Faced with scrutiny by the auditor general and the need to justify the program’s results in 
terms of Canadian commerce, officials in Ottawa looked for modest, achievable results.  Nik 
Cavell believed that Colombo Plan spending should be distinctively Canadian and 
uncompromisingly bilateral, and especially fought any attempt at multilateral engagement on the 
project level recommended by Reid.   
The sort of scheme Cavell greatly approved of, and represented a “typical” although large 
project, was the Mayurakshi dam.  Still bearing the moniker “The Canada Dam,” Mayurakshi 
was a hydro-electric project that used Canadian counterpart funds to pay for local costs generated 
by food aid in the form of wheat, and imported Canadian equipment and expertise in the 
construction of the dam.  Built for its potential to irrigate, control flooding, and generate 
electricity, the dam was an idea left over from British colonial planning, developed by the newly 
independent Indian government, and inspired by dreams of industrial modernization.  It 
displaced thousands of indigenous people, at the time considered a normal, necessary, and even 
beneficial result of the industrialization process.  It followed a normal process of aid funding and 
was a successful project in the eyes of Canadian and Indian politicians, although it at times 
presented enormous challenges for those working on the ground and in the Canadian and Indian 
governments.  While the Canada-India atomic research reactor was inspired by the same dreams 
of industrial, and to some extent, political power, it represented a completely atypical project.  In 
the government’s haste to build export markets for the Canadian uranium industry, it had a high 
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degree of executive oversight, an unusual feature for a Canadian aid project.  However, the 
government also ended up capitulating to Indian demands for political autonomy and overlooked 
concerns about fuel safeguards in order to complete the agreement.  This may have seemed a 
safe bet in the Nehruvian era of anti-nuclear weapons sentiment in India, but later showed the 
dramatic and negative consequences that good intentions can sometimes inflict through ODA. 
Canadian commercial imperatives did not only apply to the field of nuclear energy, a 
factor that became quite clear with the election of Diefenbaker to the prime minister’s office in 
Canada.  He and his cabinet, particularly the minister of the DTC, Gordon Churchill, became 
preoccupied with how the Colombo Plan could be used to dispose of the troublesome and 
expensive issue of surplus prairie wheat. In order to move the program toward this goal, Canada 
negotiated a wheat loan with the Indian government, even though India was not particularly 
interested in Canadian wheat.  Diefenbaker also played a small role in the creation of the World 
Food Programme, which eventually became another venue for Canadian food aid.  His belief in 
the Commonwealth also resulted in some significant changes to the Canadian aid program, since 
his decision to host a Trade and Economic conference in Canada in 1958 prompted the Canadian 
government to action on the aid file.  This resulted in a new scholarship program, a larger 
financial and a multi-year commitment to the Colombo Plan, and the extension of the Plan into 
new areas in Africa and the Caribbean.  Also, under Diefenbaker’s watch, Canada decided to 
participate in the Aid-India Consortium in 1958, a World Bank/US-led initiative that became 
Canada’s first major financial commitment to a multilateral aid program outside of the original 
Bretton Woods organizations.   
However, despite these changes which can be attributed at least in part to Diefenbaker’s 
leadership, his interest in aid remained fairly superficial.  The greatest changes that took place 
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while his government was in office had little to do with the prime minister.  During the latter part 
of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, the relevant departments, under the leadership of the DEA 
and with no involvement from the old Colombo Plan administration, undertook a large-scale 
reorganization of the aid program with very little ministerial involvement.  However, it may be 
argued that given the context of this reorganization, and the battles that took place between 
Churchill and officials in finance and external affairs, the strong push to make the Colombo Plan 
into a wheat disposal program had an effect on thinking in the relevant departments and 
especially in the DEA.  Although the reorganization was largely prompted by a drive to 
professionalize the aid program, the timing of the change and the decision to place the EAO 
firmly within the structure of the DEA suggests a desire to protect the program from political 
incursion.  The program also simply needed to be managed better; as officials finally conceded to 
themselves that while India did not make a perfect partner, it did have many virtues within an 
inherently challenging field, and that Canada had its own issues which contributed to the slow, 
sometimes painful process of giving bilateral assistance.  However, despite this, it is worth 
noting that the EAO situated all aid matters firmly within the DEA and gave a greater degree of 
insulation through the mechanism of the new, much more tightly controlled External Aid Board.  
  
While Canada may have been only of marginal significance in the larger history of 
bilateral aid in India, in the 1950s, Canada did enjoy a place of diplomatic prominence for the 
country’s aid program, even if it could never hope to match the sheer amount of assistance that 
the United States extended in this early era.  However, India’s importance to the early Canadian 
aid program is undeniable.  While the following decade represented a time of change for the aid 
program, especially after the founding of CIDA in 1968, many of the policies, procedures, and 
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mechanisms that Canada built around the aid program in relation to India lingered on through the 
1960s and beyond, whether it be in the focus on food aid, tied aid, or on large modernization 
projects and technical assistance. 
What Has Changed? 
Of course, many of these policies have since been found to be inappropriate With the 
advent of the basic-needs approach to development in the 1970s, and the large surge of Canadian 
NGOs involved in international work throughout the 1970s and 1980s, criticisms piled up on the 
Canadian government’s way of doing things.817  Practitioners of new forms of “alternative” 
development who focused on this needs-based approach noted the shortcomings of the top-down, 
bureaucratic, and large-scale forms of ODA practiced by countries such as Canada.  Large dams, 
the capital assistance projects that the Canadian government felt most proud of in the 1950s, 
have come under particular scrutiny as symbols of all that is wrong with large-scale 
development.  In particular, observers targeted Canada’s tied aid, which remained exceptionally 
high for decades even in comparison to like donors.
818
  Critics pointed to Canada’s interest in 
commercial, diplomatic, or security priorities over “humane internationalist” prerogatives.819  
Has much changed?  In a host of ways, Canadian aid has evolved significantly from the 
very clear-cut approach taken by the government of the 1950s. Today’s programs would be 
unrecognizable to those involved in the program in those early years.  The aid-to-GDP ratio is 
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one area of change.  While it has fluctuated dramatically over the decades, reaching an all-time 
high of 0.5 percent in 1986-1987, but then reduced to 0.25 percent as a result of cutbacks in the 
1990s, it has never again dipped to a low of the initial 0.01 percent average of the 1950s.
820
  The 
advent of the International Development Research Centre in 1970 established what has become a 
leading international organization for the pursuit of research into innovative approaches to 
international development practice, providing research funding to academics, scientists and 
social scientists in the Global South.
821
  One of the biggest changes has been the integration of 
the NGO community into CIDA’s funding package, a community that simply did not exist for 
the best part of the 1950s.  In the 2011-2012 fiscal year, CIDA gave C$672.54 million of their 
total C$5.7 billion budget to core budget support to NGOs, other private bodies, public-private 
partnerships, and research institutes, known as civil society organizations (CSOs).
822
  The actual 
figure is likely much higher, since the data the government provides does not disaggregate what 
bilateral program spending goes to CSOs. While there are many criticisms of international 
development NGOs, on the whole, they have been heavily influenced by alternative development 
approaches in the 1980s, and tend to operate small-scale, community-level projects, very often in 
conjunction with like-minded Southern partner organizations.
823
  The decision by the Harper 
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government in 2007 to completely phase out tied aid as part of their “Aid Effectiveness Agenda” 
represented one of the largest departures from the traditional Canadian aid approach.
824
  The 
influence of the “good governance” approach of the early 2000s, and the OECD’s Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, has also strongly influenced the government.  It adopted the 
Official Development Assistance and Accountability Act on 28 June 2008, bringing many of the 
government’s practices into line with the Paris Declaration.825  Certainly the Act, which ensures 
the timely and accurate reporting of statistics and expenditure related to ODA, represents a 
significant departure from the sloppy accounting of the 1950s, when the Colombo Plan 
administration forgot it had spent C$5 million on wheat for India in 1959.   
The latest report to Parliament from the Harper government on Canada’s ODA in no way 
resembles the occasional and haphazard reporting to Cabinet of the 1950s.  In the 2012-2013 
fiscal year, Canada disbursed ODA through fifteen departments and agencies of government.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dominant approach to development practice, where well-intentioned outsiders with little understanding of the 
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This represents a wide range of activities, including training for policing in fragile states, the 
provision of assistance to support forest conservation measures in the Congo Basin, and writing 
off debts from Export Development Canada.
826
  The range and scope of these activities would 
have been simply unimaginable to the officials toiling away at the fringes of the DEA, DTC and 
DF on aid programs in the 1950s.  Rather than a focus on large capital assistance projects, or 
transfers of huge amounts of commodities, the current aid program has multiple facets and a 
wide array of functions.   
Also, the language related to aid programming has undergone a revolution.  While 
officials in the 1950s thought little about who benefitted from their aid, the Accountability Act 
specifically provides that assistance must “contribute to poverty reduction; take into account the 
perspectives of the poor, and be consistent with international human rights standards.”827  In 
addition to supporting “sustainable economic growth,” the language of the 2012-2013 Report to 
Parliament specifically targets maternal, newborn and child mortality as a result of the 2010 
Muskoka Initiative that prioritizes those issues, and specifically mentions children and youth as 
an area of priority.
828
  Whether or not these measures achieve their goals must be left to other 
analysts, but certainly, the consideration of who is affected by Canada’s aid programs is a major 
part of aid policy today, and simply did not feature in the programs of the 1950s. 
Interestingly, however, there have been some recent changes in policy that are 
reminiscent of this era.  The most important one was the decision by the Harper government in 
the 2013 budget to do away with the Canadian International Development Agency, bringing the 
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foreign affairs, trade, and development portfolios into the new Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Development (DFATD) in an effort to create “policy coherence.”829  The Harper 
government has explicitly sought to align its aid policy with its trade and foreign policy 
objectives, and has particularly looked to the private sector for new approaches to development 
practice.  It makes no apology for this approach, as it “draws from a conservative philosophy that 
sees the private sector as a potential resource for innovation in development.”830  This brasher 
style, one that boldly and explicitly pursues multiple financial and foreign policy objectives 
through its ODA program, is certainly typical of the 1950s.  So too is the aim to integrate trade 
and ODA, as was the case for the Colombo Plan for the first nine years of its existence, and the 
aim to integrate foreign affairs and development, as was the case when External Affairs folded 
the Colombo Plan administration into its agenda in 1960 through the invention of the EAO.  
Many have criticized these changes, although the critique of Canada’s commercial 
objectives with its ODA program has been long-standing and certainly pre-dates the Harper 
government’s recent reforms.831  Adam Chapnick has recently argued that critics of Canadian aid 
exaggerate “expectations of the importance, or potential importance, of official development 
assistance (ODA) to Canadian political decision making.  Too often, lofty, unrealistic aspirations 
impede the development of sound, politically informed strategic thinking that might eventually 
advance the aid agenda in Canada and beyond.”832  Chapnick argues that in order to achieve real 
results to make concrete changes to the aid program, one must take account of the political 
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realities of the position of ODA in the Canadian government in this, and any iteration of the 
Canadian government.  What the early history of Canadian aid programs shows is that the 
supposedly recent “agenda” of the Harper government to integrate Canadian commerce and 
development is in fact quite an old idea.  Their belief that the entrepreneurial spirit of business 
can create new solutions to the problems of poverty is different, and reflects the perception and 
to some extent the reality within conservative circles that a lot of aid has been wasted by 
profligate and uneducated governmental spending.  However, aid has always had domestic 
imperative equal or even greater to internationalist objectives.  In the 1950s, nobody thought this 
was a bad thing, and in some ways, the many years of jargon that various governments devoted 
to obfuscating these intentions has simply been unmasked by the most recent government.   
The Great Aid Debate 
Crucially, there is one principle that has stayed the same over time for the Canadian 
government, and that is the belief in economic growth as the one indisputable key to 
development.  This has not changed, although it is now characterized as “sustainable 
development,” a nod to the ever more dire environmental outlook caused by the last two 
centuries’ rapid industrialization.833  Although it falls outside the purview of this project, the 
question that this dissertation provokes is whether or not today’s society, one far more connected 
and globalized than that of the 1950s, has in any sense found its way outside of this high 
modernist paradigm, and, by extension, the conception of foreign aid and development that it 
advocates.  Is this a post modern era?  Certainly, there is greater recognition of the value of local 
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and indigenous knowledge, the destructive capacity of development, and the ever more serious 
threat that climate change, the result of the use of carbon-based energy sources, poses to the 
entire world.  As the CIDA report outlined above shows, even the most moderate contemporary 
observers of aid have absorbed the lessons of these radical critiques, if not their political 
messages.  However, while a widespread recognition of the problems associated with traditional 
forms of aid have provoked significant reform in the past twenty years, there is little to indicate 
that the mainstream has moved into a post-modern understanding of development. 
Since the launch of the “decade of development” by John F. Kennedy in 1961, there has 
been a cyclical nature to the debate over aid, with high hopes giving way to cynicism when 
ambitious promises come to naught.  Marxist critiques such as Hayter’s in the 1970s, alongside 
the growing influence of neoliberal economics that reacted against the structuralist approaches of 
the 1950s and 1960s, and the debt crisis of the early 1980s, all lent an aura of cynicism to aid and 
forced the major international donors to re-evaluate their approaches.  Then, in 1985, and again 
in a second edition in 1994, Robert Cassen and associates worked on a World Bank study that 
tried to understand what was a simple, if loaded, question: does aid work?  Using indicators such 
as economic growth and poverty reduction as their benchmarks, Cassen’s team found that most 
aid did “work,” although a substantial fraction did not.834  Cassen’s report specifically 
emphasized the failure of donor agencies to learn from each other and their own mistakes, a 
finding that helped to launch a sustained interest in evaluation techniques in the aid industry.  
Cassen’s conclusion was that the aid enterprise was not doomed, but rather, with proper 
techniques, could be substantially improved.  Of course, the goals themselves fell within the 
parameters of a traditional, modernist understanding of development.  Several authors countered 
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this positive outlook with more critical works, with titles like Lethal Aid: The Illusion of 
Socialism and Self-Reliance in Tanzania and The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign 
Aid and International Charity.
835
  Whether or not aid “worked,” this literature showed that it also 
came with risks.  Aid is not innocuous, it is not apolitical, and it always has an impact.  Who 
decides whether or not that impact is positive or negative matters, and is usually determined by 
the extent to which aid benefits their own self-interest, both in donor and recipient countries.   
In 1998, the World-Bank released a new study on the impact of aid.  Known as the 
Dollar-Burnside study after its lead authors, it attempted to assess the impact of aid on economic 
growth.  It found that aid did have an impact on growth in developing countries where there was 
a “good” fiscal, monetary, and trade policy context.  They also found multilateral aid to be more 
effective than bilateral aid.  The Dollar-Burnside study had the benefit of strongly conclusive 
results based on econometric and policy analysis, and it came with an easily understandable 
recommendation.  If donors wanted good results, they needed to focus aid on areas that had a 
good policy environment already in place.
836
  This launched a decade-long focus in development 
circles on “good governance” as the key to unlocking the potential of aid effectiveness in 
development.  Alongside a boost of enthusiasm that came with the launch of the Millennium 
Development Goals in 2000, aid once again gained currency among the public in donor 
countries, especially after the publication of Jeffrey Sach’s popular book, The End of Poverty: 
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How We Can Make it Happen in Our Lifetime.
837
  Sachs advocated a large increase in aid to 
reach the 0.7 percent aid to GDP ratio and set out a number of specific recommendations, 
including investing in transportation networks, markets, health, and education.
838
  What made his 
message so compelling was its promise that as long as right amount of aid, given in the right 
way, to the right countries, the end of poverty, at least for millions of people, was highly 
achievable.  The “Make Poverty History” campaign and the “Live 8” concert in 2005 supported 
this new can-do spirit, as did subsequent other books by other prominent thinkers, notably Joseph 
Stiglitz and Paul Collier.
839
 
What all these works did was to not only gain new public support for aid, they also 
supported the basic concept of development that had been accepted since the 1950s.  While they 
advocated precise, targeted, surgical tools rather than the blunt instruments of the past, the basic 
concept of development did not change: economic growth and a reduction of poverty through a 
rise of gross domestic product, shared as equitably as possible within the limits of an open 
market environment.  The techniques of aid needed dramatic improvement, as did the rules and 
regulations, and laws of financial organizations in donor and recipient countries, exemplified by 
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the Paris Declaration.  The movement called for the strengthening of the aid system as it existed, 
not to replace it with something different. 
Naturally, critics reacted to this new call to action.  However, alongside predictable 
criticisms coming from the left, a new opposition to the entire aid enterprise developed among 
prominent economists.  William Easterly, a former employee of the World Bank who had 
worked with Sachs in eastern Europe, and a contributor to the Assessing Aid report, published 
two books, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the 
Tropics in 2001, and The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest have Done 
So Much Ill and So Little Good in 2006 that amounted to a scathing critique of the aid system.
840
  
Easterly wrote that aid has, overall, been damaging to the developing world by supporting 
corrupt and/or mismanaged government, by forcing free-market reforms that do not work even if 
free markets do, by focusing on big-bureaucracy planning solutions that ignore the voices of the 
poor, by collectivising responsibility for developing goals so that no one is held accountable for 
failure, among others.  Easterly called for an end to the solutions put forward by the likes of 
Sachs, whom he calls “Planners;” these are the advocates who attempt to solve huge problems 
with large-scale solutions that Easterly argues have never been effective.  Instead, Easterly points 
to those he calls the “Searchers,” who work at the grassroots level, including entrepreneurs, 
small NGOs or special personalities in large aid agencies, and other problem solvers.  
“Searchers” have no plan at all.  They utilise the opportunities they discover and respond to 
incentives if they exist.  They find ways to deliver to their “customers,” either in a more 
traditional business setting or for example, through delivering health care at a free medical clinic.  
Easterly believes that these are the people that make free markets work, and promote economic 
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growth and therefore development.  His edited collection, Reinventing Foreign Aid, is a 
collection of essays that includes recommendations to reward the “Searchers” and dismantle the 
planning-style foreign aid system that has existed for fifty years.
841
 
Another author that received a lot of media attention for her anti-aid stance, perhaps in 
part due to her status as an economist, an African, and a woman, is Dambisa Moyo.  Moyo’s 
introduction to her New York Times bestselling book Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and 
Why There is a Better Way for Africa states that “[t]he notion that aid can alleviate systematic 
poverty, and has done so, is a myth.  Millions in Africa are poorer today because of aid; misery 
and poverty have not ended but have increased.  Aid has been, and continues to be, an 
unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the developing 
world.”842  Moyo argues, in the context of Africa, that aid fosters corruption which in turn limits 
opportunities for investment, constraining internal possibilities for growth, and thus creating 
poverty and attracting more aid in a vicious cycle.
843
  For Moyo, the best development is 
provided through business-minded investment, such as that provided by China’s recent interest 
in the continent.  By building infrastructure beneficial to Chinese investment interests, She 
argues that China has created a win-win situation by providing jobs and infrastructure for 
Africans while receiving an economic benefit for themselves.  Moyo makes a slew of 
recommendations including an increase in micro-lending initiatives and the establishment of 
local bond markets in African countries.  She makes the radical suggestion that aid be completely 
withdrawn within five years in order to encourage alternative solutions for development.
844
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What both the advocates and the critics of aid in this debate have in common is their 
adherence to the traditional understandings of development brought about by economic growth.  
Observers of Sach’s work could not fail to notice that his recommendations are firmly rooted in 
theories of development economists of the 1950s from whom Mahalanobis drew inspiration, 
such as P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan’s idea of “big push” to break free from a “poverty trap,” a trap 
first postulated by Ragnar Nurske in 1953.
845
  Easterly and Moyo have novel recommendations 
in their advocacy against aid, but the central objectives of development through growth remain 
largely the same. 
Those who advocate a more radical break from traditional understandings of 
development can be found in what is known as post-development theory.  Influenced by notions 
of power articulated by post-modern theorists, primarily Michel Foucault, post-development 
theorists see the practice of development as an extension of western hegemonic power over the 
societies in the development world.  They do not necessarily, as Easterly and Moyo or other 
critics of aid do, examine the arbiters of that power, be it the U.S. government or multilateral 
donor agencies.  Rather, they examine the often hidden “multiple networks” of power, found 
particularly in the use of discourse, in development practice.  They see development and the 
problems they identify as socially constructed entities, not a “natural” response to self-evident 
problems.  Beginning in the 1990s, they called for, in Hettne’s words, “a disaggegation or 
‘deconstruction’ in development studies,” one that rejects that sacred cow of economic growth 
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and even reconceptualises the idea of poverty itself.
846
  Aid is naturally implicated in this 
deconstruction, as it is a tool of modernist development practice. 
Post-development theorists have played a crucial role in drawing the attention of 
development studies to the hidden assumptions and constructed and imagined nature of 
development.  Scholars like James Ferguson have shown that the smallest and most seemingly 
innocent of actions, such as the building of a road, can have negative social and cultural 
consequences while either not making an impact on poverty, or even at times exacerbating 
already existing problems such as gender inequality.
847
  While Marxist theorists of the past 
critiqued mainstream development thought for a number of reasons, they did not refute the 
necessity of development itself.  Post-development theorists have asked for an entirely new 
imagining of what development could mean.  As a result, it is irreconcilable to the development 
and aid infrastructure as it currently exists, either within national governments or through 
bilateral and multilateral development agencies.   
In this way, post-development theory has been very useful as a critique but less so as a 
medium for changing the infrastructure of development as it currently exists.  Easterly’s work on 
“searchers,” the decades-long movement within many NGOs toward community-led approaches, 
charities like Give Directly or Kiva that try to transfer wealth directly from the global rich to the 
global poor, and even the shift in weight from donor to recipient that the Paris Declaration has 
attempted to bring about, all represent a search for new types of development aid that break from 
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traditional forms.  However, from the post-development perspective, they all still represent, to 
varying degrees, an expression of modernist thinking: that if the “right” solutions are presented 
in the “right” way, poverty can be eradicated through economic growth.  The current systems in 
place are so entrenched, and still so much guided by a modernist framework based on ideals of 
progress and wealth, that alternative systems continue to be perceived as “on the fringe.”848  For 
the time being, the alternative that post-development theorists have called for remains largely 
elusive in the everyday practices of development. 
The author has taken this detour through a review of the literature on aid in order to 
contextualize the present work.  The epistemological system that has created definitions of 
poverty, wealth, and growth dates back centuries.  However, current debates on aid, whether they 
are about what forms aid should take, or whether the entire aid system should be eliminated 
altogether, are about forms of aid-funded development created in the 1950s, by donors such as 
Canada, and by recipients such as India.  While donor techniques have become much more 
refined, and aid’s many critics have contributed to an understanding of development that far 
surpasses anything that either the Canadian or Indian government envisioned in the 1950s, the 
assumption behind aid – that the problems of poverty can be partly resolved through a transfer of 
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wealth from donor to recipient countries – was and still is what motivates the industry.  The 
search for ever-better techniques and processes is a reflection of a modernist paradigm that 
continues in documents like the Paris Declaration or Canada’s Aid Accountability Act.  In 
Ottawa in the 1950s, officials consistently tried to make the practice of aid better by focusing on 
the process and mechanics of giving, rather than on its fundamental objectives.  As it stood, these 
objectives were vaguely defined, and included a mix of humanitarian, political, and commercial 
motives.  However, the need to articulate that purpose was felt to be unnecessary due to the 
context of high modernism that so influenced the thinking of officials in both countries at that 
time.  In many ways, initiatives like the Paris Declaration echo this focus on process rather than 
results.  Perhaps the lesson of histories such as these is a greater call for self-examination and 
self-knowledge about the underlying principles behind aid-giving, and a much greater focus on 
the actual effects of aid on the ground.  It seems unlikely that understanding the historical origins 
of aid-funded development will help to resolve the impasse between developmentalist and post-
developmentalist thought; however, it can be used to question why modern forms of aid seem to 
reproduce the supposedly outdated practices of the past. 
A Conclusion 
As authors such as Scott, Berman, and Cowen and Shenton have shown, the 
philosophical underpinnings behind high modernist thought goes back centuries.  However, the 
realization of those principles for the purpose of development in the Global South was a project 
of the post-war era, and was manifested in the development programs of countries like India, and 
the aid programs of countries like Canada, and still is.  To make sense of the decisions made by 
Canadian and Indian aid officials in the 1950s, it is important to understand the unspoken but 
highly powerful assumptions that accompanied their understanding of development and progress.  
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These assumptions were so influential in the Canadian government that little thought was given 
to the purposes of aid itself, who it was meant for, or the mechanisms through which aid was 
expected to translate into poverty reduction.  While this objective had the lip service of 
politicians, it rarely featured in considerations of the administration of the aid program. Canadian 
officials did not collect data or implement anything beyond an anecdotal evaluation system to 
determine whether or not aid had succeeded or failed in its objectives.      
Of course, these very objectives were rather obscure, and tended to hinge on technical 
criteria, such as whether or not a dam had been completed, a budget had been met, or a timeline 
had been followed.  The larger geo-political definition of success for the Canadian government, 
measured by how much influence communism had within the country, featured surprisingly 
rarely in the documentation around the aid program, given how much this has been emphasized 
in the historiography.  This is likely because most involved in the day-to-day administration of 
the program realized that the aid Canada gave to India was so low it could have little impact on 
political sentiment in the country.  Moreover, at the diplomatic level, Canada was sensitive to 
India’s concern that the Colombo Plan should not be a political tool, although both parties 
realized that this was a key underlying motivation behind the program.  Nonetheless, in an effort 
to be a good partner, Canada did not make too much of the issue in its dealings with India.  
The program did not consider who their programs targeted, or think about how aid could 
affect different groups, such as women or minorities, unequally.  This lack of concern with the 
target populations was a reflection of the patriarchal and racist social conditions in Canada itself.  
The relocation of indigenous Santhal peoples that took place as a result of Mayurakshi also 
reflected contemporary social policy in Canada.  Although many of the results of Canadian aid 
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funding have been buried by time, it is unsettling to think about what other possible negative 
consequences may have resulted from Canadian aid dollars and commodities. 
This lack of concern for target populations was a result of a fundamental detachment 
inherent in the way the Colombo Plan operated in India.  For the most part, Canada funded 
projects that had already been predetermined, or were in fact already underway, by the Indian 
government.  The Nehru government set out on a path of development that it determined on its 
own.  Canadian officials were, for the most part, happy to oblige the Indian government by 
helping to fund projects within the scope of India’s Five-Year Plans, as long as they could meet 
enough of their own obligations to satisfy the needs of Canadian commerce while they did so.  
Since most of the projects were directly administered by the Indian government, many of the 
concerns outlined above were felt by both parties to be the responsibility of the GOI.  The only 
exception to this was the Canada-India reactor, a hurried decision prompted by Canadian 
commercial concerns which had unintentional negative consequences.   
However, this aspect of the aid relationship gave it a surprisingly reciprocal character.  
While many theorists have criticized the “imperialistic” nature of aid, this certainly does not 
describe the Canada-India relationship in the 1950s.  Canada, as a donor, had the upper hand in 
negotiations.  Yet the Indian government was in no way afraid to advocate for its own needs, and 
used everything from obfuscation to outright negotiation to get its own way.  There were no 
illusions about the commercial desires behind Canada’s aid program on either side.  After all, the 
aid program emerged in the post-war context, and was highly influenced by the operation of 
Canadian programs for European recovery and reconstruction.  These programs had been all 
about “enlightened self-interest” and encouraging the growth of markets to fulfill Canada’s 
export needs, so it is not surprising that these commercial concerns transferred over to the 
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Colombo Plan. As a result, the GOI was usually forthright about what it wanted from the 
Canadian government.  Since Canada knew it could only fulfill its objectives with the Indian 
government’s participation, it usually did its best to meet those needs.  In fact, this approach 
eventually earned respect from experienced officials in the Canadian government. 
This is not to say that the seeds of a different mindset, one oriented less toward Canadian 
commercial interests and more to the economic development needs of the country, was nowhere 
to be found in the 1950s.  Escott Reid exemplified a nascent version of the developmental 
thinking that would seize governments and academies in the western world, during the 1960s 
through his advocacy for the Canadian aid program during his tenure as high commissioner.  He 
consistently thought about aid in terms of a larger international approach, one that considered the 
needs of the Indian government before those of the Canadian.  This is what primarily motivated 
his long-standing request for Canada to give a large line of credit to India in addition to, or even 
instead of, the grant program it had in operation.   
Ironically, however, it is possible that the rise of this developmental mindset in the 1960s 
may have actually been more representative of western hegemony than had been the case 
previously.  In the 1950s, Canada took Indian priorities as the starting point, then simply funded 
them when and where it made sense for Canada to do so.  While Canadian commercial desires 
were certainly front and centre, the ideas for India’s development came from the GOI.  In 
contrast, in the 1960s, the emergence of a whole new cadre of western “development experts” 
came to prominence, as did a whole new series of Washington and European-based development 
organizations.  They dedicated themselves to finding the problems and solutions to “Third 
World” poverty and creating economic growth.  The situation became even more problematic 
when, following the oil shocks in the early 1970s, many countries in the Global South became 
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heavily indebted.  The debt crises of the early 1980s saw governments teeter on the brink of 
collapse.  As a result, many governments just about handed over their economic governance to 
the IMF and the World Bank.  These IFIs forced sometimes brutal structural adjustment policies 
which caused a great deal of suffering and deeply undermined their sovereignty.
849
  While the 
small grant programs of the Canadian government in the 1950s may not have had much of an 
impact, for the most part the projects that Canada funded were led by the recipient, not the donor. 
The external realities of the Canadian aid program to India during the 1950s comprise a 
history of a new aspect of post-war policy in an emerging Cold War context.  However, this is 
really a story about the internal life of a certain ideology that motivated the aid program, the 
same one that continues to motivate the development aid today.  While the dams and wheat of 
high modernism may be a thing of the past for the Canadian aid program, the Canadian 
government, and billions of people, implicated either directly or indirectly in aid programming in 
North and the South, continue to pursue the dream that the right solutions to the suffering of the 
world’s poorest are within our grasp.  It is a dream inspired by the mindset of modernity.  As the 
expiry of the Millennium Development Goals draws closer, it is important to reflect on the 
failures and achievements that the pursuit of modernization has given the world, and the 
important types of knowledge, such as indigenous knowledge, that it leaves out.  Perhaps in time 
a new epistemological framework, one that includes different ways of knowing, may better serve 
us in a time of rapid environmental change brought on by economic growth.  However, for the 
time being the struggle against poverty continues to operate within the mind of modernity, and 
will for the foreseeable future. 
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Appendix A: Projects and Programs of Canadian Bilateral Assistance to India 1950-1960 
 
    Project  Amount Allocated   Expenditure incurred  
A. Transport & Communications     
   Bombay State Transport  $4,352,774.79   $4,352,774.79  
   Locomotive Boilers  $1,808,292.89   $1,808,292.89  
   Locomotive Engines & Tenders  $21,469,337.37   $21,469,337.37  
   Creosoted Railway Ties  $5,500,000.00   $5,493,592.53  
   Diesel Shunter Locomotives  $2,000,000.00   $1,326,679.70  
   Radio Teletype Equipment  $250,000.00   -  
   Total  $35,380,405.05   $34,450,677.28  
B. Power Projects     
   Mayurakshi Reservoir Project  $1,299,763.37   $1,299,763.37  
   Umtru Power Project  $1,200,000.00   $1,159,318.42  
   Kundah Hydro-Electric Power:     
   State I & II  $23,500,000.00   $20,172,502.82  
   Stage III  $3,500,000.00   -  
   Power Projects  $750,000.00    
   
Preliminary Report on the 
proposed Chambal Valley 
Development, Ranapratap 
Sagar Project; Bhimkund 
Project; and the Sileru 
Scheme   
 $43,642.72  
   Ranapratap Sagar Project    $15,075.00  
   Total  $30,249,763.37   $22,690,302.33  
C. Agriculture & Natural Resources     
   Fertilizers  $5,050,000.00   $5,047,507.26  
   Locust Control and Plant Protection     
   
Mobile Radio Telephone & 
spares  $21,893.12   $21,893.12  
   3-ton 4 x 4 Stake Truck  $113,792.07   $113,792.07  
   
Standard DHC-2 Beaver 
Landplanes  $146,355.49   $146,355.49  
   
Aero-Magnetic Survey of Western 
Rajasthan and Gangetic Basin  $207,224.01   $207,224.01  
   Biological Control Station, Bangalore  $46,023.00   $46,023.00  
   Calcutta Milk Scheme  $130,000.00   $82,926.32  
   Total  $5,715,287.69   $5,665,721.27  
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D. Industry     
   Non-ferrous Metals  $49,765,000.00   $43,255,201.29  
   Asbestos  $120,000.00   $118,582.20  
   Newsprint  $1,875,000.00   -  
   Total  $51,760,000.00   $43,373,783.49  
E.  Health     
   Cobalt Beam Therapy Units  $376,626.30   $292,724.38  
   Medical Books  $140,000.00   $115,849.56  
   Total  $516,626.30   $408,573.94  
F. Reactor at Trombay     
   Canada-India Reactor  $9,300,000.00   $9,233,131.14  
   Fuel Rods  $325,000.00   -  
   Total  $9,625,000.00   $9,233,131.14  
G. Wheat     
   Loan  $33,000,000.00   $32,999,999.92  
   Grant  $54,000,000.00   $53,999,999.38  
   Total  $87,000,000.00   $86,999,999.30  
H. Rural Electrification     
   Diesel Generating Sets  $3,017,587.53   $3,006,175.71  
   Total  $3,017,587.53   $3,006,175.71  
I. Miscellaneous     
   
Co-operative movement training 
Centres  $37,600.00   $37,244.97  
   Co-operative Film Training Scheme  $50,000.00   $49,214.03  
   Film and Film Strips  $275.00   $275.00  
   Total  $87,875.00   $86,734.00  
       
    Grand Total (1951-52 to 1960-1961)  $223,352,544.94   $205,915,098.46  
 
Source: Central Secretariat Library, Ministry of Finance, External Assistance, 1961 (New Delhi: 
Government of India, 1961), 34-37. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
